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PREFACE 
The purpose of this book of readings is to serve as a major guide and resource 
for all who study and implement moral education and values clarification. It is more 
than a usual facts and principles text with the expression of a single author's beliefs 
or point of view. It is a collection of opinions and theories that reflect various 
trends of thought concerning moral education and values clarificatio.n. The authors have 
attempted to provide points of view. The readers are free to judge and draw their own 
conclusions on moral education utilizing the readings as a guide. 
Many values clarification lessons are being published. These may take the form 
of strategy books to elaborate kits. As materials prolificate, more and more teachers 
will gain access. In one sense this overabundance of materials can serve a useful pur­
pose. However, the editors are concerned that well-meaning teachers and administrators 
may do as much harm as good unless there is first some degree of comprehension of an 
approach to values analysis and moral education. 
It is the writers' contentions that moral education and values clarification is 
not just another bandwagon. As educators we have a responsibility to keep abreast of 
current curriculum trends; today, we must know something about behavioral objectives, 
gaming and simulation, interaction analysis, role playing, inquiry, concepts, generaliza­
tions, and reflection. We should also know something of the theoretical constructs of 
values clarification and moral education. 
We would maintain that moral education and values clarification are going to be­
come much more important in all areas of the curriculum. As such these concepts have 
existed for several years. Perhaps John Dewey's writings in the 1890's did much to 
awaken the present generation to the need. During the past several years such writers as 
Hunt and Metcalf, Jewett, Simon, Kohlberg and Piaget, have contributed much to curriculum 
development. It is our contention that moral education and values analysis ought to be 
of central concern to the curriculum. Values education is the most important kind of 
education. 
Nationwide we are witness to a growing trend of training educators in the skills 
of moral education. Many education method courses are beginning to deal with this com­
plex issue. Many special workshops are being offered. Thus a need exists to provide a 
background for this new curriculum area. This book is one such attempt at filling this 
vacuum. 
Ronald G. Helms 
Gerald Strong 
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DO WE NEED M'.)RAL EDUCATION? 
by 
Ronald G. Helms 
(Reprinted by permission from the Ohio Council for the Social Studies Review, Spring, 
1974.) 
Today we often hear that people are behaving as they do because of a breakdown 
in moral values. Some people assume that a lack of religious upbringing is central to 
the plight of our misguided society. Others reason that our value crisis stems from 
future shock, erosion of family life, cosmopolitan effects of mass media, revolution in 
science and technology, and the complexity of ecological problems. 
While we are not certain about all the causes of increasing violence, drug use, 
and sexual promiscuity in contemporary American society, we are advised by leaders in the 
field of moral education that many people are beset with moral confusion. We are advised 
that many people, young and old, are unaware of their moral responsibilities to them­
selves and to other people. 
But how did we reach this state of moral confusion? Let us review some histor­
ical origins of traditional value systems and see how the systems have broken down. 
Throughout most of history the direction of cultural development was often de­
termined by military power, by a church-state authoritarianism, or by some other type of 
entrenched body which defined institutions and interpreted the value system. The indi­
vidualization, industrialization, and increasing population of the twentieth century have 
tended to diversify culture as well as value systems. 
In the past Americans were largely concerned with the inculcation of the puritan 
ethic. In the past we accepted the dual tenets that "fear is the mother of morality" and 
that "morali1:y is the rationalization of self-interest". In contrast, today we are at­
tempting to e,liminate fear from the life of the child; today we often insist that moral­
ity should not be limited to self-interest. 
In a time in which morals were viewed as God-given, immutable, and absolute, the 
morality of children and adults could be assumed to be synonymous. In the past we were 
in relative agreement as to the content of these absolute morals, and the institutions 
of home, church, and school were much in agreement in the task of transmitting the cul­
ture values to the youth. Today we find that, although these institutions are still very 
much concerned with teaching morality, the teachings have become more pluralistic. Each 
institution inculcates in children values which may be widely divergent from the values 
instilled by other institutions. This diversity in values training has resulted in a 
peoples harried by confusion and anomie. 
Thus, we have eliminated the absolute aspect of morality, the three institutions 
are no longer in complete concurrence, and we have eliminated fear as the basis of mor­
ality. Yet, our society need not remain in this state of uncertainty. 
Although this moral dilemma readily evidences negative implications for society, 
there exist positive implications as well. For example, people may be forced to reflect 
upon moral issues and thus discover and admit limitations in their own moral reasoning. 
After a number of peoples begin to realize that their framework of values is indeed un­
steady, it is hoped that a portion of these will determine that the value system should 
be bolstered. 
Since we often look to youth for flexibility and to educators for guidance, per­
haps a logical approach to a stable, rational system of morals is the development of moral 
education within the existing school curriculum. Educators must face this situation and 
accept their responsibility for providing a method of early moral development. 
We should at the outset distinguish between moral education and moralistic edu­
cation. M:>ralistic education refers to past and ongoing practices of instilling, incul­
cating, and indoctrinating a common set of values within children. M:Jral education as 
we will use the term refers to a process of state -to -stage development-a continual pro­
cess which is learned rather than reached automatically. Moralistic education is based 
upon absolute answers and thus may involve passive acceptance; whereas the process of 
moral education can be stimulated and enriched by presenting children with moral dilem­
mas. Theoretically, through the latter process, the child can be assisted toward more 
mature moral reasoning and a better resolution of moral problems. 
In times past the traditional school curriculum utilized fables and similar mor­
alistic "lessons" to inculcate "right" conduct. The child was trained to recite righ­
teous precepts in the belief that recitation would lead to practice. The school, church, 
and family utilized sermonizing as a method of instilling morality. Although this mor­
alization did seem to work, we might ask, was the instilling practice itself moral? 
l\bralization might seem to guarantee a standard of behavior, but is standardization moral? 
As some people recognize that moralistic education may indeed have a constraining 
effect upon the spirit of the individual, they propose that the school system abandon all 
training dealing with morals. J-k>wever, we must recognize that so long as educators main­
tain that their role is one of guidance and leadership, valueless teaching will not be 
possible and therefore a morality-free school cannot exist. 
If we conclude that values will permeate the curriculum, then surely values edu­
cation should be based upon the twin concepts of individual moral autonomy and justice. 
The overriding goal of moral education is that each person will be able to inde­
pendently define his own value structure. Moral educators would agree that this is the 
most important function of the curriculum. The new morality would emphasize the estab­
lishment of a system of justice which would promote the well-being of the person as an 
individual. 
This :;;tress on independence and autonomy should not be a focal point of confu­
sion. We are not advocating the removal of fear in order to substitute the pleasure 
principle. While we would not advance a codification of values, we would agree that a 
new "planless code" or a libertine situation would not be any more beneficial. 
It is not standardization which we seek, but justice. People must be able to, 
in their own r rame of reference, differentiate between their values. Teachers must be 
prepared to recognize that children come to school with different focal points in regard 
to moral development. And so, in twelve years of schooling - even in a traditional cur­
riculum - they will not graduate at the same level. Of course, teachers will also be 
at varying levels of moral development. 
Justice, the second of our twin concepts in values education, has in the past 
been derived from arbitrary authority. 
Individuals have either been unwilling to define justice for themselves or else 
they have not been equipped to do so. For definition we have in the past turned to au­
thority, to models , to special revelation, to faith, or to parental dictate rather than 
to rely upon our own moral reasoning. Teachers today must function to give students al­
ternatives to the above ready references. Before educators can presume to institute a 
curriculum centering upon the concept of justice, we must recognize that justice cannot 
be taught in an unjust school. As educators we need to recognize the injustices of our 
system. The school is most certainly a legal institution; however, a legal system is 
not always a moral system. Our only claim to moral superiority is through our commit­
ment to justice. 
For the complicated task of assisting students in moral development, there must 
be some framework of approach. A school cannot hope to teach about values or morals sim­
ply by offering one elective in the senior year; the curriculum K-12 must reflect a com­
mitment to moral development. Moral education must be integrated with reflection, in­
quiry, and citizenship skills. Teachers must develop additional cognitive skills. Ad­
ministrators will need to value the systematic research efforts of scholars in the field. 
Finally, schools as social institutions must serve as microcosmic models of a just so­
ciety. 
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THE AIMS OF IDRAL EDUCATION 
by 
Edward L. Ericson 
(Reprinted by permission from The Humanist, November-December, 1972, pp. 6-7.) 
Character development--to paraphrase George Bernard Shaw--is too precious to be 
wasted on children. At least it is arguable that while moral growth is vital to the 
developing child, moral education must be viewed as a life-long engagement. 
Far from minimizing the importance of childhood education, this perspective re­
quires us to heed the lament of young people that we have robbed them of a future. To 
the extent that their complaint is justified, it is so because we have sentimentalized 
about childhood and youth without regard to the quality of the adult life which is its 
culmination. 
Until our culture can again provide a reasonable basis for a sense of expectancy 
-for the fulfillment of long-term personal goals in a meaningful social process-those 
entering adulthood will be trapped in a cul-de-sac that mocks the promise of youth. Thus 
moral education has as its task the continuing self-realization of human beings from in­
fancy to matu :ci ty. The inability to instill such a morale for meaningful living is the 
mark of a dehumanized social structure that dangerously ignores the requisites for its 
own survival. 
Tested against this requirement, contemporary society proves to be an astonish­
ing contradiction. The spirit of the age has released what is often called a revolution 
of rising expectations. Progress and the pursuit of happiness are our daily watchwords. 
Yet everywhere hope for the future is buried under a landslide of cynicism and despair, 
with increasing numbers of people seeming to design their lives-if they bother to shape 
them at all-on the assumption that lasting values are out of reach and the great common 
purposes of community and culture must fail. A social attitude that creates such oppo­
site response:; is necessarily at war with itself, and likewise, the average person who 
assimilates this social contradiction is condemned to a continuing conflict within his 
own soul. 
Every culture or belief system must provide the moral resources men and women 
need to face the manifold pressures and traumas that otherwise overwhelm and fragment 
human life. The clue to the nature of this inner fortification is contained in the word 
"morale" itself-one of the "good" words of our language, suggesting confidence and sense 
of direction. High morale turns danger into challenge, doubt into determination. We 
often seem to regard good morale as a state of grace, a spontaneous "happening" received 
from the gods , which we accept gladly without analyzing or understanding. But goodmorale 
does not just happen. It is spontaneous in the sense that its attainment is largely un­
conscious, in that it cannot be forced or contrived, yet intelligent behavior can do much 
to bring abou 1; the conditions for its attainment. 
We should note that while the word "morale" is used approvingly, we respond in 
quite the opposite manner to the implications of the concept when these are made explicit. 
"M:>rale" is only a variant of "moral," but what different connotations the two words 
have I Morali ·cy is commonly avoided as a distasteful subject-necessary, perhaps, but to 
be mentioned ,,s little as possible. In the current idiom, it "turns people off." Moral 
backlash, following centuries of puritanical repression and authoritarian religion­
usually associated with sexual guilt-has produced a mood in which morality is scorned; 
and faith of ,my kind, including faith in the meaning and value of life itself, is sus­
pect. Is it any wonder, therefore, that our culture is undergoing a crisis of confidence 
and purpose that few escape? Our morale collapses because we do not know our aims. 
The morale of a people or civilization is nothing other than the force and clarity 
of their moral will. Why, then, have we allowed a gap to open between the high morale 
that we require to survive and the moral awareness that necessarily provides its sub­
stance? Why, if not because of the unfortunate identification of morality with repres­
sion and irrational guilt-the severance of human passion from meaningful insights and 
socially significant goals? A different ethic, a morale of human realization, is thus 
blocked by a repressive moralism that millions still struggle to overcome. Even the ex­
aggerated rebellion against moral standards that dominates the current scene is an ex­
pression of puritanic obsessions. The turning point in our social development will come 
w~en a significant number of people recognize that a humanistic society cannot represent 
simply a negative escape from dishonored and discredited moralities. We require a new 
ethic of personal and social transformation, a deliverance from 40 years of wanderings 
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in the desert of social amnesia. 
It is a commonplace that of all the animal species only man is a problem to him­
self. He is a problem because he must use his intelligence and sensitivity to choose 
among the seemingly countless possibilities that are open to him. Even his choices are 
not limited to a finite number of simple, clearly marked options, but are of a higher 
and more difficult order. 
On the one hand we seem to be free to choose from life as we wish, yet we dis­
cover that every choice commits us to a social and historical judgment. We are free to 
make choices, but bound by the consequences of our choices-and we are not free to ignore 
the ways in which our choices bear upon the lives of others. Thus, the very exercise of 
freedom generates responsibility. Freedom and obligation are the yin and yang of our 
existences, each leading to the other and finding completion in the other. 
The moral life is therefore not a repression or denial of our freedom as human 
beings; it is rather a confirmation, a validation, of a dimension that is distinctively, 
invaluably human. It is an enabling trait that equips us to become human. The crisis of 
morale will be within reach of solution only when an appreciable number of men and wanen 
take primary responsibility for the sanity and direction of their lives in the midst of 
the lives of others. For without the human context, the plan-the morale of the indivi­
dual life-has no place to go, no significant aim to achieve; and the crystalized sense 
of meaning is dissolved again into a murk of uselessness and drift. This is the condi­
tion of many people today, a mood so prevalent that it has become the defining charac­
teristic of the times. 
The moral decision is always the determination to be personally responsible, to 
find self-realization in the creative act of moral engagement. But the fulfillment of 
that decision obligates one to create community and trust, to weave into the meaning of 
life the web of other lives and experiences. 
Modern man, this solitary creature who is a problem to himself, lives under an 
emotional and spiritual imperative which can be reduced to the obligation to become wise, 
to grow through self-awareness and social intelligence to wisdom. Yet, despite all the 
achievements and special skills of our technological age, we have probably neglectedmore 
than most other ages the meaning and disciplines of wisdom. Psychoanalysis and other 
psychotherapies have dealt with the wisdom of life from their own particular concerns and 
vantage points, too often ignoring the larger issues of a humanistic culture. But des­
pite lip service to the humanities, very little exists in the way of a genuinely human­
istic education. What is required is a new conception of moral preparation for life -a 
"morale-making" mastery of living. This is wisdan and that is what a humanistic morality 
must provide. 
To the argument that wisdom and moral maturity cannot be taught, I would answer 
that their development cannot be left to chance. No form of behavior can be taught until 
there is readiness and responsiveness in the learner. In one sense, not even language 
can be taught. Noam Chomsky and other linguists have recently demonstrated that there is 
a universal logic imbedded in the human use of language - a logic that seems to be in­
herent in the structure of human intelligence regardless of the particular language under 
consideration. The young child does not simply imitate the speech he learns from adults. 
All children everywhere impose their own logical forms in the process of mastering speech. 
But the child who never hears speech will not develop a language by himself. He must be 
saturated with speech before his inherent capacity for speech can be actualized. 
And so it is with the process of moral development. Research in this field, espe­
cially the work of Piaget and Kohlberg, reveals a similar underlying logic, the same un­
folding of a human potentiality, with constants and commonalities observable across cul­
tural boundaries, thereby setting limits to that cultural relativism so grossly over­
stated by an ,~arlier generation of sociologists and anthropologists. 
In learning a language, or in acquiring the social intelligence and insight we 
identify as moral, the initiative must be original; the "decision" must have its genesis 
in the act of the first person singular. But in both achievements, speaking a tongue or 
behaving humanely and wisely, the individual must be immersed in the preparatory influ­
ences of human beings who know and share his awakening vision - whose insight springs 
from a common passion, a common ambition for the happiness and security of our species on 
this planet. 
Contemporary education and the behavioral sciences provide no systematic practice 
for the application of ethical knowledge to the design of personal lives, or to the de­
sign of personal lives, or to the design of communities of people, as we shape our per­
sonal or vocational goals. 
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In contrast, there are many forms of psychotherapy for the psychiatrically dis­
turbed. What skilled counsel is there for the increasing millions whose problem is not 
psychiatric, but rather a problem of finding meaning in an age that has made the loss of 
purpose a veritable life-style? A theoretical ethics is not enough. Given our present 
moral knowledge and human needs, a new discipline of Life Values Education, and partic­
ularly of Life Values guidance and counseling, is both a possibility and a necessity. 
It is this human and social need which I believe humanistic ethicists must be prepared to 
serve. Life Values Education would enable people to examine more critically and expertly 
the logic of their aimless or drifting lives. They would be enabled to see more clearly 
what must be abandoned in their life plans, if they are to realize their deeper values 
and more humanizing goals. 
The same examination must extend to our social morality and to the questionable 
assumptions upon which our industrial and commercial systems operate - assumptions that 
have been newly exposed by the rebellion of youth and the necessity of living within the 
limits of our human and natural environments. 
We need, therefore, to develop a disciplined "value analysis" - or (to coin a 
term using the Greek prefix for value) an "axio-analysis" - of the ways we live and the 
values, including the low and false values which our existing social, psychological and 
economic patterns tend to impose. I do not believe, as many do, that our economic and 
social systems are impervious to change. Certainly we have no right to abandon the task 
of modifying the system to serve human need, when we have hardly begun to develop the 
sciences that could apply that we have already learned about how human beings acquire 
values and structure their personal and social goals. These are the practical arts that 
can help the recovery of morale and social vision. 
Certainly a meaningful life-style is not reached by immersing ourselves in drugs, 
devoting our lives to the acquisition of more material wealth than we actually need, nur­
sing the racia.l and ethnic prejudices that fragment human life, retreating behind locked 
doors while our cities decay and our culture degenerates, or waiting for the bomb to fall 
or revolutionaries to strike. These are the ways to ruin. 
Even :Lf our civilization should escape destruction, millions of people, by sur­
rendering themselves to moral drift and purposeless existences, would see their lives 
withered and their hopes voided. None of this need be. Enough is known already about 
the requirements for human strength and growth for us to construct an applied science of 
Life Values Education and guidance. The present crisis in ecology, economy, race rela­
tions, and national goals should teach us that the victories and accomplishments of the 
next half-century must be radically different from the last; they must be accomplish­
ments of the human spirit, fired by a passionate attachment to the future of our one 
human race hei:e on earth. 
IBEORIES OF J\ORALS 
by 
John Dewey 
(Reprinted by permission from Democracy and Education, MacMillan and Company, New York, 
New York, 1916, pp. 402-418.) 
1. The Inner and the Outer. - Since morality is concerned with conduct, any 
dualisms which are set up between mind and activity must reflect themselves in the theory 
of morals. Since the formulations of the separation in the philosophic theory of morals 
are used to justify and idealize the practices employed in moral training, a brief criti­
cal discussion is in place. It is a commonplace of educational theory that the estab­
:is~in~ of character is a comprehensive aim of school instruction and discipline. Hence 
~tis important that we should be on our guard against a conception of the relations of 
intelligence to character which hampers the realization of the aim, and on the look-out 
for the conditions which have to be provided in order that the aim may be successfully 
acted upon. 
The first obstruction which meets us is the currency of moral ideas which split
the course of activity into two opposed factors, often named respectively the inner and 
outer, or the spiritual and the physical. This division is a culmination of the dualism 
of mind and the world, soul and body, end and means, which we have so frequently noted. 
In morals it takes the form of a sharp demarcation of the motive of action from its con­
sequences, and of character from conduct. Motive and character are regarded as something 
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purely "inner, 11 existing exclusively in consciousness, while consequences and conduct are 
regarded as outside of mind, conduct having to do simply with the movements which carry 
out motives; consequences with what happens as a result. Different schools identify mo­
rality with either the inner state of mind or the outer act and results, each in separa­
tion from the other. 
Action with a purpose is deliberate; it involves a consciously forseen end and a 
mental weighing of considerations pro and con. It also involves a conscious state of 
longing or desire for the end. The deliberate choice of an aim and of a settled disposi­
tion of desire takes time. During this time complete overt action is suspended. A per­
son who does not have his mind made up, does not know what to do. Consequently he post­
pones definite action so far as possible. His position may be compared to that of man 
considering jumping across a ditch. If he were sure he could or could not make it, def­
inite activity in some direction would occur. But if he considers, he is in doubt; he 
hesitates. DJring the time in which a single overt line of action is in suspense, his 
activities are confined to such redistributions of energy within the organism as will 
prepare a determinate course of action. He measures the ditch with his eyes; he brings 
himself taut to get a feel of the energy at his disposal; he looks about for other ways 
across, he re.fleets upon the importance of getting across. All this means an accentua­
tion of consciousness; it means a turning in upon the individual's own attitudes, power, 
wishes, etc. 
Obviously, however, this surging up of personal factors into conscious recogni­
tion is a part of the whole activity in its temporal development. There is not first a 
purely psychical process, followed abruptly by a radically different physical one. There 
is one continuous behavior, proceeding from a more uncertain, divided, hesitating state 
to a more overt, determinate, or complete state. The activity at first consists mainly 
of certain tensions and adjustments within the organism; as these are coordinated into 
a unified attitude, the organism as a whole acts - some definite act is undertaken. We 
may distinguish, of course, the more explicitly conscious phase of the continuous activ­
ity as mental or psychical. But that only identifies the mental or psychical to mean the 
indeterminate, formative state of an activity which in its fullness involves putting forth 
of overt e~ergy to modify the environment. 
our conscious thoughts, observations, wishes, aversions are important, because 
they represen·t inchoate, nascent activities. They fulfill their destiny in issuing, 
later on, into specific and perceptible acts. And these inchoate , budding organic read­
justments are important because they are our sole escape from the dominion of routine 
habits and blind impulse. They are activities having a ~ meaning in process of devel­
opment. Hence, normally, there is an accentuation of personal consciousness whenever 
our instincts and ready formed habits find themselves blocked by novel conditions. Then 
we are thrown back upon ourselves to reorganize our own attitude before proceeding to a 
definite and i rretrievable course of action. Unless we try to drive our way through by 
sheer brute force, we must modify our organic resources to adapt them to the specific 
features of the situation in which we find ourselves. The conscious deliberating and 
desiring which precede overt action are, then, the methodic personal readjustment im­
plied in activity in uncertain situations. 
This role of mind in continuous activity is not always maintained, however. 
Desires for something different, aversion to the given state of things caused by the 
blocking of successful activity, stimulates the imagination. The picture of a different 
state of thin9s does not always function to aid ingenious observation and recollection 
to find a way out and on. Except where there is a disciplined disposition, the tendency 
is for the iru,gination to run l oose. Instead of its objects being checked up by condi­
tions with reference to their practicability in execution, they are allowed to develop 
because of the immediate emotional satisfaction which they yield. When we find the suc­
cessful display of our energies checked by uncongenial surroundings, natural and social, 
the easiest way out is to build castles in the air and let them be a substitute for an 
actual achieVE?ment which involves the pains of thought. So in overt action we acquiesce, 
and build up c,n imaginary world in mind. This break between thought and conduct is re­
flected in those theories which make a sharp separation between mind as inner and con­
duct and consE?quences as merely outer. 
For the split may be more than an incident of a particular individual's experi­
ence. The social situation may be such as to throw the class given to articulate reflec­
tion back intc their own thoughts and desires without providing the means by which these 
ideas and aspirations can be used to reorganize the environment . Under such conditions, 
men take revenge, as it were, upon the alien and hostile environment by cultivating con­
tempt for it, by giving it a bad name. They seek refuge and consolation within their 
own states of mind, their own imaginings and wishes, which they compliment by calling 
both more real and more ideal than the despised outer world. Such periods have recurred 
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in history. In the early centuries of the Christian era, the influential moral systems 
of Stoicism, of monastic and popular Christianity and other religious movements of the 
day, took shape under the influence of such conditions. The more action which might ex­
press prevailing ideals was checked, the more the inner possession and cultivation of 
ideals was regarded as self-sufficient - as the essence of morality. The external world 
in which activity belongs was thought of as morally indifferent. Everything lay in having 
the right motive, even though that motive was not a moving force in the world. Much the 
same sort of situation recurred in Germany in the later eighteenth and early nineteenth 
centuries; it led to the Kantian insistence upon the good will as the sole moral good, 
the will being regarded as something complete in itself, apart from action and from the 
changes or consequences effected in the world. Later it led to any idealization of ex­
isting institutions as themselves the embodiment of reason. 
The purely internal morality of 'meaning well,' of having a good dispostion re­
gardless of what comes of it, naturally led to a reaction. This is generally known as 
either hedonism or utilitarianism. It was said in effect that the important thing morally 
is not what a man is inside of his own consciousness, but what he does - the consequences 
which issue, the changes he actually effects. Inner morality was attacked as sentimental, 
arbitrary, dogmatic, subjective - as giving men leave to dignify and shield any dogma 
congenial to their self-interest or any caprice occurring to imagination by calling it an 
intuition or an ideal of conscience. Results, conduct, are what counts; they afford the 
sole measure of morality. 
Ordinary morality, and hence that of the schoolroom, is likely to be an incon­
sistent compromise of both views. On one hand, certain states of feeling are made much 
of; the individual must 'mean well,' and if his intentions are good, if he had the right 
sort of emotional consciousness, he may be relieved of responsibility for full results in 
conduct. But since, on the other hand, certain things have to be done to meet the con­
venience and the requirements of others, and of social order in general, there is great 
insistence upon the doing of certain things, irrespective of whether the individual has 
any concern OT intelligence in their doing. He must toe the mark; he must have his nose 
held to the grindstone; he must obey; he must form useful habits; he must learn self-con­
trol, - all of these precepts being understood in a way which emphasizes simply the imme­
diate thing tangibly done, irrespective of the spirit of thought and desire in which it 
is done, and irrespective therefore of its effect upon other less obvious doings. 
It is hoped that the prior discussion has sufficiently elaborated the method by 
which both of these evils are avoided. One or both of these evils must result wherever 
individuals, whether young or old, cannot engage in a progressively cumulative under­
taking under conditions which engage their interest and require their reflection. For 
only in such cases is it possible that the disposition of desire and thinking should be 
an organic factor in overt and obvious conduct. Given a consecutive activity embodying 
the student's own interest, where a definite result is to be obtained, and where neither 
routine habit nor the following of dictated directions nor capricious improvising will 
suffice, and chere the rise of conscious purpose, conscious desire, and deliberate re­
flection are i nevitable. They are inevitable as the spirit and quality of an activity 
having specific consequences, not as forming an isolated realm of inner consciousness. 
2. The Opposition of Duty and Interest. - Probably there is no antithesis more 
often set up in moral discussion than that between acting from II principle" and from "in­
terest." To act on principle is to act disinterestedly, according to a general law, 
which is abov,? all personal considerations. lb act according to interest is, so the alle­
gation runs, to act selfishly, with one's own personal profit in view. It substitutes 
the changing expediency of the moment for devotion to unswerving moral law. The false 
idea of intenist underlying this opposition has already been criticized (See Chapter X), 
but some moral aspects of the question will now be considered. 
A elev, to the matter may be found in the fact that the supporters of the "inter­
est" side of the controversy habitually use the term 'self-interest.' Starting from the 
premisses tha1: unless there is interest in an object or idea, there is no motive force, 
they end with the conclusion that even when a person claims to be acting from principle 
or from a sense of duty, he really acts as he does because there "is something in it" for 
himself. The premiss is sound; the conclusion false. In reply the other school argues 
that since mar, is capable of generous self-forgetting and even self-sacrificing action, 
he is capable of acting without interest. Again the premiss is sound, and the conclusion 
false• The error on both sides lies in a false notion of the relation of interest and 
the self. 
Both ~.ides assume that the self is a fixed and hence isolated quantity. As a 
consequence there is a rigid dilemma between acting for an interest of the self and 
~ithout int;rest. If the self is scmething fixed antecedent to action, then acting from 
interest means trying to get more in the way of possessions for the self - whether in the 
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way of fame, approval of others, power over others, pecuniary profit, or pleasure. Then 
the reaction from this view as cynical depreciation of human nature leads to the view 
that men who act nobly act with no interest at all. Yet to an unbiased judgment itwould 
appear plain that a man must be interested in what he is doing or he would not do it. A 
physician who continues to serve the sick in a plague at almost certain danger to his own 
life must be interested in the efficient performance of his profession - more interested 
in that than in the safety of his own bodily life. But it is distorting facts to say 
that this interest is merely a mask for an interest in something else which he gets by 
continuing his customary services - such as money or good repute or virtue; that it is 
only a means to an ulterior selfish end. The moment we recognize that the self is not 
something readymade, but something in continuous formation through choice of action, the 
whole situation clears up. A man's interest in keeping at his work in spite of danger to 
life means that his self is found in that work; if he finally gave up, and preferred his 
personal safety or comfort, it would mean that he preferred to be that kind of a self. 
The mistake lies in making a separation between interest and self, and supposing that the 
latter is the end to which interest in objects and acts and others is a mere means. In 
fact, self and interest are two names for the same fact; the kind and amount of interest 
actively taken in a thing reveals and measures the quality of selfhood which exists. 
Bear in mind that interest means the active or moving identity of the self with a certain 
object, and the whole alleged dilennna falls to the ground. 
Unselfishness, for example, signifies neither lack of interest in what is done 
(that would mean only machine-like indifference) nor selflessness - which would mean ab­
sence of virility and character. As employed everywhere outside of this particular the­
oretical controversy, the term 'unselfishness' refers to the kind of aims and objects 
which habitually interest a man. And if we make a mental survey of the kind of interests 
which evoke the use of this epithet, we shall see that they have two intimately associat­
ed features. (i) The generous self consciously identifies itself with the full range of 
relationships implied in its activity, instead of drawing a sharp line between itself and 
considerations which are excluded as alien or indifferent; (ii) it readjusts and expands 
its past ideas of itself to take in new consequences as they become perceptible. When 
the physician began his career he may not have thought of a pestilence; he may not have 
consciously identified himself with service under such conditions. But, if he has a nor­
mally growing or active self, when he finds that his vocation involves such risks, he 
willingly ado:;its them as integral portions of his activity. The wider or larger self 
which means inclusion instead of denial of relationships is identical with a self which 
enlarges in order to assume previously unforseen ties. 
In such crises of readjustment - and the crisis may be slight as well as great -
there may be a transitional conflict of 'principle' with 'interest.' It is the nature of 
a habit to involve ease in the accustomed line of activity. It is the nature of a read­
adjusting of habit to involve an effort which is disagreeable - something to which a man 
has deliberately to hold himself. In other words, there is a tendency to identify the 
self - or take interest - in what one has got used to, and to turn away the mind with 
adversion or irritation when an unexpected thing which involves an unpleasant modifica­
tion of habit comes up. Since in the past one has done one's duty without having to face 
such a disagreeable circumstance, why not go on as one has been? To yield to this temp­
tation means to narrow and isolate the thought of the self - to treat is as complete. 
Any habit, no matter how efficient in the past, which has become set, may at any time 
bring this temptation with it. To act from principle in such an emergency is not to act 
on some abstract principle, or duty at large; it is to act upon the principle of a course 
of action, instead of upon the circumstances which have attended it. The principle of a 
physician's conduct is its animating aim and spirit - the care for the diseased. The 
principle is not what justifies an activity, for the principle is but another name for 
the continuity of the activity. If the activity as manifested in its consequences is 
undesirable, ·to act upon principle is to accentuate its evil. And a man who prides him­
self upon act:Lng upon principle is likely to be a man who insists upon having his own way 
without learning from experience what is the better way. He fancies that some abstract 
principle justifies his course of action without recognizing that his principle needs 
justification. 
Assum~ng, however, that school conditions are such as to provide desirable occu­
pations, it is interest in the occupation as a whole - that is, in its continuous devel­
opment - which keeps a pupil at his work in spite of temporary diversions and unpleasant 
obstacles. Where there is no activity having a growing significance, appeal to principle 
is either pun?ly verbal, or a form of obstinate pride or an appeal to extraneous consid­
erations clothed with a dignified title. Undoubtedly there are junctures where momentary 
interest ceases and attention flags, and where reenforcement is needed. But what carries 
a person over these hard stretches is not loyalty to duty in the abstract, but interest 
in his occupa -i;ion. Duties are "offices"- they are the specific acts needed for the ful­
filling of a function - or, in homely language, doing one's job. And the man who is gen­
uinely interei;ted in his job is the man who is able to stand temporary discouragement, to 
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persist in the face of obstacles, to take the lean with the fat: he makes an interest 
out of meeting and overcoming difficulties and distractions. 
3. Intelligence and Character. - A noteworthy paradox often accompanies dis­
cussions of morals. On . the one hand, there is an identification of the moral with the 
rational. Reason is set up as a faculty from which proceed ultimate moral intuitions, 
and sometimes, as in the Kantian theory, it is said to supply the only proper moral mo­
tive. On the other hand, the value of concrete, everyday intelligence is constantly 
underestimated, and even deliberately depreciated. Morals is often thought to be an 
affair with which ordinary knowledge has nothing to do. M::>ral knowledge is thought to 
be a thing apart, and conscience is thought of as something radically different from con­
sciousness. This separation, if valid, is of especial significance for education. M::>r­
al education in school is practically hopeless when we set up the development of charac­
ter as a supreme end, and at the same time treat the acquiring of knowledge and the de­
velopment of understanding, which of necessity occupy the chief part of school time, as 
having nothing to do with character. On such a basis, moral education is inevitably re­
duced to some kind of catechetical instruction, or lessons about morals. Lessons "about 
morals" signify as matter of course lessons in what other people think about virtues and 
duties. It amounts to something only in the degree in which pupils happen to be already 
animated by a sympathetic and dignified regard for the sentiments of others. Without 
such a regard, it has no more influence on character than information about the moun­
tains of Asia; with a servile regard, it increases dependence upon others, and throws 
upon those in authority the responsibility of conduct. As a matter of fact, direct in­
struction in :morals has been effective only in social groups where it was a part of the 
authoritative control of the many by the few. Not the teaching as such but the reen­
forcement of it by the whole r~gime of which it was an incident made it effective. To 
attempt to get similar results from lessons about morals in a democratic society is to 
rely upon sentimental magic. 
At the other end of the scale stands the Socratic-Platonic teaching which iden­
tifies knowledge and virtue - which holds that no man does evil knowingly but only be­
cause of ignorance of the good. This doctrine is canmonly attacked on the ground that 
nothing is more common than for a man to know the good and yet do the bad: not knowl­
edge, but habituation or practice, and motive are what is required. Aristotle, in fact, 
at once attacked the Platonic teaching on the ground that moral virtue is like an art, 
such as medicine; the experienced practitioner is better than a man who has theoretical 
knowledge but no practical experience of disease and remedies. The issue turns, however, 
upon what is meant by knowledge. Aristotle's objection ignored the gist of Plato's 
teaching to the effect that man could not attain a theoretical insight into the good ex­
cept as he had passed through years of practical habituation and strenous discipline. 
Knowledge of the good was not a thing to be got either from books or from others, but 
was achieved through a prolonged education. It was the final and culminating grace of a 
mature experience of life. Irrespective of Plato's position, it is easy to perceive that 
the term know.ledge is used to denote things as far apart as intimate and vital personal 
realization, - a conviction gained and tested in experience, - and a second-handed, 
largely symbolic, recognition that persons in general believe so and so - a devitalized 
remote information. That the latter does not guarantee conduct, that it does not pro­
foundly affect character, goes without saying . But if knowledge means some thing of the 
same sort as our conviction gained by trying and testing that sugar is sweet and quinine 
bitter, the case stands otherwise. Every time a man sits on a chair rather than on a 
stove, carrie,; an umbrella when it rains, consul ts a doc tor when ill - or in short per­
forms any of the thousand acts which make up his daily life, he proves that knowledge of 
a certain kind finds direct issue in conduct. There is every reason to suppose that the 
same sort of knowledge of good has a like expression; in fact "good II is an empty term un­
less it inclucies the satisfactions experienced in such situations as those mentioned. 
Knowledge that other persons are supposed to know something might lead one to act so as 
to win the approbation others attach to certain actions, or at least so as to give others 
the impression that one agrees with them; there is no reason why it should lead to per­
sonal initiative and loyalty in behalf of the beliefs attributed to them. 
It is not necessary, accordingly, to dispute about the proper meaning of the term 
knowledge. le is enough for educational purposes to note the different qualities cover­
~d by_ the one name, to realize that it is knowledge gained at first hand through the ex­
ig~ncies of experience which affects conduct in significant ways. If a pupil learns 
things from books simply in connection with school lessons and for the sake of reciting 
what he has learned when called upon, then knowledge will have effect upon some conduct 
-namely upon that of reproducing statements at the demand of others. There is nothing 
surprising that such 11 knowledge 11 should not have much influence in the life out of school. 
But this is not a reason for making a divorce between knowledge and conduct, but for 
ho~ding in low esteem this kind of knowledge. The same thing may be said ot knowledge 
which relates merely to an isolated and technical speciality; it modifies action but only 
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in its own narrow line. In truth, the problem of moral education in the schools is one 
with the problem of securing knowledge-the knowledge connected with the system of im­
pulses and habits. For the use to which any known fact is put depends upon its connec­
tions. The knowledge of dynamite of a safecracker may be identical in verbal form with 
that of a chemist; in fact, it is different, for it is knit into connection with differ­
ent aims and habits, and thus has a different import. 
Our prior discussion of subject-matter as proceeding from direct activity having 
an immediate aim, to the enlargement of meaning found in geography and history, and then 
to scientifically organized knowledge, was based upon the idea of maintaining a vital 
connection between knowledge and activity. What is learned and employed in an occupation 
having an aim and involving cooperation with others is moral knowledge, whether con­
sciously so regarded or not. For it builds up a social interest and confers the intelli­
gence needed to make that interest effective in practice. Just because the studies of the 
curriculum represent standard factors in social life, they are organs of initiation into 
social values. As mere school studies, their acquisition has only a technical worth. 
Acquired under conditions where their social significance is realized, they feed moral 
interest and develop moral insight. Moreover, the qualities of mind discussed under the 
topic of method of learning are all of them intrinsically moral qualities. Open-minded­
ness, singlemindedness, sincerity, breadth of outlook, thoroughness, assumption of res­
sponsibility for developing the consequences of ideas which are accepted, are moral 
traits. The habit of identifying moral characteristics with external conformity to auth­
oritative prescriptions may lead us to ignore the ethical value of these intellectual at­
titudes, but the same habit tends to reduce morals to a dead and machine-like routine. 
Consequently while such an attitude has moral results, the results are morally undesir­
able-above all in a democratic society where so much depends upon personal disposition. 
4. Toe Social and the M:>ral.-All of the separations which we have been criti­
cizing-and which the idea of education set forth in the previous chapters is designed to 
avoid - spring from taking morals too narrowly, -giving them, on one side, a sentimental 
goody-goody turn without reference to effective ability to do what is socially needed, 
and, on the other side, overemphasizing convention and tradition so as to limit morals to 
a list of definitely stated acts. As a matter of fact, morals are as broad as acts which 
concern our relationships with others. And potentially this includes all our acts, even 
though their social bearing may not be thought of at the time of performance. For every 
act, by the p:rinciple of habit, modifies disposition-it sets up a certain kind of in­
clination and desire. And it is impossible to tell when the habit thus strengthened may 
ha ve a direct and perceptible influence on our association with o thers. certain traits 
of character have such an obvious conne ction with our socia l relationships that we call 
them "moral" in an emphatic sense - truthfulness, honesty, chastity, amiability, etc. 
But this only means that they are, as compared with some other attitudes , central: -that 
they carry other attitudes with them. They are moral in an emphatic sense not because 
they are isolated and exclusive, but because they are so intimately connected with thou­
sands of other attitudes which we do not explicitly recognize - which perhaps we have not 
even names for. TO call them virtues in their isolation is like taking the skeleton for 
the living body. The bones are certainly important, but their importance lies in the 
fact that they support other organs of the body in such a way as to make them capable of 
integrated effective activity. And the same is true of the qualities of character which 
we specifically designate virtues. M:>rals concern nothing less than the whole character, 
and the whole character is identical with the man in all his concrete make-up and mani­
festations. To possess virtue does not signify to have cultivated a few nameable and 
exclusive traits; it means t o be fully and adequately what one is capable of becoming 
through association with others in all the offices of life. 
The moral and the social quality of conduct are, in the last analysis, identical 
with each other. It is then bu t to restate explicitly the import of our earlier chap­
ters regarding the s ocial function of education to say that the measure of the worth of 
the administration, curriculum, and methods of instruction of the schoo l is the extent to 
which they are animated by a social spirit. And the great danger which threatens school 
work is the absence of conditions which make possible a permeating social spirit; this is 
the great enemy of effective moral training. For this spirit can be actively present 
only when certain conditions are met. 
(i) In the first place, the school must itself be a community life in all which 
that implies. Social perceptions and interests can be developed only in a genuinely 
social medium - one where there is give and take in the building up of a common experi­
ence. Informational statements about things can be acquired in relative isolation by 
any one who previously has had enough intercourse with others to have learned language. 
But realization of the meaning of the linguistic signs is quite another matter. That 
involves a context of work and play in association with others. The plea which has been 
made for education through continued constructive activities in this book rests upon the 
fact they af f ord an opportunity for a social atmosphere. In place of a school set apart 
from life as a place for learnin;i lessons, we have a miniature social group in which 
study and growth are incidents of present shared experience. Playgrounds, shops, work­
rooms, laboratories not only direct the natural active tendencies of youth, but they in­
volve intercourse, communication, and cooperation, - all extending the perception of con­
nections. 
(ii) The learning in school should be continuous with that out of school. There 
should be a free interplay between the two. This is possible only when there are numer­
ous points of contact between the social interests of the one and of the other. A school 
is conceivable in which there should be a spirit of companionship and shared activity, but 
where its social life would no more represent or typify that of the world beyond the 
school walls than that of a monastery. Social concern and understanding would be devel­
oped, but they would not be available outside; they would not carry over. The proverbial 
separation of town and gown, the cultivation of academic seclusion, operate in this direc­
tion. So does such adherence to the culture of the past as generates a reminiscent social 
spirit, for this makes and individual feel more at home in the life of other days than in 
his own. A professedly cultural education is peculiarly exposed to this danger. An ide­
alized past becomes the refuge and solace of the spirit; present-day concerns are found 
sordid, and unworthy of attention. But as a rule, the absence of a social environment in 
connection with which learning is a need and a reward is the chief reason for the isola­
tion of the school; and this isolation renders school knowledge inapplicable to life and 
so infertile in character. 
A narrow and moralistic view of morals is responsible for the failure to recog­
nize that all the aims and values which are desirable in education are themselves moral. 
Discipline, natural development, culture, social efficiency, are moral traits - marks of 
a person who is a worthy member of that society which it is the business of education to 
further. There is an old saying to the effect that it is not enough for a man to be good; 
he must be good for something. The something for which a man must be good is capacity to 
live as a social member so that what he gets from living with others balances with what 
he contributes. What he gets and gives as a human being, a being with desires, emotions, 
and ideas, is not external possessions, but a widening and deepening of conscious life -
a more intense, disciplined, and expanding realization of meanings. What he materially 
receives and gives is at most opportunities and means for the evolution of conscious life. 
Otherwise, it is neither giving nor taking, but a shifting about of the position of things 
in space, like the stirring of water and sand with a stick. Discipline, culture, social 
efficiency , personal refinement, improvement of character are but phases of the growthof 
capacity nobly to share in such a balanced experience. And education is not a mere means 
t o such a life. Education is such a life. To maintain capacity for such education is 
the essence of morals. For conscious life is a continual beginning afresh. 
Summary. - The most important problem of !lDral education in the school concerns 
the relationship of knowledge and conduct. For unless the learning which accrues in the 
regular course of study affects character, it is futile to conceive the moral end as the 
unifying and culminating end of education. When there is no intimate organic connection 
between the methods and materials of knowledge and moral growth, particular lessons and 
modes of discipline have to be resorted to: knowledge is not integrated into the usual 
springs of action and the outlook on life, while morals become moralistic - a scheme of 
separate virtues. 
The two theories chiefly associated with the separation of learning from activ­
ity , and hence from morals, are those which cut off inner disposition and motive - the 
conscious personal factor - and deeds as purely physical and outer; and which set action 
from interest in opposition to that from principle. Both of these separations are over­
come in an educational scheme where learning is the accompaniment of continuous activi­
ties or occupations which have a social aim and utilize the materials of typical social 
situations. For under such conditions, the school becomes itself a form of social life, 
~ miniature community and one in close interaction with other modes of associated exper­
ience beyond school walls. All education which develops power to share effectively in 
social life is moral. It forms a character which not only does the particular deed so­
cially necessary but one which is interested in that continuous readjustment which is 
essential to growth. Interest in learning from all the contacts of life is the essen­
tial moral interest. 
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TI-IE PROBLEMS APPROACH AND THE SENIOR HIGH SCHOOL 
by 
Robert E. Jewett 
(Reprinted by permission from Richard E. Gross and Raymond H. Muessig, eds., Problem­
Centered Social Studies Instruction, National Council for the Social Studies, Washington, 
D.C., pp. 58-59, 65-66.) 
And this I believe: that the free, exploring mind of the individual 
human is the most valuable thing in the world. And this I would fight 
for: the freedom of the mind to take any direction it wishes, undirected. 
And this I must fight against: any idea, religion, or government which 
limits or destroys the individual. This is what I am and what I am about. 
I can understand why a system built on a pattern must try to destroy the 
free mind, for this is one thing which can by inspection destroy such a 
system. Surely I can understand this and I hate it and I will fight 
against it to preserve the one thing that separates us from the uncreative 
beasts. If the glory can be killed, we are lost. 
-John Steinbeck 
As I envision it, the primary goal of the senior high school should be to produce 
the intellectually autonomous individual; the individual who can arrive at his own con­
clusions based on the relevant facts. To produce the autonomous individual -- the self­
directing person--the school must help the student discover his identity; that is, help 
him come to know who he is, what he values, and what he wants to achieve . 
The social studies program within the senior high school can play a key role in 
achieving this goal. The content of the social studies, if approached from a problem­
solving orientation, is rich in opportunities to develop the skills and insights, and 
values, required for a reflective resolution of problems. 
For the student to gain a sense of identity he must come to understand the sa­
lient features of his social environment; he must come to grips with the crucial issues 
imbedded in his culture. Furthermore, as he makes sense out of his society, as he re­
solves social issues reflectively, he must determine the significance of the meanings 
thus acquired for his pattern of values. When doubt is resolved, when a social situation 
which was confused has be=me clarified, then the meaning acquired needs to be related to 
the value structure of the student. Thus, the student gains insight into self through 
the recognition of the significance of meanings derived in problem-solving for his con­
cept of self. 
The problems with which the student comes to grips within the social studies 
classroom are social, the meanings which he derives from their solutions must become 
personal if self-knowledge is to be attained. A student, for example, addressing him­
self to the question, "How can Negroes acquire decent housing?", is involved in a social 
problem and he is dealing with social studies content. The student may conclude that 
"open housing" is a necessary condition for a solution to the problem. If so, he has 
arrived at a solution to the problem. Assuming that the quality of the thinking that 
took place in the process of problem-solving was of a high order, the meaning distilled 
from the process is significant. If problem-solving is to contribute to intellectual 
autonomy in this instance, the student must ascertain his reactions to the principle of 
"open housing." Thus, in engaging in the solution of social problems, the student gains 
meaning which when referred to the self affords knowledge which results in clarification 
of identity. 
Assuming that we develop the intellectually autonomous student, will he face 
frustration and become alienated from his society due to the complexity of modern life 
and the centralization of decision making? Aware of social problems and skillful in ar­
riving at a satisfactory logical solution, will he feel powerless to effect change, to 
realize his solutions? This outcome seems unlikely, since the student will be aware of 
the social forces and the organizational structures inherent in society. He will be cog­
nizant of the organized groups and the influential individuals that effect chane in so­
ciety. Hence he will be able to effectively engage in "the passions and actions of his 
time." 
Will the student use his skills to gain selfish, anti-social ends? There is no 




the values sought by the student. However, by involving the student in the crucial prob­
lems of society he is immersed in the human condition. He is sensitized to the trouble 
and the tensions of his fellow men by the very focus of the social studies curriculum. 
Furthermore, since an effective use of the problem solving approach required an intellec­
tually permissive classroom atmosphere--an atmosphere in which the students contribution 
is courteously and fairly ·entertained--the student experiences sensitive inter-personal 
relations and is expected to accord it to his fellow classmates. Hence, living within a 
socially sensitive classroom atmosphere, immersed in the problems of mankind, the likely­
hood that the student will develop into a socially conscious individual is quite prob­
able. 
Next let us turn to an examination of the atmosphere which must exist if prob­
lem-solving is to occur. If the student is to become engaged in problem-solving he must 
be doubtful, uncertain or puzzled concerning something within his experience and have the 
desire through inquiry to remove the doubt. As long as he is certain of the truth or 
goodness of a particular idea or action; or as long as~ is unconcerned, indifferent 
about the matter, he is not involved in problem-solving. 
Hence, the initial task confronting the teacher is that of creating the state of 
uncertainty or doubt in the mind of the student. Obviously, in instances where the stu­
dent brings the doubt to the classroom this initial stage is eliminated. But for the 
remainder of the students, and in most cases for reasons outlined below this will be a 
majority of the class, the teacher must implant the element of doubt. 
Let us now consider why students do not bring doubt to the classroom. Most 
classrooms are places where doubt is not prized. Classroom activity consists largely of 
producing right answers. Usually the atmosphere is one of certainty, not doubt . The 
classroom activities often consist of recitation in which the student is required to re­
call specific facts in an atomistic context. Certainly doubt is not demanded. The very 
fact that formal educatio;-i must take place within the confines of a social organization 
discourages an emphasis upon the nurturing of doubt and the fostering of inquiry, for 
social organi::ations tend to be conservative. 
Problem-Solving and Values 
Much confusion, frustration, and indoctrination can be avoided in class discus­
sions if the ceacher--and eventually the student--have a clear understanding of the rela­
tionship which exists between the process of reflection and the realm of values. 
The reflective problem-solving process operates both in dealing with problems of 
fact and problems of value, but in different ways. The failure to recognize this dis­
tinction is a basic cause of the ineffective use of the problem-solving process. When 
the problem-solving process is used in a manner appropriate for dealing with a factual 
problem in a c~ntext in which a value question is involved, the result is the breakdown 
of the reflective process. Likewise, when the converse misapplication occurs, reflection 
fails to perform its function. 
For e}(:ample, in a senior high school class the following question arises, "Should 
we declare war on Communist China?". In the course of the discussion the point is made 
and conceded that this could bring Russia to the defense of China. With Russia 1 s capa­
city for waging war, this could result in devastation to our country. At this point a 
student asserts that he would rather be dead than Red. Another student counters with the 
statement tha1 he would rather be Red than dead. The teacher then asks the class to de­
termine reflectively which student is right. 
In effect, one student has said that his ultimate value, in this situation, is to 
stay alive even if this would mean living in a communistic system. The other student has 
expressed as his ultimate value the desire to live regardless of the conditions of life. 
Now in such a situation reflection can make clear what is at stake; it can clarify the 
consequences flowing from p?rticul.ar choices and may uncover additional possible choices. 
One or both of the students may discover that the value expressed is an instrumental ra­
ther than an ultimate value. This latter possiblity will be discussed further, but let 
me emphasize that the reflective process cannot decide matters of ultimate value. Both 
students can agree that a declaration of war on Communist China would result in majordes­
t:uction to the United states, arriving at that insight reflectively, yet they can con­
tinue to disagree over the value to be sought and hence they will disagree on the course 
of action to be adopted. 
t· When it becomes clear in a class discussion that what is involved is the selec-
ion of ultimate (end} values, it becomes important at this point that the teacher use 
r:f~e~tion to clarify the consequences of the possible choices (values) and to uncover 
a ditional choices. When the teacher in dealing with a discussion involving end values 
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treats the situation as if instrumental values or factual assertins were under consid­
eration he creates a situation in which reflection is inoperative. For reflection can­
not determine the right where right is an ultimate value. 
If the teacher treats a problem involving ultimate values as if it were one in 
which instrumental values were under consideration often indoctrination is the outcome-­
indoctrination made more effective in that it occurs under the guise of reflection. Re­
turning to the illustration, the teacher may conclude the discussion with the statement, 
"Now that we have thoroughly examined the problem you can clearly see that to go to war 
with Communist China would result in catastrophic destruction and we wouldn't want that. 
Therefore, we see that we must avoid such a war." In this case the teacher assumes the 
"correct" ultimate value and makes the leap from a reflective consideration of al terna­
tives to sanctioning one of two ultimate values. 
When values emerge in a problem-solving context, usually the value involved is an 
instrumental one. When this is the case the situation can be handled in the same manner 
as when strictly factual matters are at stake. The instrumental value either is or is not 
a means to the end sought. The determination of the question is open to reflective exam­
ination. If the student, for example, says that racially mixed marriages are wrong he 
may, of course, be stating what for him is an ultimate value. It is more likely that the 
student has e~-pressed an instrumental value. In the course of the subsequent discussion 
he may disclose that he opposes mixed marriages because the divorce rate is higher among 
marriages in ·this category than among non-mixed marriages. In this instance the stu­
dent's ultimate value may be associated with the divorce question and his stand on mixed 
marriages may be an instrumental value. If this is the case, then the mixed marriage 
statement can be dealt with on the basis of relevant fact. The divorce rate in the two 
categories can be checked. 
It is true that most value statements encountered in problem-solving will either 
initially or during the course of the discussion prove to be instrumental in nature. Yet 
frequently the value involved is an ultimate value, and, in fact, all situations can be 
pursued far enough to drive the discussion back to an ultimate value. Therefore, while 
much of the time classroom discussion will involve instrumental values which can be re­
flectively tested, this should not obscure the fact that ultimate values will be encount­
ered and that such values cannot be reflectively tested. 
There is, of course, a third category of problems; namely, those problems which 
do not directly involve values. Problems of this nature include such examples as the 
following: De armament races lead to war? Under what conditions, if any, does a tax in­
crease lead to deflation? Does an increase in the well-being of a suppressed class lead 
to revolution? These are problems involving alleged relationships between concepts or 
events. In problems of this type evidential relationships can be established. In other 
words, such problems can be solved reflectively. Such problems, assume the data are 
available, can be solved in a public manner. Such problems can be dealt with in a manner 
which allows all persons, who are willing to examine the evidence and base their conclu­
sions on the evidence, to arrive at the same conclusion. 
THE DEVELOPMENT OF MJRAL JUDGMENT 
by 
Clive Beck 
(Reprinted by permission from James A. Phillips, Jr., ed., Developing Value constructs in 
Schooling: Inquiry into Process and Product, Ohio Association for Supervision and Curri­
culum Development, 6300 N. High Street, Worthington, Ohio, 1972, pp. 41-50.) 
J\t:>st educators at present seem to be concerned not so much with specific tech­
niques of moral education, but rather with general problems about the teaching of ethics 
and values, and even fundamental ethical questions: How do we arrive at our values? 
What right hav ,? we to impose values on students? Or , if impose is too strong a word: 
What right have we even to push them in a certain direction in the area of values? 
It is fortunate that these are the concerns of educators, because it seems to me 
that we are still at the stage where somewhat general discussion (an attempt to get our 
bearings) is necessary. I have been involved in some research into particular teaching 
techniques in the Toronto area, but I am not going to report on them in any detail. For 
one thing, it is difficult to draw conclusions from a few experiments; also, there are a 
great many techniques that can be used and must be used in a balanced moral education pro­
gram. However, I will discuss some aspects of the broad approach to moral education we 
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have taken. 
In what follows, I will be concentrating on the more cognitive aspects of moral 
education. This is partly because of lack of space, but also partly because these are 
the aspects upon which most of our efforts have been concentrated. Also, I must admit 
to a certain prejudice in this direction. It seems to me that in so-called character edu­
cation programs in our schools there has often been a lack of discussion of ethical the­
ory, a lack ol' a serious attempt to help students develop a value theory or set of value 
ideas of their own. Although there has been a lot of talk in recent times about sensi­
tivity training, role playing activities, sociodrama and psychodrama, and while all of 
these are excellent and important for broad moral development, I feel there has not been 
enough emphasis upon development of students in moral judgment . Accordingly, I plan to 
concentrate here on the development of moral judgment as distinct from moral emotions or 
moral actions. 
First , however, I wish to state briefly what I consider to be the relationship 
between development of moral judgment and development in moral emotions and dispositions. 
some people assume that if they help students develop in their moral emotions and dispo­
sitions, then development of their ITDral judgment will follow naturally. Other people 
believe that if they help students develop in their thinking about moral matters, then 
their moral emotions and dispositions will develop naturally. It seems to me both of 
these approaches are mistaken; what is needed is an interactive approach. Often we try 
to help a child understand a particular aspect of ethical theory; for example, we try to 
help him understand the need for reciprocal relationships (as in promise-keeping and for­
mation of contracts); and we find that we fail, because there is a lack of sensitivity, a 
lack of concern, a lack of emotional development- a lack of non-cognitive development­
which prevent!; him from having this cognitive insight. On the other hand, there are cases 
where we try to help a person become more sensitive to other people and their needs and 
more disposed to help them, and the "log-jam" (to use a good Canadian expression) is his 
lack of understanding of the place of concern for others in a person's life. 
SO it works both ways: we have to move on both these fronts, helping students in 
their cognitive and their emotional/dispositional development at the same time. However, 
f o r the reasons I have given, in our work we have tended to concentrate upon their cog­
nitive moral development. And, in doing this, we have drawn rather heavily on the work 
o f Lawrence Kohlberg of Harvard, who also has emphasized cognitive development. Excerpt­
e d below are 1:he stages of moral development he has identified: 
1
Kohlberg' s Definition of Moral Stages 
I . Preconven1:ional Level 
At this level the child is responsive to cultural rules and labels of good and 
bad, right or wrong, but interprets these labels in terms of either the physical or the 
hedonistic consequences of action (punishment, reward, exchange of favors) or in terms of 
the physical power of those who enunciate the rules and labels. The level is divided in­
t o the fo llowing two stages: 
Stage 1: The punishment and obedience orientation. The physical consequences of 
a ction determine its goodness or badness regardless of the human meaning or value of these 
consequences. Avoidance of punishment and unquestioning deference to power are valued in 
their own right, not in terms of respect for an underlying moral order supported by pun­
ishment and aLthority (the latter being stage 4). 
Stage 2: The instrumental relativist orientation. Right action consists of that 
Which instrume,ntally satisfies one's own needs and occasionally the needs of others. 
Human relatioLs are viewed in terms like those of the market place. Elements of fairness, 
of reciprocity and equal sharing are present, but they are always interpreted in a physi­
cal pragmatic way. Reciprocity is a matter of "you scratch my back and I' 11 scratch 
yours," not 01· loyalty, gratitude or justice. 
II. Conventicnal Level 
At this level, maintaining the expectations of the individual's family, group, or 
nation is perceived as valuable in its own right, regardless of immediate and obvious con­
sequences. The attitude is not only one of conformity to personal expectations and social
0rder, but of loyalty to it , of actively maintaining, supporting, and justifying the order 
a nd of identifying with the persons or group involved in it. At this level, there are the 
following two stages: 
Stage 3: The interpersonal concordance or "good boy- nice girl" orientation. 
Good behavior is that which pleases or helps others and is approved by them. There is 
~uc~ coi:if ormity to stereotypical images of what is majority or "natural" behavior. Be-
t -:i-vior is frequently judged by intention- "he means well" becomes important for the first 
ime · One earns approval by being "nice. 11 
Stage 4: The "law and order" orientation. There is orientation toward authority, 
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fixed rules, and the maintenance of the social order. Right behavior consists of doing 
one's duty, showing respect for authority and maintaining the given social order for its 
own sake. 
III. Post-Conventional, Autonomous, or Principled Level 
At this level, there is a clear effort to define moral values and principles 
which have validity and application apart from the individual's own identification with 
these groups. This level again has two stages: 
stage 5: The social-contract legalistic orientation generally with utilitarian 
overtones. Right action tends to be defined in terms of general individual rights and 
in terms of standards which have been critically examined and agreed upon by the whole 
society. There is a clear awareness of the relativism of personal values and opinions 
and a corresponding emphasis upon procedural rules for reaching concensus. Aside from 
what is constitutionally and democratically agreed upon, the right is a matter of person­
al "values" and "opinion." The result is an emphasis upon the "legal point of view," but 
with an emphasis upon the possibility of changing law in terms of rational considerations 
of social utility (rather than freezing it in terms of Stage 4 "law and order"). Outside 
the legal realm, free agreement, and contract is the binding element of obligation. This 
is the "official" morality of the American government and Constitution. 
Stage 6: The universal ethical principle orientation. Right is defined by the 
decision of conscience in accord with self-chosen ethical principles appealing to logical 
comprehensiveness, universality, and consistency. These principles are abstract and ethi­
cal (the Golden Rule, the categorical imperative): they are not concrete moral rules like 
the Ten Commandments. At heart, these are universal principles of justice, of the reci­
procity and eguality of the human rights and of respect for the dignity of human beings as 
individual persons. 
It is important not to misunderstand Kohlberg's position. In some of his writings, 
he seems to give the impression that if we look after cognitive development, then every­
thing else will look after itself; or even that all there is to moral development is de­
velopment of moral judgment. However, this is a false impression. It is due partly to 
the fact that he is concerned to emphasize something he thinks has not been emphasized 
sufficiently and partly to the fact that he has not always been very adept at conveying 
his theories to the general public. 
Our research, which has been going on for two and one-half years, has consisted 
very largely in carrying on classroom discussions of values, most of which we have led 
ourselves. We have completed one full cycle of research at the Grade 11 and 12 level, and 
the results are quite interesting. We pretested two Grade 11 classes on the Kohlberg 
questionnaire, discussed values with the experimental class for five months, two periods 
a week, posttested both groups immediately afterwards, and then gave tham a follow-up 
posttest fifteen months later. We found no change on the Kohlberg scale in either group 
immediately after the series of discussions, but the experimental group showed quite a 
significant shift into post-conventional morality fifteen months later compared with the 
control group, thus displaying a "sleeper" effect. The control group throughout this 
twenty-month period did not change significantly. 
This is just one piece of research: since it has yet to be corroborated by others, 
we should not place too much emphasis on it. But it suggests to us that as we discuss 
with students and try to help them see the purposes of morality, purposes which lie be­
yond morality, try to help them to take a more questioning approach to moral conventions, 
they initially tend to become "churned up." They enjoy the discussions very much, but if 
we hit them with a questionnaire immediately afterwards ("What do you think about this, 
and why?" or "What should so and so have done in such and such a situation?"), they re­
vert to their more conventional responses: they are still in that unsettled state gen­
erated by the discussions. 
This requires a comment on our approach to discussion. We try to let students 
express whatev,~r views they want to express at a given time, even if this means they come 
out with something which might seem quite abhorrent from a moral point of view. Of course , 
if a student says something which to us seems quite extreme (e.g. "I think I would like 
to murder my g:!"andmother," or "Hitler was right killing six million Jews"), then we do not 
let it pass without comment. However, our approach is not to throw up our hands and all 
but send the student out of the classroom for ever having had such a thought (as has often 
been the appro«ch in character education in the past): rather, we try to find out what 
he is getting at. What is the point? Perhaps the conclusion he has come up with is mis­
taken, but there is probably something really serious he is trying to get at. 
We encourage students to consider a range of alternative approaches to different 
moral dilemmas and moral decisions - which means that after the teaching period they have 









which they can then think about in making decisions in everyday life. We have extended 
their imagination, so to speak: and I think there is a lot of truth in the notion that 
people often do not develop morality because certain better alternatives have never oc­
curred to them. They go on reacting in the ronventional way simply for want of an al­
ternative strategy. And so we try to suggest a more reflective, critical, independent, 
autonomous kind of approach which they then work out in everyday living and which might 
not become very apparent in their lives for a rouple of years. 
But I have jumped the gun. Let us begin at the other end of the K-13 spectrum. 
In my booklet , M:>ral Education in the Schools, 2 there are some topics suggested for ages 
s-9 with which we have not experimented yet. Probably the discussion method cannot be 
used in any systematic fashion below age 10. We have used it with 10-year-olds somewhat 
successfully, but below that age I think one would definitely have to apply other teach­
ing technique:;;, introducing children to vivid and concrete examples of certain kinds of 
moral relationships. I do not mean to discourage discussing values with youngP.r chil­
dren; but it is even more obvious at this age level than at other levels that discussion 
of values must be supplemented by other teaching techniques. 
The topics I have suggested for 5-9-year-olds include: Helping other people; 
The self and others; The value of rules to ourselves and others; Exceptions to rules; 
The need to look ahead; Parent-child relationships; Attitudes toward teachers; Other au­
thorities in society; The need to learn; The need for advice; Making up one's mind; Val­
uable goals in life; The legitimacy of happiness as a goal; The place of work; and so on, 
taking topics from all the subsequent lists at appropriate times. 
During this early age period, it is rather difficult to deal thoroughly with such 
topics, but I think there are certain approaches to morality which one can help students 
to develop; and later on in Chapter 1 of the booklet I mention some of them. Young chil­
dren may learn that morality is meant to serve certain purposes, and is not just a set of 
self-contained rules arbitrarily imposed by adults or the powers that be; they may learn 
that being moral is not always unpleasant; they may learn that among the purposes moral­
ity is meant to serve, their own well-being has an important place; they may learn that 
other people have needs similar to their own; and they may gain some idea of the rom­
plexity of value questions, and of the kind of situations in which exceptions must be 
made to moral rules. There are many such hints about morality that one can communicate 
at this earlier age level without exhaustive discussion. 
Admittedly, research has shown that such ideas are rather difficult for younger 
children to grasp. However, in my view, younger children can grasp them to a degree, 
and this is v1?ry important. For example, a 6 year-old may learn that other people have 
needs similar to his own. This is difficult for him to understand in amy comprehensive 
way, but he can begin to understand it. Indeed, I think that from the earliest age chil­
dren can acquire part of the raw material of a mature morality. Informally, I have no­
ticed what I consider to be very significant differences between 2-year-olds in their 
reactions to adults, other differences, which have a very strong change of showing up in 
some form in t heir value structure when they are 16 or 17. However, it is impossible 
with these younger children to have an intellectual discussion of all the aspects of 
these topics, so one has to devise other methods of helping them gain these impressions, 
or hints, of morality. 
However, once we get to age 10 or 11, there are a great many topics that can be 
discussed in quite a syste.matic fashion. The broad approach to discussion I have used, 
and would recommend for mid-elementary students and above, is perhaps best described as 
the "theoretical discussion approach." This does not mean that one spends all the time 
discussion abstract theories and principles; in fact, a great deal of time is devoted to 
concrete cases. But I do not use the classical case-study method (.as it has bee;, devel­
oped, for example, by the Ha rvard Public Issues people, and by the canadian Public Issues 
Pr~ject in Toronto) in which a class discusses a particular case in great detail and then 
t:ied to derive certain principles from it. What the class does is discuss ideas, prin­
ciples, concepts, with constant reference to examples taken from their own lives, or from 
othe: sources, so that in discuss ng a principle (e.g., that one often has to make ex­
ceptions to rules) we might refer to twenty different examples. I have found this ap­
proach very Scttisfactory. For one thing, it helps students to grasp the principle in a 
rather thorough way. Also, it helps keep their interest; for, if we simply discuss a 
case (it ~ght be a case of euthanasia, for example), there may be only a small group of 
~tudents in the class who are interested in that case; whereas, if we discuss a general 
idea or principle and review many relevant examples, then every student in the class can 
~ome :1P with bis own examples and make a contribution to the discussion, at the same time 
t~~rning more ~bout the principle. (Of couise, the case study method can be adapted to 
_is approach if plenty of analogous cases are considered fairly early in the discus­
sion.) 
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With respect to topics for ages 10 and 11, I have suggested the following, un­
der the heading of Human Relations: Rules people give up; The place of rules in society; 
Exceptions to society's rules, the Individual's need for other people; Helping otherpeo­
ple; The self andothers; The place of laws, judges, and police; The place of governments 
and other authorities; Lawbreaking and the place of punishment; Different values am 
rules in our society; Different values and rules around the world; Loyalty and patrio­
tism; The place of the inner group of relatives and friends; Parent-child relationships; 
Prejudice against races, social classes, and other groups; and Differences in taste in 
our society and around the world. 
The reason for discussion topics which have to do with the social aspects of 
value at this particular age level is that most of the students fall roughly into what 
Kohlberg calls the "Instrumental Relativist Orientation" (Stage 2) where they do not have 
very much concern for other people, or for the rest of society. usually, we find that 
children at this age level still have strong ties with their parents, but, as far as 
their brothers and sisters and other children are concerned - as far as uncles, aunts, 
and cousins and other adults are concerned - they are in a strongly independent phase. 
So it is useful to have them begin thinking about the importance of other people, the 
importance of getting along with other people, the importance of society, in an attempt 
to move them into what Kohlberg would call the "umventional" stages, or what I have 
called the"Conformity" stages, a necessary phase in their development. But then, para­
doxically, after we have helped them move in that direction (and we do not have to give 
them much help because society in general is pushing them rather effectively), we have 
to start to "deconventionalize" them, onsofar as this is appropriate. The topics on de­
cision-making for ages 12 and 13, then, take up questions that have to do with the needs 
of the individual and how these are met in social contexts. Among the topics are: 
Worthwhile goals to pursue in life; The place of education in one's life; Work and lei­
sure; The place of leisure, recreation, and exercise; Alcohol and drugs; Vocational de­
cision-making; Personal moral virtues; and The need to look ahead. 
Actua.Lly, in the Ontario situation, this fits in very appropriately since ages 
12 and 13 (Grades 7 and 8) are the grades in which there is a heavier emphasis on the 
guidance prog :ram, and so these kinds of topics tie in with the centrally prescribed 
course of study. 
For ages 14 and 15, I have suggested a number of topics which have to do with 
social problems in the world today - issues such as War, Disarmament, Underdeveloped 
Nations, Pollution, Population Control, Abortion, Euthanasia, Nationalism, Racism, and 
Women's Liberation. Here there is a wealth of study material to use, some of which is 
listed in the Bibliography given in M:>ral Education in the Schools. Various educational 
series and a proliferation of semipopular literature in bookstores all provide resources 
for these topics. When dealing with such topics, it is important to keep moving back to 
the more general principles, ideas and concepts dealt with in the earlier discussions. I 
would not recommend that a class become embroiled in extensive discussion of these con­
crete issues without some prior consideration of general value theory. If they do en -
gage in such discussion prematurely and exclusively, without a background of this kind, 
they tend to become frustrated and pessimistic, and may be forced into an extreme rela­
tivism. Everyone seems to have a different point of view, and the students cannot see 
how the differences can possibly be resolved. A mistake that is often made with the 
case study method is th<!-t students become involved n9t only in .a particular problem area 
(such as pollution), but in a particular case within that problem area, and they do not 
have the necessary theoretical background to handle it. In a case of pollution, one 
student in the class knows that if there is a clampdown on po.llution in his town, his 
father will be out of a job. So what sort of position is he going to take on the prob­
lem of pollution? Another student's father is an academic, and his job would go on re­
gardless of whether the mills stopped working, at least for five years or so, so he will 
probably take a different approach. Again, constant reference to a general set of ideas 
about values is necessary. 
For ages 16-18 (Grades 11-12 in Ontario), I have suggested a list of topics on 
value theory that includes the following: The purpose of morality; Justifying moral 
judgments; Th(! self and others; Favoring an inner group; Human moral psychology; Attain­
ing moral maturity; Hedonistic and Utilitarian theories; and Principles of decision­
making. For these topics I have developed a set of materials (which McGraw-Hill, Canada, 
will publish 1:his summer) called An Introduction to Ethics. The chapters are divided 
into discrete sections, with questions and projects attached to form a basis for discus­
sion and further research. Here, again, we return to a more general consideration of the 
nature of values, the criteria of good and bad, right and wrong, and one's general ap­
proach to value questions. The list o f topics is like the one for 5-9 year-olds in many 
respects, but of course they are dealt with at a much higher level of sophistication. so 
we have a sort of spiral curriculum, in Bruner's terms; and hence, the fact that I am 
advocating a linear approach to value discussions. I think that one can keep revisiting 
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topics constantly and develop one's own spiral curriculum. However, unless one does have 
a list of toplcs, one tends, as a teacher, to keep harping on the same topic; and stu­
dents also have a feeling of "not getting anywhere." I know this seems to be a case of 
pandering to numan weakness, but I think it is something we have to do. Because of the 
manner in which subjects are normally studied in school, we must provide students with a 
list of topics so they can have the feeling of having "done" this or that. 
The topics proposed for K-13 are in many cases what might be called substantive 
topics; and this illustrates one way in which we, in our work, depart rather fundamental­
ly from the approach suggested in the book Values and Teaching, by Raths, Harmin and 
simon3 and the approach put forward by Oliver and Shaver in Teaching Public Issues in 
High Schools4 and by Newmann and Oliver in Clarifying Public Controversy. 5 we feel that 
discussion of the form or methodology of moral reasoning as distinct from the content 
will not take one very far in dealing with values. Further, I suppose there is some dis­
agreement here with the suggestions of Milton Rokeach in his presentation as I think he 
also tended to advocate the values-clarification approach that reveals to students their 
values and th,? values of other prople and then waits to "see what happens." What we have 
done is take up substantive issues schh as those I have listed and actually try to re­
solve them in the classroom. Let us consider an example. 
Obviously, nearly all of us favor a circle of relatives and friends over other 
people. Someone may be dying of starvation in India, yet we buy our son a $2,000 car. 
Is that morally wrong? M:Jst of us would say that provided we send a donation of $SO to 
India, we can still go ahead and buy our son a $2,000 car. And so, the classical utili­
tarian principle proves to be completely unworkable. The idea that you strive for the 
greatest happiness of the greatest number is just not a practical moral principle. How­
ever, there are some hard questions here that we have to examine. To what extent_are we 
morally entitled to favor our inner group? I think one has to confront this and try to 
a:r .n.ve at som~, general conclusions about it. The difference between this and indoctri­
nation is that the teacher does not impose the conclusions; he does not come with set 
conclusions. He himself comes to the group with a somewhat open mind on the matter and 
joins the group as it tries to arrive at solutions or the beginnings of solutions to this 
problem. 
This also differs from the traditional prescriptive type of moral education where 
a teacher tells the students what is right. He would say that Joe Blow down the road 
should not have bought his son a $2,000 car; he should have · bought him a $1,000 car and 
shipped off $1,000 to India. (This kind of concrete, very specific moralizing is inap­
propriate.) Not that there are no answers to cpestions of this kind, but a teacher nor­
mally does not know enough about the circumstances of Joe Blow to make such a specific 
judgment. So, in a classroom discussion, we try to avoid making pronouncements, or en­
couraging the class to make pronouncements, on these concrete, personal, and very spe­
cific moral problems of individuals, with respect to which we do not have enough infor­
mation. But, we do try to arrive at conclusions at a somewhat more general level. 
Groups in the class may continue to disagree right to the end. But their respective po­
sitions will all have increased in soundness as a result of the discussion, and the stu­
dents should sense the progress that has been made and note how it has been made. 
Other questions of content that we get into are these: How much importance 
should governments attach to treating people equally? How much control should a govern­
ment exercise over the economy? Are politicians immoral people? Again, we must normally 
stay clear of very specific judgments, but we can work out general principles which would 
help one to judge in cases of this kind. Then there is the law. Which laws are immoral 
and which are not? What principles can we arrive at that would help us to answer this 
kind of question? Further, is it true that businessmen are immoral, as so many people 
seem to belive? If not, what is the place of business and commerce in the life of a 
morally mature person? Again, what about national, racial, and cultural distinctions: 
How important are these? Are people who are racially, nationally and culturally biased 
completely up the creek? Or is there something in inner-group loyalty and cohesiveness 
th~t is important? The modern movement toward internationalism: Again, is this a good 
thing? And so we try to resolve these kinds of substantive issues - with the teacher 
always openly learning along with the students, so that we minimize the problem of in­
doctrination. 
I would like now to make a few observations concerning Kohlberg's theory of cog­
nitive moral development, in the light of our own thinking and research. To begin with, 
we have again and again found evidence of the broad pattern of invariant progress through
the stages, and although not all reach the post-conventional stages (according to Kohl­
berg, at least 80 per cent of Americans never proceed beyond Stage 4), yet insofar as 
they develop morally, they go through the stages in the sequence indicated by Kohlberg. 
There a.re, however, some qualifications of Kohlberg's account of the stages that 
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I wish to suggest. I have informally noticed in Stage 4 students some awareness of more 
obvious life goals- such as survival, security, health-which are served by morality and 
seen as part of the basis of morality, Not it is important to realize this; otherwise, 
one might easily classify a Stage 4 student as Stage 5; and this is in fact a standard 
mistake that inexperienced people make when they are trying to assess students on this 
kind of scale. There is some inkling of more ultimate purposes that are served by mor­
ality at Stage 4; although the main emphasis is certainly upon the maintenance of rules 
and law and order. 
Stage 6, as I see it, contains people who see the sole purpose of morality as 
that of serving fundamental life goals such as f reedom, love, happiness, survival, self­
respect; or, if you like the kinds of "terminal values" that Milton Rokeach has identi­
fied although we can have discussions as to which values should be included in the list 
and which excluded. But a Stage 6 person is a thorough-going utilitarian in some senses. 
He says, "Well, morality must serve certain broad life goals for myself and for other 
people. If a particular implementation of a particular moral rule, principle or pro­
cedure on a particular occasion does not serve these life goals, then we must set it 
aside." And he has no qualms about that. In a way, he accepts head-on the idea that the 
ends justify the means. However, he recognizes that a log of people who have performed 
highly immoral acts in the name of "the ends justifying the means," have, in fact, not 
taken sufficient account of all the ends at stake in the situation. Sometimes when one 
talks about what I have described as Stage 6 morality, people say, "But wouldn't this 
justify Hitler's murdering six million Jews? I mean, after all, there was probably some 
life goal he was pursuing." But think of all the life goals -even of the Nazis them­
selves - that were frustrated by the measures he took. So, a lot of the obvious counter­
examples of this kind of approach to morality can be met simply by pointing out that they 
are not cases of the ends justifying the means; the means are not justifiable on any 
ground. In fact, the ends do not justify the means if we take account of all the rele­
vant ends which are affected by the particular course of action in question. 
We could argue at great length about Stage 6. What I have suggested here is that 
at Stage 6, a person takes account of all relevant considerations; and the reason why 
this is an important qualification of Kolhberg's position is that at Stage 6, he sees 
justice as the fundamental moral principle. Now in one sense of justice, he could be 
saying simply what I am saying. The word "justice" was used by the Greeks and has been 
used by many people since to refer to doing what is right, all things considered; and if 
this is what Kohlberg means by justice at Stage 6 there is no problem. A person takes 
all relevant considerations into account; he is not hung up on rules {Stage 4); he is not 
hung up on authority figures {Stage l); he is not hung up on institutions and processes 
{Stage 5); he takes all these things into account but does.not take any one of them as 
decisive. However, there are some narrower definitions of justice. It is possible to 
define justice in terms of simply equality - literally giving everyone the same amount of 
everything - and it seems to me fairly obvious that this is inadequate as the ultimate 
underpinning of a workable morality. Another definition of justice is giving everyone 
what he deserves. Again, this is hardly appropriate as the ultimate underpinning of 
morality - unless one defines what everyone deserves in a very broad way, so that it 
comes down again to doing what is right, all things considered . The word "justice," then 
is very ambiguous; and unless it is conceived and expressed in terms of taking all rele­
vant considerations into account, it yields a rather narrow definition of moral maturity, 
which we must avoid. 
Conclusions 
In Chc,pter 3 of Moral Education in the Schools, I summarize my approach to ethics 
and some of its implications for schooling. This summary can here serve as an appropri­
ate conclusion to my remarks. 
1, TI1ere is undoubtedly fairly wide diversity in moral codes in our society and 
around the world, and hence a considerable amount of time in classes on values should be 
spent in revie,wing these in order to build up understanding and, where appropriate, tol­
erance of idfferent points of view. 
2. Hcwever , the relativity of morals is limited, since certain basic and gener­
ally accepted goals can be identified. Students should learn to identify these goals, 
compare them in terms of ultimacy, and determine the emphasis to be given to each indif­
ferent circumEtances. It should be pointed out that these goals normally cut across ideo­
logical and religious differences. 
3. ·Morality does have goals that lie beyond itself; and hence students should 
normally be encouraged to abandon the conformity orientation, which simply accepts spe­
cific moral values and rules as they are handed down, and le rn to identify the reasons 
that lie behind morality. One must be careful, here, however, as some students may live 
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in circumstances such that they cannot handle a post-conformity orientation, 
4. Much of traditional morality - temperance, patience, courage, unselfishness, 
humility, honesty, promise-keeping, and so on - can be salvaged, and the student, having 
recognized the purposes of morality and having learned how much weight to give to various 
moral values in differing circumstances, can be encouraged to develop a healthy respect 
for morality. 
s. Moral decisions are a subclass of human life decisions, generally distin­
guished by a particular kind of inner conflict. Only a limited amount of class time 
should be spent in trying to distinguish moral from non-moral decisions. The important 
task is to learn how to make sound decisions, all things considered. 
6. In making sound decisions in the area of interpersonal morality, one should 
strike a balance between providing for one's own needs and providing for the needs of 
others. On the contrary, they should be shown that the major concern of ethics is to 
try to arrive at mutually beneficial arrangements or "happy compromises" in the light of 
more ultimate life goals; and they should be given practice in developing such arrange­
ments and compromises. 
7. Also, in making sound moral decisions, one must face up to the fact that, 
normally, one can help only a limited group of people. Moral principles that require us 
to treat everyone alike are seldom useful. Students should learn how to determine the 
population to which particular acts of kindness and unselfishness ought to be directed. 
8. While sound moral attitudes and behavior are undoubtedly an essential ingre­
dient in total world harmony and well-being, they are only an ingredient, and must be 
supplemented by appropriate institutions of various kinds with adequate built-in reward 
structures. Students should be made aware of the limited scope of morality, and of its 
cc,,-,,·,cc,:;-::io ;-is with other realms of inquiry and p::c. ctice. They should constantly be en­
couraged to pursue problems in political theory, law, economics, social theory, psycho­
logical theory, education, and so on. They should be encouraged to develop an overall 
theory of man and society. This will be of value in itself, and will also help them to 
gain more adequate perspectives on the nature and purpose of morality. 
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IF WE DO NOT SPF.AK OUT ON BEHALF OF MANKIND, WHO WILL? 
by 
Warren L. Ziegler 
,- ( Reprinted by permission from Pennys Forum, Spring-Summer, 1971, pp. 18-19.) 
Mankind is in desperate need of a new capacity; to invent the future, We must 
lea rn to engaq e in political social, human acts of invention which might produce a future
better than tl.1e present, which is the product of past inventions. All of us, rich and 
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poor, black and white, teacher and student, manager and worker, government official and 
citizen, must develop a new set of skills and attitudes for which we have few human and 
institutional precedents. 
This need, which I have described as desperate, arises from a perception of the 
future based upon unthoughtful acts of invention we are now undertaking. What do I mean 
by "unthoughtful" acts of invention? Just this-we have not yet learned how and why to 
pay attention to the unanticipated and unintended consequences of decisions we take in 
the present. 
Some of these decisions occur in social and political affairs, taken by govern­
ments and legitimate authorities. Q:>nsider, for example, the decision in the 19S0's to 
build a nationwide network of superhighways, at a cost of over 70 billion dollars. The 
consequences of that decision have locked us into a transportation mode which will be 
very difficult to break. That decision has now, in the decade of the Seventies, power­
fully reduced our governmental capacity to invent alternative modes of mass transporta­
tion which move people as efficiently, with more safety, and without the consequence of 
further ecological deterioration. 
some of these decisions occur in the fields of science and technology. Such de­
cisions we are more inclined to call "inventions" or discoveries. Scientific and tech­
nological breakthroughs now in the making promise to confront us with a set of human and 
societal problems unprecedented in their moral, organizational, human consequences. 
Item: Within the next ten years or so, we may well possess the scientific capa­
city to "clone" a human being. Without going into technical explanation, this means that 
it will be possible to reproduce a genetically-identical twin or any person on the globe 
... or an entire race of such "twins." 
Questions: Who is going to decide which person is so full of grace, virtue, 
beauty, courage, intelligence, strength, wisdom that he or she deserves to be reproduced 
identically? How are we going to decide? 
Item: Within a decade or so, it will probably be possible to control the behav­
ior of human beings by radio-electronic stimulation of the brain, in such a way that the 
individual so-controlled believes he is acting out of his own volition or free will, as 
an autonomous person. 
Questions: How shall we use this technique? Should we use it or even permit it 
to be developed? can we control its application in a way which will benefit mankind ra­
ther than lead us into a subtle system of slavery in which we continue to believe we are 
free? 
Item: Within a decade - probably less - we shall possess computers which can 
respond in behavioral terms to standard IQ tests and score 150 or better. 
Questions: How do we develop the wisdom to utilize this electronic intelligence? 
For what purposes shall we use it? Will it enable us to solve complex social engineering 
problems? Shall we end up-or want to end up-as print-outs from a computer program? 
These items are merely suggestive. It is possible to add literally hundreds more 
to the list of forecasts of important scientific/technological breakthroughs which repre­
sent the discovery and application of knowledge to the condition of man in society. 
Some of these decisions are neither governmental nor scientific/technological, 
and we rarely call them inventions because most of them are not. They are "people" de­
cisions, involving masses of human beings. No one person or organization has either the 
authority or the power to pay attention to the long-term consequences of these people 
decisions. But in the long-run, they are the most powerful, the most consequential, the 
most difficult to forecast and deal with. In our society, many of these decisions repre­
sent consumer behavior. We are just beginning to learn how millions of individual con­
sumer choices and producer decisions (by giant corporations, farmers, small businesses) 
bring with them unintended and unanticipated consequences which waste, pollute, irre­
versibly destroy our natural environment and resources. 
But the worst and most unforgivable decisions of all are those which result in 
the waste, pollution, denigration, destruction of our human environment ...which means 
people. Wars, brutality, violence, discrimination and injustice result from our apparent 
incapacity to invent new forms and kinds of individual and collective behavior. We have 
not yet learned how to free ourselves from that oppressive weight of tradition, institu­
tion, and culture where it no longer assists us to deal with the formidable social 













"Discontinuities" with the past. 
We must learn new models of how and why to live together on this shrinking globe. 
But if models from the past are inadequate to this task, then we must learn how to invent 
them. Unless we learn how to invent "alternative futures," the least surprising future 
will emerge from the past like an uncontrollable behemoth, forcing us into desperate sit­
uations in cities, nations, and the good ship earth, where sheer physical survival be­
comes our sole need and purpose. Survival is an old ethic, which we all understand. But 
can we invent a new ethic? 
The plain fact is that we no longer have to look to science fiction to titillate 
our imaginations about the future. Science fiction has come to life. We no longer have 
to attempt to forecast what the future will be like. we are living and inventing that 
future right now. 
But will it be a futurJ we want? Will it be our future ...or somebody else's? 
Are we now co l onizing the future-the last frontier of mankind--in the same way that past 
generations made decisions whose unanticipated and unintended consequences we are now 
living, many of them to our detriment? In short, can we now begin the new, main business 
of life; inventing a human future? 
There are many difficult problems to understand and solve before we can provide 
satisfactory answers to these questions. Ultimately, these answers will represent a new 
consensus about the good, the true and the beautiful in human affairs, the content of a 
new ethic. But first we must pay attention to here-and-now problems. One major problem 
lies in the ai:ea of values, about which in our society, and perhaps throughout the world, 
we increasing~y disagree. One remembers the traditional caution: you can't argue about 
values, for there is no basis for disputing what one person values as against what an­
other person values. Values are neither true nor false, in the scientific sense. Values 
do not emerge as the conclusions of solely scientific or intellectual inquiry. They are 
a composite of an extremely rich and complex interaction of social tradition, inherited 
cultural belief, spiritual perception, affective need and procivity, and intention or 
will. This complex mix of social and individual forces takes on specific meaning in 
situations of growing up, education and socialization, love, sex, marriage, politics, 
economy (meaning production, distribution and consumption) .•. a host of acts and institu­
tions which, if we examine them closely, we discover what it is we really value. 
What we value we learn by observing what we say and do. Values are symbolic cat­
egories-ideas , notions, articulated feelings, if you will - which enable us to rank be­
haviors and events and discover which we prefer and which we don't. The central problem 
is simply this : when we observe ourselves in the living, breathing, acting present, we 
find that our traditional consensus about values is rapidly eroding. Disagreements about 
wha t we should do, in any given situation, have become exacerbated. we have begun to 
recognize that traditional beliefs about what is good no longer produce agreement when 
applied to spE,cific life situations. Consider, for a moment, some evidence: (1) the 
rapid shift in values held by some members of the present youth generation, resulting in 
so-called "radical" behaviors on campus, in high school, with drugs and sex, in communes, 
in politics, in economics and ecology; (2) the opposing judgments among our citizens 
a bout Vietnam; (3) the increasingly volatile conflict within our populace about whether 
or no t black and other minority groups are to be treated as full-fledged citizens of so­
ciety, in political, economic, human terms; (4) disagreements about social priorities 
f or the allocation of our resources ... to ending urban deterioration, to supporting con­
t inued space exploration, t o clean up our living, drinking, breathing spaces, to provide 
post-secondary education for everyone, youth and adult. 
we might find it useful to recognize that resources are not solely economic. 
They comprise more than money , machines, goods, jobs, economic production. Indeed, our 
most important resource is ourselves, our human resource, a marvelous wealth of intelli­
g ence, will, energy and emotion. For a century or more, humanresourceshave been allo­
~a ted. mainly towards building a powerful economic engine to produce a "better" life, an 
American" way o f life. Now we discover our lack of clarity about what is "better," in­
deed about what is "American." we discover that traditional beliefs about what is good 
f or us no lon;;ier serve equally well, among all of us, to guide and justify our choices 
and behaviors. 
Indeed, the notion that resources extend far beyond a conventional economic and 
m~terialistic definition is itself an attempt to move into a new mode of social inven­
t~on. Consider, for example, the vast, untapped experience and wisdom collected in our 
0 d ~eople. We relegate them to the scrap heap of no work, no job, no love, no place, 
:~ time. But if that rare quality -wisdom- resides in any age-cohort, are these not 
: very people to whom we might first look? What marvelous contributions they might 
ma e to the scores of thousands of day-care centers which, in this decade, we shall 
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develop for our infants. What stories they could tell, what patience they could provide, 
what simple acts of loving, teaching, reading, and learning games they could give to in­
fants who have not yet "learned" to denigrate age, who have not yet adopted, like the 
rest of us, the value of false youth and physical vigor. 
Consider the vast reservoir of energy untapped in those millions of our citizens 
who, because of poor training, racial discrimination, an under-employment economy, have 
no "jobs" and are therefore ronsidered less than human. Can we not invent the social in­
stitutions within which that energy is given an opportunity to apply to a huge range of 
unfinished or scarcely started tasks which would help us beautify our human, social and 
physical environment and make it habitable for human beings? 
We do not value these resources. We do not value these human beings. That tells 
us what our values are, and sets the problem. New social inventions depend upon our will­
ingness to investigate new priorities, to open ourselves to alternative interpretations 
of what is to be valued, to recognize that we must mix the good we take from the past with 
new ideas about the good we shall learn to discover for the future. 
How are we to invent new values? Our accumulated knowledge and experience in 
education, in psychology, and in ethics, enables us at least to begin to break down that 
task into more specific components. It is these romponent behaviors which must become a 
part of the education of our children, as well as of ourselves. I call this, for want 
of a better term, "inventive education," and I believe we must implement it in all the 
forms and kinds of schooling and education in which scores of millions of infants,youth 
and adults are engaged. What are the characteristics of this inventive education? That 
we scarcely kr.ow. But it would appear to rontain some mixture of the following: 
(1) A psychological capacity to deal comfortably with uncertainty and ambiguity. 
(2) Intuition: a process of inventive, pre-conscious insight which we mustpro­
mote and accept even though it still withstands clear scientific explanation. 
(3) §Ynthesis: a capacity to develop new canbinations and meanings from old 
components and ideas, to "see the forest for the trees." 
(4) Moral Courage: a skill - to be learned from practice and imitation- and 
willingness to speak out against all forms of human injustice perpetrated by man against 
man. 
(5) E~ological Courage: an ability to speak out against all forms of man's in­
justice to his natural environment. 
(6) Self-governance: an understanding amongst us all, but particularly teach­
ers, students a nd administrators, to clearly distinguish between spurious administrative/ 
organizational power and the genuine authority of great ideas and hard facts. 
(7) Choice: A disposition to choose among alternatives with practical wisdom, 
which means, among other things, not to protect youth and adults from the consequences 
of wrong choices. 
(8) Futures-cognition: Being openminded about the future, seeking not to colo­
nize it but to tolerate, indeed celebrate the alternative futures invented by colleagues, 
friends, strangers, other groups and nations. 
(9) 1h~mos: The Greek word, the marvelous notion which we might translate as 
spirit, will,-~urage, whi ch enables us to harness and bring into balance our intel­
lect and our appetites. 
(10) The Questi ve Spirit: The development of our capacity and willingness to 
seek after the good , the true and the beautiful when we are now all very unclear about 
what these qualities mean in human affairs. 
(11) Mankind Itself: When all is said and done, the content of inventive educa­
tion and its sole purpose to teach our children and ourselves that it is right, it is 
proper , it is possible and it is necessary to speak out on behalf of mankind, future arrl 




VAWES AND OUR YOUTH 
by 
Gordon w. Allport 
(Reprinted by permission from Teachers College Record, (December 1961), Teachers College, 
Columbia UnivEirsity, New York, pp. 211-219.) 
one aim of education is to make available the wisdom of the past and present so 
that youth may be equipped to solve the problems of the future. If this is so, then we 
have good groi:,nds for a feeling of consternation concerning the adequacy of our present 
educational procedures. The reason is that in the immediate future, the youth of today 
will have to live in a world very unlike the world of the past from which our store of 
wisdom has beEm drawn. 
SOME PROSPECTS 
Think of the vastly changed nature of life in the future, for which we have 
little relevant wisdom from the past to call upon: 
1, The new generation of students will have to face an ever increasing domina­
tion of life by science, by technology, and by automation. (One thinks of the story of 
two cows graz:ing along the roadside. An immense milk truck passes with the painted leg­
end: Pasteuri~:ed, Homogenized, Vitamin B Added. One cow turns to the other and says, 
"Makes you fe<::,l inadequate, doesn't it?") 
2. n,e new generation will have to recognize the impossibility of living any 
longer in a state of condescension toward the colored peoples of the world (about three­
quarters of the world's population). centuries of comfortable caste discrimination and 
segregation are from here on impossible to maintain. 
3. The coming generation will have to deal with a population explosion whose 
predicted magnitude staggers our imagination. 
4. I1. will need a completer understanding of world societies and their marked 
dif ferences in values. In the past, we could be politely ignorant of such places as 
Af rica, Latin America, and Asia in a way that is no longer possible. 
5. I1: will have to create a world government or, at least, an effective confed­
e ration to forestall the threat of thermonuclear war. 
6. As if a planetary world view were not difficult enough to achieve, the com­
ing generation may have to develop an interplanetary point of view. (I find this pros­
pect especially alarming because we seem to be solving the problems of outer space be­
f ore those of the inner space of mind, character, and values.) 
It is no wonder that this preview of problems confronting our youth throws us 
educators into a state of self-scrutiny bordering sometimes on panic. Where can youth 
f ind the needed equipment? Are they sound enough in mind and morale? 
Sometimes our dismay finds an outlet in gallows humor. They tell of the benevo­
lent lady who saw a depressing specimen of the very young generation sprawled on the 
curb o f a city street, swilling down cans of beer. Greatly shocked, she asked, "Little 
boy, why aren't you in school?" "Cripes, lady," he replied, "I'm only four years old." 
And they tell the story of the London bobby. London police, we know, are well 
trained for social work, even for psychotherapy. This bobby's beat was Waterloo Bridge. 
He spotted a man about to jump over and intercepted him. "Come now," he said. "Tell me 
what is the matter. Is it money?" The man shook his head. "Your wife perhaps?" An-
0ther shake of the head. "Well, what is it then?" The would-be suicide replied, "I'm 
:orried about the state of the world." "Oh, come now," said the bobby. "It can't be so 
fad. Let's walk up and down the bridge here and talk it over." Whereupon they strolled 
o r about an hour discussing the state of the world, and then they both jumped over. 
Humor helps us put our dilemma into sane perspective, but it does not solve the 
p roblem. The vague apprehension we feel has led to certain empirical studies of the 




Not long ago, Professor Phillip Jacob undertook to survey all available studies 
concernin;J the values held by college students. He found a marked uniformity among them. 
Fully three-quarters of the students were "gloriously contented, both in regard to their 
present day-to-day activity and their outlook for the future." Their aspirations were 
primarily for material gratifications for themselves and their families. They "fully ac­
cepted the conventions of the contemporary business society as the context within which 
they will realize their personal desires." While they will not crusade against segrega­
tion and racial injustice, they will accept non-discrimination when it comes as a "ne­
cessary convention in a homogenized culture." They subscribe to the traditional virtues 
of sincerity, honesty, and loyalty, but are indulgent concerning laxity in moral stand­
ards. They normally express a need for religion, but there is a hollow quality in their 
beliefs. They do not desire to have an influential voice in public policy or government. 
Their sense of civic duty stops at the elementary obligation of voting. They predict 
another major war within a dozen years, but they say that international problems give 
them little concern and that they spend no time on them. Only a minority value their 
college education primarily in terms of its intellectual gains. They regard it as good 
because it gives them vocational prepartion, social status, and a good time. Such is 
flabby value-fibre that Jacob discovers among college students of today. 
The picture becomes more vivid when viewed in cross-national perspective. James 
Gillespie and I, in a comparative study2 of the values of college youth in 10 nations, 
asked students to write their autobiographies of the future ("My life from now until the 
year 2000") and also gave them an extensive questionnaire. The instrument was translated 
into nine different languages. 
In comparison with youth of other nations, young Americans are delightfully frank 
and open, unsuspicious and cooperative. Their documents had no literary affectation 
(and, I may add, little literary quality). But the most important finding was thatwith­
in these 10 nations, American students were the most self-centered, the most "privatis­
tic" in values. They desired above all else a rich, full life for themselves, and showed 
little concern for national welfare or for the fate of mankind at large. The context of 
their outlook was private rather than public, passive rather than pioneer. The essential 
point is made clear by two excerpts, the first drawn from the autobiography of a Mexican 
girl, 18 years of age, and the second from a Radcliffe student of the same age: 
Since I like psychology very much, I wish, on leaving this school, to 
study it, specializing in it and exercising it as a profession. I shouldn't 
like co get married right away, although like any woman I am desirous of 
gettir~ married before realizing all my aspirations. In addition, I should 
like to do something for my country-as a teacher, as a psychologist, or 
as a mother. As a teacher, to guide my pupils in the best path, for at 
the present time they need solid basis in childhood in order in their 
future lives not to have so many frustrations as the youth of the present. 
As a psychologist, to make studies which in some way will serve humanity 
and my beloved country. As a mother, to make my children creatures who 
are useful to both their country and all humanity. 
Now follows the Radcliffe document. Its flavor of privatism is unmistakable: 
Our summers will be spent lobster fishing on the Cape. Later we'll 
take a look at the rest of the country-California, the Southwest, and 
the Chicago Stockyards. I want the children, when they get past the 
age of ten, to spend part of the summer away from home, either at camp 
or as apprentices to whatever profession they may show an interest in. 
Finally, I hope we will be able to take a trip to Europe, especially 
to Russia, to see what can be done about Communism. 
Many critics have called attention to the same American value predicament. Our 
current social pattern, they say, is almost completely geared to one objective alone, 
namely a profitable, expanding production. To insure expanding production, there must be 
more and more consumption. Hence comes the expensive glamor of our advertising and its 
control of our mass media. The sole objective seems to be to stimulate the accretion of 
goods. Self-respect and status, as well as comfort, are acquired in this way. Someone 
has called our national disease "galloping consumption." Half a century ago, William 
James saw the peril and was much worried by what he called "the American terror of pov­




HOPE IN UNEASINESS 
Now a high standard of living is not in itself an evil thing. All the worldwants 
what we already have. But the single-minded pursuit of production and consumption has 
brought a dulling of other values. One consequence is symbolized by the scandal of rig­
ged quiz programs. These were in the service of advertising, which in turn was in the 
service of a profitable expanding economy. Another consequence is the accumulated froth 
of our TV, radio, and movies. Another is the widely discussed conformity of the organi­
zation man, as well as the futile rebellion of the beats. An especially peppery critic, 
Paul Goodman,3 has shown that the starved lives of juvenile delinquents and of young 
people caught in the organizational grind are at bottom much alike. Both are attracted 
to the cult of easiness and aspire to nothing more than amiable mediocrity. Both styles 
of living fail to prepare youth for the problems that lie ahead for themselves and for 
the nation. 
All this familiar criticism is irritating; yet the fact that it flourished is a 
hopeful sign. We suspect it may be too harsh. I am inclined to think so. It is rash 
indeed to indict a whole generation. At worst, Jacob's gloomy picture held for three­
quarters of the college students studied, but not at all for a vital and far from negli­
gible minority. And even though the gloomy generalizations have some truth in them, are 
the assets given fair attention? I myself have some favorable impressions, although one 
man's view is not reliable. But youth today appears to enjoy a certain freedom and flex­
ibility that was not common in the more rigid days of our parents and grandparents. I 
even have the impression that there is less neuroticism among students now than among 
those of a generation ago. What is more, young people, I find, are not blind to the 
world changes that are occurring. Their apparent repression of the challenge is due 
largely to their bewilderment =ncerning proper paths to take. (And one has the feeling 
that our own statesmen in Washington are no less bewildered.) All in all, these are 
hopeful signs that should not be overlooked. 
VALUES AND THE SCHOOL 
Another hopeful sign is the fact that many teachers are asking, "What can we do 
to be helpful?" They know, and we all know, that the ability of the school to give 
training in values is limited. For one thing, the home is vastly more important. A 
home that infE,cts the child with galloping consumption, that encourages only canned re­
creation and has no creative outlets, can only with difficulty be offset by the school. 
Another limitation lies in the fact that the school is ordinarily expected to mirror cur­
rent social values and to prepare the child to live within the existing frame. It is an 
unusual school system and an unusual teacher who even wish to transcend the current 
fashions of value. 
But assuming that we have an unusual school system and an unusual teacher, what 
values shall they elect to teach? If they do not choose to follow the prevailing fash­
ions, what standards shall they follow? The ancient ~mans were fond of asking, "Who 
will judge the judges?" and ''Who will guard the guardians?" Can the guardians turn 
perhaps to standard discussions of "the aims of education?" Such discussions are num­
erous, abstract, and often dull. Their weakness, I feel, is their effort to formulate 
absolute goals, vistas of abstract perfection. The result is often a series of plati­
tudes or generalizations so broad as to be unhelpful. Of course we want to develop 
"good citizenship"; we certainly want to "free the child's intellect. 11 These and all 
other absolutes need to be reduced to concrete, stepwise processes before they can guide 
us in the strategy of teaching values. 
The teacher must start with the stiuation as he or she finds it and in concrete 
instances sharpen the value-attributes of the lesson being taught. To a =nsiderable 
extent, these value-attributes can be drawn from the codified wisdom of our nation. We 
cannot neglect the value of profitable production and high living standards, for all our 
vocational and professional education contribute to this end. But the codified wisdom 
of our unique society extends far beyond the obsession of today. Our values include al­
so such matters as respect for civil liberties. Does the school accent this value? 
They ~nclude approval for individual initiative, for philanthropy, for compassion. And
they imply much concerning civic duties that are the reciprocal of civic rights. What 
must we do to deserve our precious cornucopia of freedom? Vote? Yes. But voting does 
no good unless the voter is informed above the stereotyped level of the mass media. He 
~us~ also pay taxes willingly. Do schools and colleges teach the young to pay a glad 
_ax. I wonder. To me the most disturbing finding in Youth's Outlook on the Future lay
1 th 
~ e elaborate talk about one's right to a rich, full life and in the almost total
1si ence regarding one's duties. 
I am saying that in the first instance teachers should choose the values they 
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teach from the whole (not from a part) of our American ethos. Deep in our hearts we know, 
and most of the world knows, that our national values, derived, of course, from Judeo­
Christian ethics, are about the finest mankind has yet formulated. In no sense are these 
values out of date, nor will they go out of date in the world of tomorrow. Yet many of 
them are badly rusted. Unless they are revitalized, however, our youth may not have the 
personal fortitude and moral implements that the future will require. 
THE LARGER ANCHOR 
Excellent as the American Creed is as a fountainhead of values, it does not con­
tain them all, It says nothing explicity, for example, about intellectual curiosity. 
And yet surely schools exist to augment this value. The most severe indictment of our 
educational procedures I have ever encountered is the discovery that a sizeable percent­
age of graduates of our colleges after completing their formal education never afterward 
read a single book. 
There are other important values that are not spelled out in our American Creed. 
I am thinkin;J of those details of human relationships that make all the difference be­
tween boorishness and brotherhood in the human family. As our population increases, it 
becomes more and more important to teach the elements of the new science of human rela­
tions which go far toward smoothing the roughness of common life by leading us to respect 
effectively the integrity of the other fellow. I recall a teacher of English whose class 
was studying The Merchant of Venice. She turned a wave of incipient anti-Semitism in her 
class to a sound lesson in values. Shylock, she explained, was like the resentful, self­
seeking portion of every person's nature. we are all potential Shylocks. But while 
self-love is prominent in all of us, we are so constructed that it need not be sovereign 
in our natures. 
To return for a moment to the relation between home and school-the former, as I 
have said, is far more important. Recognizing this fact, some people say, "Well, let's 
leave the teaching of values to the home and to the church. Schools can't do much of 
anything about the matter." 
This position is untenable. If the school does not teach values, it will have 
the effect of denyin;J them. If the child at achool never hears a mention of honesty, 
modesty, charity, or reverence, he will be persuaded that, like many of his parents' 
ideas, they a~e simply old hat. As they grow toward adolescence, children become criti­
cal of the teaching of both parents and the church. They are in a questioning stage. If 
the school, which to the child represents the larger outside world, is silent on values, 
the child will repudiate more quickly the lessons learned at home. He will also be 
thrown onto peer values more completely, with their emphasis on the hedonism of teen-age 
parties or on the destructiveness of gangs. He will also be more at the mercy of the 
sensate values peddled by movies, TV, and disk jockeys. What is more, some homes, as we 
have said, give no fundamental value training. In such a case, it is only in the school 
that the chi lcl has any chance at all of finding ethical anchorage. 
This brings us to the hardest question: How does the teacher, the instructor, 
the professor, handle his assignment in the classroom? How is it possible to teach 
values, including the value of intellectual curiosity? 
THE MEANING OF VALUE 
Before tacklin;J this question, we must pause to define what we mean by value. 
You will recognize that I am using the term psychologically, not in its objective phil­
osophical sense. Values, as I use the term, are simply meanings perceived as related to 
self. The child experiences value whenever he knows that a meaning is warm and central 
to himself. Values, to borrow Whitehead's term, are "matters of importance" as distinct 
from mere matters of fact. 
So much for definition. Now the hard-pressed teacher is given a solid substan­
tive curriculum to teach. The curriculum in its original state consists of mere matters 
of fact. And on the number of facts absorbed the pupil's standing depends. It takes 
virtually all of a teacher's time to convey factual information and grade the pupil on 
his achievement. There is little time left to transmute these matters of fact into mat­
ters of importance, let alone teach all of the moral and social values we have thus far 
been discussing. 
The curriculum itself is not, and should not be, a direct aid. Prescribed in­
struction in values would be laughed out of court. we have recently been bumped by Sput­



















with courses in folk-dancing, personal adjustment, and fudgemaking! I agree that value­
study has no place in curriculum planning, but not because it is a frivolous subject -
rather, because it is a subject too hard and too subtle for curriculum makers. 
Education for values occurs only when teachers teach what they themselves stand 
for, no matter what their subject is. If I were to write a treatise on the teaching of 
values, I would give most of my emphasis to the moral pedagogy that lies in a teacher's 
incidental comments, to the obiter dicta. The hard core is central, but the hard core 
has a penumbra of moral significance. I mentioned the teacher of English who made a 
value-lesson out of Shylock. I recall also my college professor of geology who paused 
in his lecture on diatom ooze to say to us, "Others would not agree with me, but I con -
f ess that whenever I study diatoms, I don't see how anyo ne can doubt the existence of 
God because t:-1e design and behavior of these protozoa are so marvelous." Is it not in­
teresting how we all recall the obiter dicta of our teachers, the penumbra of value they 
point out to us, surrounding the hard-core data? We remember them better than the sub­
ject matter itself. 
Why does the student remember them so well? No current theory of learning seems 
able to tell us. I suspect it is because values, being matters of importance to the 
self , are always warm and central and ego-involved and therefore claim priority on our 
a ttention. The child, being value-ripe, cannot help being impressed when the teacher be­
tra ys excitement and enthusiasm for a mode of thought or for the content of the subject 
being studied. True, the youngster does not, and should not, adopt the teacher's values 
ready-made; but the teacher's self-disclosure leads the student to self-discovery. 
What wouldn't we give if we could develop intellectual ardor in every child for 
hard core subjects? Why is it that for most pupils arithmetic, spelling, physics, re­
main forever full matters of fact and never become a meaning perceived as related to the 
self? One reason, I think, is that the weary teacher fails to convey his own sense of 
the importanc•~ of the subject to the student. If he did so, he would, as I have said, at 
least fix att,mtion upon the value-potentiality of the subject. 
Anoth, ir reason perhaps is that not all of a teacher's obiter dicta are wholesome. 
Some, indeed, may be deeply damaging, though the teacher may be innocent of any such in­
tent. Sometimes we hear incidental (but still attitude-forming) remarks like this one: 
"All right now, children. You have had a good time playing at recess; now settle down to 
your English :... esson." Play is recognized as a matter of joyf ul importance. English, the 
teacher is saying in effect, is a mere routine matter of fact. 
VAWES AND LEARNING 
I think our educational psychology has been mostly wrong about the process of 
learning - or perhaps not so much wrong as woefully incomplete. At the beginning of his 
learning career, a young child cannot, of course, be expected to feel adult enthusiasm 
f or the intellectual content of his studies. He does his work in the first instance to 
a void a scolding or because he has a habit of obeying instructions. Soon he finds added 
incentive. The teacher - really in the role of mother - gives praise and love ("Susan, 
I am proud o f you"). There is a great deal of such dependency in the learning situation. 
Love and socia l reward (as well as some fear of punishment) sustain the processes of at­
tention and re,tention. When the child puts forth intellectual effort, he does so in or­
der to obtain a gold star, commendation, or other symbols of love. 
All tl:.ese incentives are extraneous to the subject matter. The youngster does 
not learn it because it is a matter of importance. When he leaves school or college, he 
loses these extraneous suppo rts. He finds his love relations directly; they are no long­
er a reward fer intellectual effort. Hence, intellectual apathy sets in, and, distress­
ing to say, nc further books are read. 
In such a case as this, intellectual curiosity was never tied to independence, 
o n~y t o extraneous supports. At some point in the schooling - and the earlier the better 
- intellectual activity should become not a second-hand but a first-hand fitting to the 
;ense o f self. At the beginning, all learning must be tied, perhaps, to specific rein-
o rcements; but if the dependency is long continued, authentic curiosity fails to develop. 
It would be going too far to put the blame for intellectual apathy onto our cur­
rbent teaching of educational psychology. Yet I am inclined to feel somewhat punitive 
a out this m ttmatt a er. Psychology has not yet settled down to the problem of transformin;i 
a t ers of fact - whose acquisition current learning theories explain fairly well - into 
u onomous matt f • . .ers o importance- wh:i.ch they do not explain at all. 
Our emphasis has been on learning by drill and by reinforcement. Such "habit 
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acquisition" receives all the emphasis. But the learning theory involved postulates a 
continuing dependency relation (extraneous reinforcement). When the relation terminates, 
the habits of study simply extinguish themselves. I am surprised, therefore, that stim­
ulus-response psychologists do not see this consequence of their own theory. Insofar as 
teachers employ an educational psychology of this order, they are not likely to break the 
dependency relation, which belongs properly only to the earlier stages of schooling. 
Matters of importance, I strongly believe, are not acquired by drill or by rein­
forcement. They are transformations of ha9t ts and skills from the "opportunistic" layer 
of personality into the ego-system itself. Once inside the ego-system, these habits and 
skills turn into true interests and utilize the basic energy, the basic spontaneity, that 
the organism itself possesses. They are no longer sustained as "operant conditionings" 
by outside rewards. The interest, now being the very stuff of life itself, needs no 
outer supports. 
FUNCTIONAL AUTONOMY 
I have called this process of transforming means into ends, of changing extrinsic 
values into intrinsic values, functional autonomy. Concerning this concept, I am often 
asked two questions: How do you define "functional autonomy, and how does functional 
autonomy come about?" 
For a definition, I offer the following: Functional autonomy refers to any ac­
quired system of motivation in which the tensions involved are no longer of the same 
kind as the antecedent tensions from which the acquired system developed. 5 To answer the 
question of how functional autonomy comes about requires a more extended and technical 
discussion. I can only hint at the direction of my answer. Neurologists are gradually 
discovering a basis for what I would call "perseverative functional autonomy." I refer 
to the "self-sustaining circuits," "feedback mechanisms," and "central motive states" 
that are now commonly recognized to exist in the nervous system. This line of discovery, 
I find, provides a partial answer to the question. But I believe we have to go further 
and call on the concept of self. Values, we have said, are meanings perceived as relat­
ed to the sel:f. Functional autonomy is not a mere perseverative phenomenon; it is, above 
all, an ego-involved phenomenon. Besides admitting an opportunistic layer to person­
ality, which :i.s the exclusive concern of most current theories of learning, we have no 
choice but to admit also a "propriate" layer. It is in this layer that all matters of 
importance reside. 
The goal of the educator, then, is to shift the content of the subject he teaches 
from the opportunistic (matter of fact) layer to the propriate. But there is no sure­
fire, mechanical strategy to use. The best general rule, one that John Dewey saw clearly, 
is to strive ceaselessly to integrate routine matters of fact into the growing experience 
system of the child himself , It would take a long treatise to specify various detailed 
strategies of teaching that help achieve this goal. 
Let me focus on only one aspect of this topic, upon a canmonmistake that teachers 
make. I myself am a continual offender. It is to present students with our own care­
f ully thought out conclusions when they themselves lack the raw experience from which 
these conclusions are fashioned. 
This particular error is inherent, for example, in the lecture system. Instead 
of lecturing on comparative religion, for instance, it would be much better to require 
all students to attend services of worship that are unfamiliar to them. If raw experi­
ence is present, then perhaps a lecture may be effective. M..ich of the intellectualy 
apathy we complain about is due to our fault of presenting conclusions in lieu of first­
hand experience. To us, our well-chiseled conclusion, summing up a long intellectual 
struggle with a problem of knowledge or of value, seems like a beautiful sonnet . To the 
student, it may be gibberish. 
The fallacy of giving conclusions holds both for subject matter and for values, 
A lad of 15 cannot profit from the fully fashioned philosophy of life of a man of SO. To 
register at all, a statement about values must fall precisely on his present growing 
edge. 
Teaching, then, is not the art of offering conclusions, however hard won and 
valid they may be. No teacher can forcibly enter the students' proprium and plant a 
functionally autonomous motive. He can at best open channels of experience and, by his 
obiter dicta, sometime lead the student to see_ the value-potential in the experience. 
The theory of personality that we need to guide a more fully developed educa­















It will show us that only at the outset of learning is it a transitive verb. By drill, 
by reward, by reinforcement, the teacher does indeed educate the child - in matters of 
fact. But true maturity comes only when the verb is reflexive. For in matters of im­
portance, where values lie, the growing individual alone can educate himself. 
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VALUES IN THE EMERGING AMERICAN CIVILIZATICi, 
by 
Philip H. Phenix 
(Reprinted by permission from Teachers College Record, (April 1960), Teachers College, 
Columbia University, New York, pp. 355-366.) 
My task is to delineate the value system upon which our educational efforts of a 
decade or two hence may be built - to characterize some of the dominant commitments and 
purposes which we may reasonably expect will guide Americans of 1970 or 1980 as they seek 
to perpetuate and improve their civilization. 
A well-nigh impossible task this is, not only because the prevailing values em­
brace all aspects of a culture but also because the pace of contemporary cultural trans­
formations is so breath-taking and because the most serious unresolved conflicts of our 
plural civilization revolve about differences in values. Yet, speculative and tentaive 
though the effort must necessarily be, it should be made, for values are the sould of 
civilization. Apart from the values by which we make our choices, things and activities 
are empty of meaning. In particular, since teaching and learni~ necessarily presuppose 
guiding commitments, we cannot think about the future of American education without some 
forecast of values in our emerging civilization. 
What do we mean by the word "value"? TWo distinct meanings are in common use by 
layment and scholars alike. According to the first, a value is anything which a person 
or ~ersons actually approve, desire, affirm, or exert themselves to obtain, preserve, or 
ass:st. According to the second meaning, a value is anything which ought to be approved, 
des:r~d, and so forth, whether or not any given person or persons in fact do adopt these 
positive attitudes toward it. Values in the first sense are human preferences which can 
be systematically described by the regular tools of empirical inquiry such as those em­
~loyed in sociology, anthropology, and psychology. Values in the second sense are not 
bacts at all, but ideals, standards, or norms by which actual human preferences are to 
_e a~p~aised; they are not obtainable by empirical inquiry but by revelation, rational 
inftuition, personal decision, or social convention usually contained in the traditions 
0 the civilization. 
. What Americans actually do crave in 1960, or will desire in 1970 or 1980 obvi-
ous1Y is a d · 1 -n wi 1 be far different from what they ought to want. A popular demand for 
amusement and t • 11 . . . .di . 
1 
. ranqui izers may make these things more valuable in the first sense than 
r:fcip ined skill and sympathy for those who suffer, but in the second sense the order of
P erence may be · t th .would b Jus e reverse. Agreement between the desired and the desirable 
e found only in a society of saints, and we cannot yet claim to have achieved that 
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condition. 
Necessary though this distinction is, I do not think we must simply choose be­
tween the two meanings of value. Instead, they must be maintained in constant reciprocal 
tension. Acknowledgment of desire without ethical criticism by a standard of obligation 
simply confirms the status quo. On the other hand, affirmation of ideals without regard 
to actual human wants or interests makes these standards irrelevant and ineffective. 
The two contrasting conceptions of value are particularly evident in educational 
practice. Value in the sense of what people actually want underlies education emphasiz­
ing the felt needs and interests of the learner. Value in the sense of what people ought 
to want underlies education emphasizing discipline, standards, and tradition. I am con­
vinced that wa need not choose the one or the other, but that the educator's task is to 
secure continuity between the interests of the learner and standards of excellence which 
transcend the immediate desires of the immature. This goal can be realized only if there 
is a basic harmony between informed desire and the truly excellent; that is to say, only 
if human longings provide clues to and directions toward ideal values and if ideals are 
confirmed and verified in the fulfillment of enduring human wants. 
Tue distinction between values as actual desires and as desirable goals has im­
portant bearings on the question of changes in values. Actual wants are modified along 
with the conditions of society and culture. Many of the things people value today, such 
as automobiles and the thirty-hour week, were not values for earlier generations simply 
because these objects of desire did not then exist as genuine possibilities. Over the 
next ten to twenty years our rapidly changing technical civilization is bound to intro­
duce many new things which will be desired, thus significantly modifying the actual value 
system of American society. 
On the other hand, normative values - ideal standards - are independent of or 
less dependent on particular cultural changes. According to some thinkers, there are 
certain "ultimate" values which are absolute and unchanging. Thus, they would say, the 
values we should live by and educate for will be the same in 1970-1980 at a profound 
level will be the same as those of today or of a century or a millennium ago, but they 
will necessarily exercise their power in human life in the new shapes of things in years 
to come, and to that extent will be different values. 
I forsee and welcome the increasing unification of the descriptive and normative 
concepts of value. We are going to be increasingly dissatisfied with values which are 
presented either as detached eternal principles or as the shifting interests and conven­
tions of particular cultures. Tue realization is going to grow that the proper ideals o f 
civilization must find their justification in the facts of human nature. The humanly 
valuable is that which sustains the most complete actualizing of the potentialities res­
ident in human nature. Thus I predict that the educationally significant values of futu re 
decades will be established increasingly on a humanistic and scientific foundation and 
that the old polarity of absolutism and relativism in values will disappear. 
I believe that empirical investigators of man and society - social scientists and 
psychologists - will more and more become concerned wtth the ethical consequences of their 
inquiries; that is, with the salient facts about human nature, its potentialities, and 
the necessrry conditions for their fulfillment which these studies reveal. I believe 
further that these scientific investigations will increasingly be confirmed, corrected, 
and supplemented by the traditionally humanistic studies, so that there will emerge at 
length a unified and coherent idea of man and his possibilities which will become the 
basis for a secure knowledge of human values. As the years pass I forsee the disappear­
ance of the boundary between those who investigate facts - the scientists - and those who 
purvey ideals -- the prophets, mystics, and moral philosophers. I envision, not long 
hence, a time when aspirations will be disciplined by a knowledge of the humanly actual 
and possible ,rnd when scientific inquiry will be devoted to the discovery and realization 
of the summum bonum. 
What can now be said, in a tentative way, about the realistic ideals which shou ld 
guide us Americans a decade or two hence? What do humanistic and scientific inquiries t o 
date suggest as values appropriate to the era into which our civilization is now moving ? 
Here I can only suggest in broad outline the values I see emerging, with only passing ref ­
erence to the evidence for their rootage in the facts of human nature. 
The b,,sic values are human personality and its social concomitant, democracy. 
The emerging American civilization for which we should struggle is founded upon the twin 
ideals of fre~dom and responsibility; that is to say, of maximum personal realization 
within the context of social justice. Furthermore, because personality is social in it s 











































These are still high abstractions. They need now to be more precisely analyzed. 
To this end, I suggest that human realization encompasses four pivotal values; namely, 
intelligence, creativity, conscience, and reverence. These are the pillars of selfhood 
and democracy. These are the value-foundations for American education of 1970-1980 and 
beyond. 
INTELLIGENCE 
First, then, intelligence. Human beings are of the species homo sapiens. It is 
by virtue of :intelligence that man is distinguished from the lower animals. Reason is 
the sovereign tool by which all the achievements of culture are possible. The capacity 
to make, to decide, and to worship - all the other values which we shall discuss - de­
pend upon rational insight. We must awaken to the realization that primary concern for 
intelligence does not mean an exclusive aristocratic intellectualism. Democracy pre­
supposes full development of reason in all members of society o No other ideal of human 
organization places so high a premium on intelligence. When a so-called democracy in the 
uncritical pu:rsui t of equality develops anti-intellectual mediocrity and commonplace­
ness, that society is on the road to degradation and ultimately to subversion by clever 
and unscrupulous tyrants. 
We shall need to value highly the ability to think clearly and cogently, to dis­
criminate meanings with precision, to argue validly and to detect the fallacies in inval­
id arguments, to know good evidence from bad, and to use sources of knowledge responsi­
bly. Scientific methods must become widely understood and the spirit of critical inquiry 
must suffuse our common life. At the same time, we will come to see that not all compe­
tent thinking proceeds according to the canons of deductive logic or of experimental in­
vestigation in the natural sciences. The specific and unique methods of thought in the 
social and psychological sciences, in historical study, in philosophy, literature, and 
the other art:; will be recognized and appropriately applied. 
There must arise a new dedication to the ancient ideal of truth, to the fullest 
possible correspondence between word and fact, between symbol and act. More and more the 
fabric of civilization will be woven of verbal symbols, and correspondingly important 
will be the preservation of integrity in the employment of these instruments. Our pre­
sent-day carelessness with language and our commonly practiced hypocrisy and deceit must 
promptly be sEien in their true light as exceedingly virulent poisons to civilized exist­
ence, and a renewed respect for words and their responsible employment must speedily de­
velop. 
Of particular urgency is the establishment of the intellectual integrity of the 
mass media of communication. As never before in human history, time and distance have 
been annihilated by instruments for the transmission of symbols, and the whole life of 
mankind has bE,en made available to each person, wherever or whoever he is, by these com­
mon agencies c,f information. The simple and settled symbolic environments of the past 
have been replaced by a complex and rapidly shifting envelope of sight and sound com­
pacted of elements from far and near. For this unprecedented and surprising development 
our traditiona l patterns of judgment and control do not suffice. What has commonly been 
regarded as an interesting "fringe benefit" of modern technology, to be employed for the 
more efficient conduct of old business or for amusement, must henceforth be recognized as 
what it is: the most potent and most pervasive culture-forming and character-forming in­
f luence in modern society. 
From this recognition will spring tomorrow's demand for a keener sense of respon­
sibility for truth in what is published and broadcast. The concept of freedom of speech
through the mass media must be re-examined to ascertain the limits beyond which freedom 
in this public domain becomes dangerous license and a means to the most profoundenslave ­
ment _of others. At the same time, a premium must be placed on the cultivation of criti­
cal_Judgment in all citizens, so that they may better sift truth from falsehood and ex­
ercise selectivity in what they attend to and accept. 
CREATIVITY 
_After intelligence, the next pivotal value is creativity. Human beings are not 
~nlyd thinkers and knowers but also makers. No person can achieve his full measure of man-
oo unless he en · . . . . .ic . gages in acts of creation. Such creativity is thus in essence anesthet-
experience M:>de • • i · . . .produ t· · rn c1v1 1zat1on, with its concern for power and sheer quantity of 
with~ i~n, _has tended to neglect the qualitative dimensions of experience. Obsession 
ec anism has dulled our sensitivity to significant forms. Meaning has been 
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sacrificed to efficiency, and life has thereby been impoverished. The feeling of depth 
in appreciation of delightful things has been replaced by the superficial and partial 
understanding necessary for technical mastery and manipulation. 
These dehumanizing tendencies in contemporary culture should give way before a 
growing awareness of the importance of the es the tic - of beauty and elegance, of good 
taste and culcivated style. Especially as we move into an age in which machines will 
take over from human beings most of the chores which have hitherto kept us from the free 
choice of qualitative enjoyment, the need to recognize the importance of the creative 
arts in the enhancement of human life will become evident. Esthetic resources will no 
longer be chiefly for serious pursuit by a professional elite or for the amusement of the 
idle rich or of the ''beats." They must be ingredients in the common life, raising it 
above the commonplace to new levels of immediate significance and satisfaction. 
One of the features of modern Alllerican culture which most clearly betrays our 
present lack of concern for quality of experience is the disintegration of manners. In 
the name of equality, modernity, and democracy traditional patterns of social conduct 
have been abandoned and customary modes of showing respect and consideration have become 
matters of individual choice rather than of social constraint. 
I forecast a revived interest in manners. We shall once again realize that cus­
tomary acts of deference and traditional styles of deportment are not necessarily undemo­
cratic, but aJ:e in fact essential to democratic culture. Manners may be hypocritical and 
humiliating to others or they may be sincere and exalting. An urgent task for the future 
of Alllerica is the formation of a code of expected behavior which will vividly express 
that respect :for each person's dignity which is the wellspring of democratic order. Such 
a code will be based upon a due regard for significant functional differences. We must 
not connnit the blunder of confusing equality of personal right and dignity with identity 
of social function. 
This renewed emphasis on the ennobling formalities of life will provide sorely 
needed social symbols for the celebration of our common life. We are today ceremonially 
impoverished. For the future we require an array of vivid and familiar acts with which 
to express ove,rtly the convictions by which we live as a people. 
In quite a different way, the value of creativity will be acknowledged in a fresh 
assessment of the significance of work. Because man is by nature a maker, he must ful­
fill his being through productive labor. Because he is by nature social, he must serve 
others in exchange for their efforts on his behalf. In past eras of human history the 
attitude toward work has been at best ambiguous. For many if not most people it has been 
regarded, often not without justification, as a burden or a curse rather than as acre­
ative opportunity. As we consider the future of our civilization, it is then not unnat­
ural to expect that many will value highly the progressive emancipation from labor which 
advancing machine production makes possible. I believe such a simple extrapolation from 
the past is quite mistaken, and that values for the new age must not include escape from 
work but a restoration of the ideal of work as creative vocation. 
Modern man is haunted by a feeling of emptiness, despite the ceaseless busyness 
of his existence. His days are filled with activity, he travels quickly and produces 
things efficiently, but he is gnawed by a sense of meaningless and futility. Why? In 
large part because he does not find in his daily occupation sufficient opportunity to 
realize significant purposes which are truly his own. He regards himself as an inter­
changeable part in an impersonal social mechanism. 
Therefore, high on the agenda for tomorrow's American should be the rediscovery 
of authentic vocation. The next generation must be enabled to experience widely what the 
creative minority have always know: the joy and salvation in significant work. Thiswill 
require a reduction in the value assigned to mere speed and efficiency of production. 
Modern concepts of narrow specialization will have to be revised in favor of broader in­
dividual grasp of the total productive process. Prevailing patterns of centralized in­
dustrial organization and hierarchical control will need to be altered to permit a higher 
degree of individual participation and responsibility. 
Complementing the value of true vocation there should be a reconstruction of the 
ideal of play. The long-term purposes of work require supplementing by the immediacies 
of recreation. Human creativity has a rhythmic character. It does not retain its zest 
and freshness under the demands of unremitting work. Its fruition depends upon the per­
iodic alternation of short- and long-range activities. Yet, properly conceived, play is 
not merely surcease from work. It should not be regarded simply as temporary release and 
relief from the burdens of the job. Its value lies in the contrast in type of creative 






























Perhaps the onset of the do-it-yourself age gives some hint as to the quality· of 
play we shall increasingly learn to prize. Surely the spirit of man the maker cannot 
long find satisfaction in cheap amusements and in watching other people play. Nor will 
the mul tiplic.c1. tion of manufactured gadgets for young or old answer the deeply felt need 
to exercise the capacity for free, imaginative experiment and construction. We are 
waking up to the obvious truth that the joy of play is in the playing, not in merely ob­
serving what others do or in possessing what others have made. 
creative play for the future, I submit, will pe marked by simplicity- perhaps 
even by a touch of the ascetic. As life in so many respects necessarily becomes more 
complicated, we shall yearn for some experience of plainness. As the marvels of tech­
nology mutiply about us, we shall long for some unprefabricated crudeness to which we 
can individually and personally lend form and refinement. As pain and hardship are pro­
gressively lifted from us, we shall seek in play some chance to prove our physical cour­
age and power to endure. 
Finally, play is necessary to democracy, for it is one of the clearest expres­
sions of freedom. Man who do not know how to play are slaves, not free men. Further­
more, any form of play which is dictated by society is not truly play, because it is not 
free. Recreational activity in accord with the democratic ideal grows from individual 
choice or consent. It is a measure and mark of an open society in which the unique qual­
ities o f each person are recognized and encouraged. 
CONSCIENCE 
I turn now to the third great value. To intelligence and creativity we must add 
the value of conscience, or moral purpose. To make moral choices is fundamental to human 
nature. To be free is to be able to choose. Freedom is perfected as choice follows the 
p ... :i.n ciples required by the facts of human nature and potent:i.a:i.i i.y. For convenience, let 
us consider some of the crucial elements in the moral conscience by reference to man's 
relationships first to nature, then to himself, and finally to other people in his en­
vironment. 
One of the most critical re-evaluations American are going to be forced tomake, 
a nd that no long hence, concerns our employment of natural resources. The technical rev­
o lution o f modern times has put in our hands unprecedented powers of exploiting nature. 
Man has becom~i the major force in geologic change. He has gained mastery of material 
things, tamed the wild energies of the cosmos, and turned erstwhile natural enemies into 
servants of his will. 
At length the realization is dawning that nature's bounty has limits and that man 
ha s responsibilities for the wise administration of his natural estate. Even though the 
continued growth of cities will continue to take our people away from the soil and from a 
life which automatically breeds respect for the earth as the source of all material well­
being , I am confident that a more vivid awareness of our dependence on nature is inevit­
able. We shall not much longer be able to take abundant material resources for granted. 
We shall need to deal quickly and decisively with the population explosion . The volun­
tary limitation of family size must be widely encouraged. Respect for individual dignity 
and worth dictates that procreation be regulated by due concern for the optimum balance 
between population a nd resources. Here is an issue in which the practical consequences 
of a belief ir, the basic value of human personality are vividly apparent. 
Parallel to this heightened valuation of nature must be increased respect for the 
human organisrr. and greater con cern f o r its healthful functioning. We have mistakenly 
tended to regard the inges tion of materials into the body, whether in the solid, liquid, 
or vaporous stat e , a s no t morally significant . As more is learned about the consequences 
of overeating , d rinking, and inhaling various substances, the value of choosing the whole­
some and avoiding the noxio us ones will become clearer. I hope and expect that in the 
1 970' s we shall be well on our way toward an assessment of diet, alcohol consumption, 
tobacco use, and drug employment which will be founded upon well-tested knowledge of 
human phy · 1f sio ogy and p sycho logy rather than upon the pronouncements of faddists and re-
ormers or upon aversive reactions to moralistic zealots. Eating, drinking, and smoking 
a r1 matters of moral conscience, not merely of personal taste and inclination. A high 
~a ue for our civilization should be the cultivation of healthful habits and social en­
orhsement of the same witho ut any imputation of dreariness or intolerance on account of 
sue advocacy. 
t si ·t· 1'-t:>S of the claims of conscience involve social relationships. Perhaps the most 
gni icant of these d f · 1 l"f · · ·ide b . concern sex an ami y 1 e. In no domain is the formulation of an 1 
a S~ simple extrapolation of present tendencies more misleading than in the ethics of 
sex. ince FrPud, and more recently Kinsey, the idea has become commonplace that fairly 
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uninhibited sexual activity best meets the needs of human nature. I do not think the 
most searching analysis of the psychology of sex supports this evaluation. I anticipate 
a growing, informed conviction as to the importance and healthfulness of appropriate dis­
cipline of sexual drives. I believe attention will move away from the view .of sex as a 
natural animal appetite which should be regularly gratified to one in which the spiritual 
and personalistic dimensions of sex are regarded as paramount, so that direction and con­
trol of the biological impulse become the crucial considerations. 
Democracy in sexual relations will not, as some incorrectly assume, mean license 
and promiscuity. On the =ntrary, it will mean the use of sex as a way of serving and 
honoring another person - as the expression of self-giving devotion to one with whom a 
unique, enduring, and profound relationship of mutual fidelity and support has been estab­
lished. Thus, the monogamous family with marriage for life will remain as a fundamental 
of the democratic ideal. 
We shall also need to reconsider some current assumptions about the equality of 
the sexes. While the trend toward equality of occupational opportunity for men and 
women probably will not and most likely should not be reversed, a greater value should be 
placed on the differences between males and females. Democracy does not presuppose iden­
tity and interchangeability of persons, as in a collectivist society, but rather the or­
chestration of differences into a rich and harmonious social commonwealth. We need to 
examine much more thoroughly the ways in which the special qualities inherent in male­
ness and femaleness may be employed for the enhancement of life. 
We should grow in our appreciation of other differences too. Conscience does not 
require equality in all things, but equity in accomodating qualitative variation. Each 
person should have an opportunity to develop to the full his special talents. None 
should be constrained to conform to others, and condemned to mediocrity, on the strength 
of a simple (and quite undemocratic) egalitarian dogma. 
Still, this affirmation of individual differences in no way negates the tradi­
tional and enduring American opposition to social classes. The classless society is an 
authentic part of our democratic ideal. we acknowledge differences, and we grant the 
technical usefulness of classifying people by such indices as age, sex, income, place of 
residence, and occupation. But we know, or ought to know, that such groupings are ab­
stractions, valid only for limited statistical purposes, and that they do not represent 
real lines of division between actual people. Such designations as "middle income," 
"southern," and "manual worker," for example, do not mark people off into separate sub­
species of the species homo sapiens, justifying total treatment as a class, including 
aspects of life other than the special characteristics defining each group. We must hold 
high the importance of treating each person on his own merits, recognizing his unique 
array of characteristics, each of which puts him in a classification with others similar 
in that one nispect. Every person is abstractly classifiable in an infinite number of 
ways, but no one should ever be identified concretely and personally, and dealt with 
totally, as a member of any class or group. 
A particular vivid illustration of the ideal of classlessness is found in the 
principle of racial equality. In few if any other matters of social concern is moral 
conscience more surely guided by the empirical study of human nature than in race rela­
tions. Such study reveals with great clarity how superficial are the characteristics by 
which one so-called "race" is distinguished from another, how fundamentally alike we all 
are under the skin, and to what a major extent alleged inborn racial traits are in fact 
produced by alterable social conditions. While the scientific study of human nature does 
not automatically prove the value of human personality or the desirability of brotherly 
attitudes, it at least exposes the falsehoods upon which most racial prejudice rests, 
demonstrates the baneful social and psychological consequences of racial discrimination, 
shows the compatibility of non-discriminatory policies with the known facts of human in­
heritance and development, and helps to supply the means for eliminating the sources and 
effects of racial bias. 
The already growing realization of racial equality in all of the major spheres of 
social life - economic, residential, legal, political, educational, vocational, and reli­
gious - must continue as a key imperative for the moral conscience of America. 
With respect to economic values generally, I believe that material accumulation 
is likely to diminish as a dominant goal for many Americans. It should become apparent 
that wealth can be burdensome as well as satisfying and that material goods do not in 
themselves produce felicity. Human beings thrive not on surfeit but on modest suffi­
ciency . Nevertheless, private ownership and control of property, within limits, must 
continue as a basic democratic value. The sphere of social control of property rights, 
through taxation and government ownership or regulation, cannot without severe damage be 








means of guarding individual security and insuring personal incentive but also as a vis­
ible symbol of the freedom of the human person and of his integrity and inviolability. 
At the same time, and on the same principles, we shall insist upon the right to 
the means of healthful subsistence of persons who, because of their age or through mis­
fortune or incapacity of any kind, are unable to earn a livelihood. We should also so 
organize our economic life that material rewards beyond the subsistence level are in 
proportion to social contribution. 
Under our conditions of increasing economic complexity and interdependence we 
shall of necessity place increasingly high value on the ability to manage economic re­
sources knowledgeably and equitably. We shall depend very heavily upon those who both 
understand the intricacies of the economic machine and are dedicated to the ideals of 
distributive justice. But we cannot rely upon managers or bureaucrats alone, however 
wise and just. The security and prosperity of our material existence rest ultimately 
upon the assumption by each citizen of moral responsibility to do his work with dili­
gence and, when required, to render a scrupulously honest accounting of his financial 
stewardship. 
rvving now from economic to political morality, it should certainly be evident 
that the awesome problems of our corporate life necessitate an upward revision in the 
importance assigned to political life and leadership. Politics must cease to be regard­
ed as the characteristic domain of scoundrels and opportunists. The ideal of statesman­
ship as a high (if not the highest) calling must be reinstated. Furthermore, we must 
dispel the pseudo-democratic notion that all men are equally competent to govern, and 
abandon our p€:rilous practice of electing to positions of high leadership commonplace 
men and women with whom we feel at ease but who do not inspire our profound admiration 
and respect. Representative government ought to mean that our elected officials repre­
sent us not as we on the average are, but as we aspire to be, and this requires calling 
to public service men and women of the most extraordinary ability and character. 
It is one of the truly astonishing facts of modern history that American consti­
tutional government, though devised for a newly formed, sparsely settled agricultural 
society, stil] persists in its essential features nearly two centurees later as an ef­
fective instrwnent for the control of our present populous industrial commonwealth. We 
hold now as firmly as ever to such basic American democratic principles as a majority 
rule, minorit~ rights, and the separation of powers. What remains is the concrete appli­
cation of our political ideals under the altered conditions of the new age. 
Tulo current problems are particularly urgent. First, in a world where decisive 
governmental action must sometimes be taken q.iickly, there may not always be time for the 
relatively slow deliberative processes of representative assemblies to operate. It is 
likely that we shall need to give higher value in the future to freedom and flexibility 
of executive action, still reserving to the legislative and judicial bodies - ultimately 
to the people as a whole - the right and duty to review, revise, and recall. Such an 
enhancement of executive prerogatives goes hand in hand with the aforementioned insis­
tence on the selection of superior persons for positions of leadership. 
The second problem is related to the first but opposite in emphasis. Our enor­
mous size and power tend to create in the average citizen a sense of political impotence 
and hence indifference. We need to recapture in the megapolitan age the high value of 
individual civic responsibility that characterized the citizens when all government was 
done in the town meeting. This can be achieved only if we as a people resist the trend 
toward indefinite centralization of government in all fields and reserve to states and 
local communities well-defined and significant powers and responsibilities. To the same 
nde , ~twill also be important to preserve the local stake in federal government through
the vigorous pursuit of the honored activity of party politics. 
A final aspect of social conscience is concerned with world responsibility. 
need not elaborate the obvious importance of world-mindedness. National and local pro-
vincialism is be o · · · 1 d'ff' 1 d d · ·Tr c ming increasing y 1. 1.cu tan angerous in our interdependent world. 
av~l abroad is just now coming within the reach of most Americans. Overseas military 
sembrv7c~, bu~iness in other countries, governmental foreign service, and student travel are 
co 1.n1.ng with ordi t · 1 · · · · nary ouri sm, wor d news coverage, visits from citizens of other lands, 
and numerous int lt . . . .ercu ura1 exchanges to make Americans vividly conscious oi other places
and peoples. 
but T~is world-knowledge and these world-associations add richness to our experience
1emb a so impose heavy demands and create fresh conflicts. Our moral horizons must now 
ownracet_all peoples. We shall now have to value the security and welfare not only of our 
na ion but of k.i d . man n everywhere. The value assigned to national self-preservation, 
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with its concomitant exaltion of armed might, must be exceeded by devotion to human 
welfare everywhere and by the untiring determination to create a family of nations living 
in peace and cooperation. 
The preservation of world order is, in fact, the primal imperative for modern 
man. With the present destructive powers at the disposal of all major nations, civili­
zation and all of its values will be destroyed unless general armed conflict can be 
avoided. In the event of war, none of the values previously discussed would have any 
practical worth, for there would exist no tolerable physical basis within which they 
could re realized. From this fact the fundamental value of measures which will secure 
reasonable global stability is readily evident. 
One of the ways in which world peace is today being promoted is through the study 
of other cultural traditions. While I do not doubt the contemporary worth of this under­
taking, I venture the somewhat unorthodox prediction that large-scale cross-cultural ex­
plorations will become less and less useful, because a world culture will emerge and at 
length envelop and absorb all prior cultures. At the risk of being charged with hope­
less provincialism, I further predict that this world culture will be largely character­
ized by the scientific outlook and modern democratic ideals. This speculation rests on 
the conviction that science and democracy are substantially more in accord with the fact s 
and potentialities of human nature than most nonscientific and nondemocratic cultural 
systems. This viewpoint suggests that the values suitable for America's future may also 
be in their major outlines values for the coming world civilization, and thus for all 
mankind. Americans should not be ashamed to have a mission in the world, provided it is 
performed in humility and in full obedience to the principles of critical inquiry and 
democratic persuasion. 
REVERENCE 
The last of the four fundamental values is reverence. Intelligence, creativj~y, 
and conscience are undergirded and completed by reverence. This is the office of re­
ligion, broadly conceived. By religion I mean concern with and devotion to the ultimate, 
which may be understood and symbolized in many ways, as in the great historical reli­
gions (and outside of them also). The ultimate refers to the sources and ends of our 
being, to the matters of supreme worht - of life-and-death import - and to our attitude 
toward experience in its depth and totality. As I see it, human nature is inescapably 
faced with religious questions. Reason forever drives beyond finite understanding, the 
human powers of creation unceasingly seek to plumb new depths of being, and conscience 
remains unsatisfied with its proximate forms of justice. Reverence is the perception of 
the inexhaustible wellsprings of truth, beauty, and goodness, and devotion to the ever 
fuller realization of these values. 
Reverence is the saving grace and the generative power of civilization. It saves 
us from the arrogant presumption that we ever possess perfect knowledge, unsurpassable 
loveliness, or absolute righteousness. Its infinite ideal lures us ever on to the higher 
levels of civilized achievement. Reverence is also the final guardian of democracy, be­
cause it refutes the absolute claim of any person or group of persons. It submits every 
person and system to the judgment of superior and yet unrealized possibilities. 
That the trend of our times is toward increased religious interest is generally 
agreed. How much of this is a retreat from the anxieties and stern demands of the pre ­
sent age into the ready-made answers of traditional faiths it is difficult to estimate. 
I suspect that much of the alleged religious revival of our times does not spring from 
reverence. Nevertheless, I do believe that modern men are groping toward reverence. 
They desperately want to experience a devotion to something more than their own small a nd 
pitiable lives and their own frail and fallible institutions. I believe that in the 
1960's, 1970's and 1980's, as in all epochs of human history, reverence will be the con ­
summatory human value, and that all the ideals of our civilization will find theirproper 
ground a nd goal in the vision of holiness. 
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In his book, The r«>ral Judgment of the Child (10), Piaget presented a theory con­
cerning the development of moral judgment. In general, he outlined systematic changes 
with age in children's moral judgments. These changes are a function of age insofar as 
the child's chronological age defines the nature and quality of his social relationships • 
Specifically, Piaget emphasized the importance of the progression from the constraint ex­
ercised by the unilateral authority of parental discipline in early childhood to a rela­
tionship of cooperation existing among peers in the later childhood years. 
one aspect of the transition with age in moral judgment is a change in the child's 
notion of justice. The young child tends to emphasize the rightness and necessity of 
strict punishment and the importance of submitting to parental dictates; later he is con­
cerned with equality among peers and with types of punishment that more nearly "fit the 
crime." Piaget examined a number of aspects of the child's developing sense of justice. 
111ese include the child's attitude toward the necessity and efficacy of physical punish­
ment; the child's selection of various types of punishment, reflecting his position re­
garding expiatory punishments as opposed to punishments by reciprocity; his belief in 
immanent justice; his notions pertaining to distributive or equalitarian justice; and 
finally, the child's judgment in situations which pit the demands of adult authority 
against the child's desire for equality of treatment among siblings and pee,rs. 
11J.e present paper is concerned only with the child's belief in immanent justice. 
Piaget attributed the child's belief in the inevitability of punishment to adult con­
straint. Children are often made to feel that accidental falls and minor injuries are 
punishments because their parents have said, "It serves you right"; "That will teach you 
to be careful"; or , "God made it happen to teach you a lesson." Piaget noted elsewhere 
(8, p. 247) the tendency in children to regard the whole world as aware of their mid­
deeds, and thE!ir tendency to feel that they are being seen and watched by objects in the 
u niverse, such as the sun and the moon. The child's belief in the moral necessity of the 
physical laws which go vern the Universe is related to his belief that everything in na­
ture is "constructed, intentional, and coherent (9, p. 216)." Since the child also tends 
t o ascribe o mniscience to adults, the commands which he receives from them are regarded 
as a part of the system of laws governing the Universe. Consequently, children are led 
to believe that nature and objects in the physical environment are accomplices of their 
parents in guaranteeing the infliction of punishment for any and all wrongdoing. Chil­
dren's belief in the existence of automatic punishments which emanate from things arises 
primarily, then, from the unilateral relationship existing between children and adults. 
Later, through experiences which show that wrongdoing may go unpunished and virtue may 
go unrewarded, through the discovery of the imperfection of adult justice, combined with 
the child's intellectual development, belief in immanent justice diminishes. 
Piaget (10, p. 251) listed the following percentages of children at the various 
age levels who affirmed the existence of immanent justice: age 6, 86 per cent; ages 7-8, 
7 3 per cent; ages 9-10, 54 per cent; and ages 11-12, 34 per cent. 
B. REVIEW OF RELATED LITERAIDRE 
A number o f investiga tors have attempted to verify Piaget's findings on other 
social and etbnical groups , and to identify various factors related to the development of 
relativistic 1hinking in the moral judgment area. Only the studies and the sections of 
the studies dealing with immanent justice will be discussed. 
. In an investigation of moral realism in American children, Lerner (4) obtained 
value Judgmen1s from 389 children in the first six grades of the public school system of 
an eastern community. Children from two different socio-economic levels of the city were 
used; one group came from the upperclass residential districts and the other group was 
drawn f rom the poorer section populated primarily by people of foreign extraction. 
~ r ner,asked o ne questio n pertaining to immanent justice. His findings agree with 
:1aget sin showing a decrease with age in the number of children expressing a belief in 
:~anent justice. 'lhis decrease was more pronounced, however, among those children from 
e better socio-economic group. 
Liu (5), at Columbia University, investigated the influence of cultural back-
ground on the mo 1 . d f . . . . 
1 . ra JU gment o children. He attempted to define differences in moral rea ism responses between Chinese- and non-Chinese-American children which could not be 
accounted for by diffe . . 11 · . . .ad rences in inte igence and socio-economic status. Ll.u also found 
ecrease in beli f · • . .non-ch· . e in immanent Justice from age 6 to 12 but at each age level more 
ing inese children revealed a belief in immanent justice. Liu concluded that decreas­
1mora realism is not due to age maturity alone. 
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Abel (1) employed Piaget's technique to study the moral judgments of mentally 
retarded girls. Comparisons were made between groups in terms of institutionalization, 
length of institutionalization, and mental age. The subjects were 94 subnormal adoles­
cent white girls with chronological ages ranging from 15 to 21 years and mental ages from 
6 through 11. Seventy~four of the subjects were institutionalized at a New York state 
institution for mental defectives; the other 20 were attending trade adjustment · classes 
in the Manhattan High School for Women's Garment Trades. In the comparison between the 
institutionalized girls and those living in the community, it was found that approxi­
mately twice as many of the former gave responses which indicated a belief in immanent 
justice. A greater percentage of those institutionalized over six years expressed a 
belief in immanent justice as compared with those institutionalized under one year. No 
difference in response was found between· two groups equated for chronological age but 
differing in mental age. 
MacRae (6) administered a questionnaire containing moral judgment qu'estions drawn 
from Piaget's work, and other similar · questions, together with a set of questions about 
the child's social relations (background variables), to a group of 244 boys between the 
ages of 5 and 14. The questionnaire included two stories designed to elicit the subjects' 
position with regard to belief in immanent justice. Although in general MacRae found a 
decrease over the age range in the children's belief in immanent justice, the trend was 
not consistent. For both stories, a smaller percentage of the five- and six-year-olds 
gave responses which were scored as indicating a belief in immanent punishment than did 
the nine- and ten-year-olds. 
Al though Dennis (2), in his work with Hopi Indian children, was primarily con­
cerned with the concept of animism, he also questioned his subjects regarding their be ­
lief in immanent punishment. Ninety-eight subjects, 43 girls and 55 boys, between the 
ages of 12 anci 18 years were examined. Dennis found that 64 per cent of his youngest 
subjects indicated a belief in the immanence of punishment. This figure decreased mark­
edly with age, standing at 47 per cent for the 14- and 15-year-olds, and dropping to only 
9 per cent among the 16- and 17-year-olds. These percentage figures were uniformly high­
er than those found by Lerner (4) on white ciildren, but were below those obtained by 
Abel (1) on institutionalized feeble-minded girls of comparable chronological ages. 
Dennis concluded that t he differences in the rate at which early ideas concerning animi sm 
are abandoned in Hopi and white communities may be due to a variety of cultural factors 
which remain, as yet, unidentified. Dennis contended, however, that "the earliest ideas 
of children are uniform in all societies and are the product of universal child experi­
ences and of mental maturity (2, p. 35)." 
As a part of the Indian Education Research Project of the Committee on Human De ­
velopment of the University of Chicago and the United States Office of Indian Affairs, 
Havighurst and co-workers (3) studied the moral and emotional development of Indian chi l­
dren. In the overall field project; 902 Indian children from six Indian tribes in the 
age range from 6 to 18 years were studied. One part of the larger study is pertinent t o 
the present discussion. concerning immanent justice, the authors attempted to test 
Piaget's hypothesis that, in contrast to children in modern societies, children in prim­
itive societies become more rather than less rigid in their moral ideas as they grow 
older because these societies exercise an increasing amount of moral constraint on them . 
Thus, if these societies have a view of the world order which includes a supernatural 
power that watches over men and rewards and punishes their actions, then belief in im­
manent justice will be as strong in older children as it is in younger children or per­
haps even stronger. The findings in this study showed that there was either an increase 
or no change with age in the children's belief in immanent justice for most of the group s 
studied. With the exception of one of the Indian groups, the proportion of the 12- to 18 
year-olds indicating a belief in immanent justice was approximately 85 per cent. At the 
younger ages the proportion believing in innnanent justice tended to be smaller. These 
data seem to substantiate Piaget's theory concerning belief in immanent justice in primi­
tive societies. They do not, however, agree with D3nnis's (2) findings in his study of 
Hopi children discussed above in which he found a marked decrease with age in belief in 
immanent justice. 
To test the hypothesis of a relationship between belief in immanent justice and 
degree of acculturation, Havighurst divided the people from one of the Hopi communities 
into three groups with differing degrees of acculturation. The three groups were hardly 
distinguishable in their percentage of immanent justice responses. These investigators 
concluded that, rather than looking to the concept of primitive cultures subject to vary­
ing degrees of influence from a modern culture for an explanation of these results, "we 
must look for total environmental factors within each group of Indians and of whites to 
explain the results given by that particular group (3, p. 153)." 
In discussing these results, Thompson (11) argued that the basic religious orien­





















deeply rooted in the tribal past and persists regardless of changes in the group's eco­
nomy or exposure to white cul tu res. This would seem to account, at least in part, for 
the lack of n?lationship between the degree of acculturation and belief in immanent jus-
tice, 
In sum, a number of investigators have sought to verify and extend Piaget's find­
ings concerning changes with age in children's belief in immanent justice. These studies 
have supported Piaget's data regarding a decrease in belief in immanent justice with age . 
In a comparison of children from two different socio-economic levels, Lerner found this 
decrease to be more pronounced among the children from the better socio-economic group . 
Liu, contrasting Chinese- and non-Chincese-American children, reported that more non­
Chinese than Chinese children revealed a belief in immanent justice at each age level 
from 6 to 12. Abel's comparison of the responses of two groups of mentally-deficient 
girls showed little relationship between mental age and belief in immanent justice. Abel 
interpreted the differences which she found between institutionalized girls and girls 
living in the community as indicating the constraining influence of an institutional at­
mosphere. Though MacRae found a decrease in belief in immanent justice from age 7 to 14, 
this trend was reversed at the five- and six-year leavels where the percentage of sub­
jects expressing this belief was comparable to the 11- to 12-year level. Dennis found a 
higher proportion of Hopi children expressing a belief in immanent punishment than is 
usually found among white children. The decrease with age in this belief which Dennis 
found was not supported by Havighurst' s findings in a study of six American Indian tribes. 
C. PROCEDURE 
1. Description of the Subjects 
TWO hL.ndred and forty children, 30 boys and 30 girls, at each of the following 
four age levels, 6, 8, 10 and 12, served as subjects in the present study. The subjects 
were selected from the lower socio-economic groups, specifically from Classes V, VI, and 
VII according to the Minnesota Scale for Paternal Occupations (7). Children from these 
groups were u~.ed so that the sample would be as comparable as possible to that used by 
Piaget who studied children from "the poorer parts of Geneva" (10, footnote, p.37) . 
2. Method 
EightE•en story-situations and questions drawn from Piaget were administered to 
each subject individually. The subjects' responses to the questions were recorded ver­
batim by the e•xaminer. Only those two items pertaining to immanent justice will be dis­
cussed in this paper. The two stories which were employed to elicit the subjects ' posi­
tion with regard to belief in immanent justice were: 
Story I 
There was once a little boy who didn't mind his mother. He 
took the scissors one day when he had been told not to. While he 
was trying to cut some paper, he cut his finger. 
Why did he cut his finger? 
If his mother had said it was all right if he used the 
scissors, would he have cut himself just the same? 
Story II 
Once there were two children who were walking by a house in 
the country. There were some apple trees out in the yard in front 
of the house. No one was around so they went into the yard and 
stole some apples. Suddenly a man came out of the house and ran 
af~er them. He caught one of the boys but the other one got away. 
This one crossed a river on a rotten bridge and he fell into the 
water. 
Why do you think the boy fell into the water? 
If he had not stolen the apples but he had crossed the river 
on that rotten bridge, would he have fallen into the water anyway?
Why? 
dicated F~llowing Lerner's method of scoring, a plus was given those responses which in­
thas fo t fat ~ subject conceived of the accidents described in each of the two stories 
nns O punishment d · · al for a ministered by the object s themselves, or by God, or by the "mor-• 
ce 11 in the Univ r th · • .sponses wh· h . e se rough these obJects . A minus score was assigned those re-
ic 1.nvolved a rat· 1 1 · f 1 · · sponses to St . iona exp anation; or examp e, a minus was given those re-




The subjects' responses to the two stories are tabulated in Table 1. Although 
the number of subjects revealing a belief in immanent justice decreased with age for 
Story I, the opposite trend is indicated for Story II. The chi-squares for the two 
stories are not significant, however. The sex difference for the stories was likewise 
significant. 
TABLE 1 
Number of + and Valuations at Each Age Level for Stories I and II 
Story I Story II 





















X = 3.57 
ns 
X = 4.36 
ns 
E. DISCUSSION OF RESULTS 
Whereas Piaget found that 86 per cent of the six-year-olds whom he questioned 
affirmed a belief in immanent justice, only 62 per cent of the children at this age level
in the present study indicated such a belief in response to Story I . An examination of 
the answers which the children gave in response to the question, "Why did he cut his f in 
ger?" provides a partial clue to the comparatively small percentage found in this study. 
The rational explanations offered by the six-year-olds seemed to indicate that they we re 
drawn from the child's personal experiences. The following are representative of this 
type of response: "Because he might not was careful." "Maybe he was too little." "May•
be they slipped." "The scissors were sharp." "Because he didn't watch what he was do ­
ing." The situation described in the story seems to be one which is well within the e x­
perience of the children at this age level. In other words, the children did not need tc 
invoke the operation of a supernatural force to account for the misfortune which befell 




An exmination of Table 1 shows that a smaller percentage of children at each age 
level evinced a belief in immanent justice for Story II than did so for Story I. A com­
parison of the contents of the two stories throws some light on this discrepancy. In 
Story I no rational explanation is provided to account for the boy's misfortune which 
occurred while he was in the act of cutting up some paper. In Story II, on the other 
hand, mention is made of the fact that the bridge on which the culprit crossed the rive r 
was rotten. In the latter story, then, the subject need not resort to an explanation of 
the punishment inflicted based on the intervention of a supernatural force operating 
through objects in the environment; rather, he can utilize the information presented to 
him to account for the incident. It would seem that the tendency for children to exp l a iil 
occurrences on the basis of a supernatural vigilance and conspiracy depends in part upo n 
the amount of information which is available to them in a given situation. 
The results of the present study do not corroborate Piaget's conclusion that t her 
is a marked decrease with age in the number of children who believe in immanent justice. 
Although it is apparent that the percentage figures differ from one story to another, 
Piaget did noc tabulate separately the result obtained from different stories, and, i n 
fact, it is not clear from which stories the results given were obtained. A similar c rit 
icismmightbe leveled at the other studies (1, 2, 3, 4) which employed only one story i n 
an attempt to determine the number of children at various age levels who believe in im­
manent justice. The present findings indicate that the point of view which a child ex­
presses varies depending on the story used so that any percentage figure is specific t o a 
particular story. Before one could speculate or theorize about differences in the belie1 
in immanent justice among various cultural, ethnic, and other such groups, one would haVE 
to be concerned about the differences obtained from the same group by stories which vary 


























most fruitful problem for future research in this area. 
In summary, the present findings indicate that a child's expressed belief in im­
manent justice is dependent upon a number of such factors as the meaningfulness of the 
situation to him, the presence or absence of rational alternative explanations, the range 
of his experiences, the concreteness of the young child's thought, and so forth . The 
possible importance of specific parental teachings will be discussed briefly in the next 
section. 
F. SUGGESTIONS FOR FURTI-IER RESEARCH 
It was found that a number of six-year-olds responded to Story I (a child cuts 
himself with scissors) on a very concrete level; the incident described was within their 
range of experience. It might be postulated that whether or not a child demonstrates a 
belief in immanent justice depends upon whether or not the situation described is within 
his range of experience and understanding. It would follow that the more foreign and 
remote the situation is from the child's experience, the more likely it will be that he 
will give an immanent justice type of response. To test this, two groups of items could 
be developed: in one group, the incidents described would be placed in contexts mean­
ingful to the child; the incidents in the other group would be placed in contexts alien 
to the child's experience. Toe thesis is that children tend to explain events in super­
natural terms when the situation is unfamiliar to them. 
Toe present study also found that children tend to be less likely to give super­
natural explanations of incidents in stories where an alternative rational explanationis 
provided. It was argued that whether or not a child invokes the operation of a super­
natural force to explain an event depends upon the amount of information which is avail ­
able to him. To test this, stories which are essentially similar except for the presence 
or absence of a rational explanation could be administered to a group of children, and 
the number of children expressing a belief in immanent justice for the two types of 
stories could be compared. 
Although Piaget seemed unclear in his position regarding the importance of adult 
teachings in producing an "immanent justice" type of thinking in children, it would seem 
that parental attitudes in this respect are significant determiners of the child's tend­
ency to explain punishment and other such events in this manner. A possible method to 
get at such a relationship would be to formulate subtle items appropriate to the adult 
level in order to assess the parents' way of thinking. It would be hypothesized that 
adults do differ in this regard and that this influence the child's tendency to consider 
punishments as automatic and inevitable. 
G. SUMMARY 
A review of the literature concerning Piaget's notion of immanent justice re­
vealed that the various studies supported Piaget's findings which showed a decrease with 
age among children in belief in immanent justice. Several environmental factors affect­
ing this belief were identified. 
In the present study, 240 chlldren, 30 boys and 30 girls, at each of the follow­
ing four age levels, 6, 8, 10 and 12, were administered a questionnaire consisting of 
st0:ies drawn from Piaget's work. The subjects were selected from the lower socio-eco­
no11U.c levels . The data obtained from the two immanent justice items included in the 
questionnaire were presented and discussed. 
Although the number of subjects revealing a belief in immanent justice decreased 
from age 6 through age 12 for Story I the opposite trends was found for Story II. Ten­
tative explanations for these results'were found in the nature of the stories themselves. 
It was concluded that a child's expressed belief in immanent justice is dependent on s 
sue~ factors as the meaningfulness of the story described, the presence or absence of 
rational alternative explanations, and the range of the child's experiences. 
Several suggestions for further research in this area were discussed. 
F001NOTES 
1 
. This study was done under the di"recti"on f p f M 0 ld d 1· t·tof Ch ld o ro • i re C. lemp in, Ins i ute1 Welfare, University of Minnesota. 
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TEACHING STRATEGIES FOR IDRAL DILEMMAS: 
AN APPLICATION OF KOHLBERG'S THEORY OF IDRAL DEVELOPMENT 
TO THE SOCIAL SnJDIES CLASSROOM* 
by 
Ronald E. Galbraith and 11lomas M. Jones 
(Reprinted by permission from Social Studies Curriculum Center, carnegie-Mellon 
University, 1974.) 
American schools used two general methods of moral education during the first 
half of the twentieth century. One method stressed direct educational procedures, such 
as telling students that honesty is always the best policy. Its adherents argued that 
teaching students a ''bag of virtues" (such as honesty, responsibility, etc.) could pro ­
mote sound character development , just as prescribed patriotic ritual could allegedly 
insure good citizenship. Advocates of these explicit procedures wanted young people t o 
internalize particular social, political, and moral imperatives. The second method of 
* In 1972 the Social Studies Curriculum Center at Carnegie-Mellon University and 
the Laboratory of Human Development at Harvard received a three-year grant from thew . 
Clement and Jessie v. Stone Foundation. This grant supports research designed to apply 
Harvard psychologist Lawrence Kohlberg's theories of moral development to the social 
studies curricular materials developed at CMU. The joint staffs have written and tes t­
ed new materials, devised a variety of teaching strategies, and developed teacher prep­
aration programs. During the present academic year, the work of the project is under ­
going an extensive field test which involves forty-eight school classes in a wide var ­
iety of schools. The results of this evaluation will be available early in 1975. 
The fo.llowing article reports the preliminary conclusions of the staff of CMJ' s 
Social Studies Curriculum Center about classroom applications of Kohlberg's theory. We 
wish to thank the Stone Foundation for the support which has made our research possible. 
Professors Edwin Fen ton and Barry K. Beyer have made substantive contributions to this 
article as well as numerous editorial suggestions. The authors are Staff As-sociates in 
the Social Studies curriculum Center and candidates for the Doctor of Arts degree in 
















moral education stressed three indirect educational techniques. First, teachers pro­
vided adult models for their students. Through their daily activities, teachers dem­
onstrated expected norms of behavior such as cleanliness and neatness. Second, the 
classroom environment established by the teacher socialized students to accept certain 
values , Punctuality, obedience, and orderliness may serve as examples. Third, curric­
ulum materials contributed to incidental teaching of values. For example, in social 
studies classes students learned about values such as honesty, responsibility, and pa­
triotism by studying the biographies of famous American statesmen. 
During the past decade educators increasingly stressed new approaches to moral 
education which emphasized valuin;i. They described these approaches by terms such as 
value clarification, value analysis, the analysis of controversial issues, humanistic 
education, and concern for the student's self-concept. Within the social studies, 
these new approaches replaced both indoctrination and the incidental methods of moral 
education frequently used before the 196O's. 
THE THEORY OF COGNITIVE IDRAL DEVELOPMENT 
Concurrent with the introduction of these new methods of value education, re­
search began on a theory of cognitive moral development. This theory focused on the 
ways in which individuals reason about moral issues. Lawrence Kohlberg, a Harvard psy­
chologist, led research efforts in the field. His findings have evoked considerable 
interest among social studies educators who wish to apply the theory of cognitive moral 
development to social studies curricula. 
Educators frequently ask two significant questions about the theory of cognitive 
moral development and its relationship to social studies education. First, what is cog­
nitive moral development? second, what types of materials and classroom processes must 
a teacher know in order to use the cognitive moral developmental approach to moral edu-
cation? This article will attempt to answer these two questions. · 
Developmental psychology has discovered that mental processes develop in invari­
ant sequences through a series of stages. For example, most educators know Piaget's 
stages of cognitive development. Cognitive development means that an individual's 
thinking or reasoning changes or matures. Cognitive moral development, Kohlberg's con­
tribution to the field, posits that an individual's thinking about matters related to 
morality also changes or matures through an invariant sequence. The increase in matur­
ity involves the growth or development of a more rational system of reasoning about sit­
uations involving moral conflicts. Cognitive moral development stresses constant ex­
amination of the reasoning behind reactions to moral conflicts. 
Kohlberg's theory of cognitive moral development indicates that an individual's 
thinking about moral situations matures according to a specific sequence which he pre­
sents in three levels, each consisting of two stages:1 
Level One: Pre-Conventional 
At this level an individual's moral reasoning results from the consequences 
of actions (punishment, reward, exchange of favors) and from the physical power of 
those in positions of authority. 
Stage One: Decisions result from a blind obedience to power, an attempt to avoid 
punishment, or an attempt to seek rewards. 
stage 'lwo: Decisions result from a desire to satisfy one's own needs and occasion­
ally the needs of others. Individuals view reciprocity as a matter of 
"you scratch my back and I'll scratch yours." Reasoning involves little 
consideration of loyalty, gratitude, or justice. 
Level Two: Conventional 
At this level an individual's moral reasoning involves consideration of the in­
:ere~t of others (family and peers) and a desire to maintain, respect, support, and 
JUS t ify the existing social order. 
Stage Three: 
Deci~ions r~sult from a desire to please and help others and 
~eceive their approval in return. Behavior is frequently 
Judged by intention--"he means well" becomes important for 
the first time. 
Stage Four: 
Decisions result from a desire to maintain the existing 
authority, rules, and social order. Right behavior 
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consists of doing one's duty. 
Level Three: Post-Conventional 
At this level an individual's moral reasoning incorporates moral values and prin ­
ciples which have validity and application beyond the authority of groups. Moral rea­
soning becomes more comprehensive and reflects universal principles. 
Stage Five: Decisions result from recognition of an individual's rights within 
a society which has a social contract. As a result the individual's 
reasoning emphasizes the "legal point of view," but with an emphasis 
upon the possibility of changing laws. 
Stage Six: Decisions result from an obligation to universal ethical principles 
which apply to all mankind. The universal principles of justice, 
reciprocity and equality of human rights, and respect for the dig­
nity of human beings as individuals serve as a basis for individual 
reasoning. 
Kohlberg derived his stages of moral reasoning empirically from longitudinal 
studies in the United States. He gathered data from the responses of 75 American males 
to moral dilemmas. He interviewed each subject every three years between adolescence 
and adulthood. As a result of these studies, Kohlberg concluded that moral development 
occurred in invarian sequence through the stages in Kohlberg's scale. Cross-cultural 
studies involving middle class urban males in the United States, Taiwan, and Mexico; 
and lower class peasants living in villages in Turkey and Yucatan confirmed the devel­
opmental theory. Despite divergent cultural, social, and religious backgrounds, the 
subjects moved through the same stages of moral development in the same sequence. While 
the rate of movement varied between cultures, the basic concept of universal stages of 
moral development emerged clearly. In the late 1960's and the early 1970's, Kohlberg 
and his colleagues continued their research into moral development in prisons, religious 
schools, elementary schools, secondary schools, and colleges. 
These studies confirm basic principles about the nature of cognitive moral de­
velopment. Individuals move through the stages sequentially. Each individual must go 
through the preceding stage before moving on to a higher stage of moral reasoning. 
Stages cannot be skipped. A person may understand and become attracted to moral rea­
soning at thii next higher stage; however, an individual will translate reasoning sev­
eral stages higher into his own stage-related manner of thinking about a moral issue. 
Kohlberg's studies also establish a clear relationship between chronological age and 
the level of reasoning. Although children and adolescents move at varying rates of 
speed through the stages, pre-adolescents usually attain a pre-conventional level, adol ­
escents achiiive the conventional level and adults move toward the post-conventional 
level of reasoning ,2 However, individuals can become "frozen" at any level. Actually, 
less than 20 percent of the adult population reasons at the post-conventional level .3 
The research of Kohlberg and his colleagues has also established that students 
who participate regularly in discussions of moral dilemmas often begin to articulate 
reasoning at higher stages of development. This evidence indicates that exchanging rea­
soning during a group discussion of a moral dilemma can stimulate moral development 
through the stages. A good group discussion of a moral dilemma depends on three vari­
ables: a recognized moral dilemma, a leader who can help to focus the discussion on 
moral reasoning, and a classroom climate which encourages students to express their 
moral reason:i.OJ freely. The explanation of a moral dilemma, the lesson plan for teach­
ing a moral dilemma, and the teaching process outlined below have been developed and 
tested with these three variables in mind. 
A dil~?mma presents the class with a moral problem. A dilemma usually involves a 
story or situation which presents a central character with a choice. The dilemmas are 
moral because students must think about the rig htness or wrongness of various actions 
which the characters in the dilemma may take. Here is an example of a moral dilemma f or 
a social studies class: 4 
HELGA'S DI LEMMA 
Helga and Rachel had grown up together. They were best 
friends despite the fact that He l ga's family was Christian and 
Rachel's was Jewish. For many years, this religious difference 
didn't seem to matter m ch in Germany, but after Hitler seized 
power, the situation changed. Hitler required Jews to wear 








his followers to destroy the property of Jewish people and 
to beat them on the street. Finally, he began to arrest 
Jews and deport them. Rumors went around the city that many 
Jews were being killed. Hiding Jews for whom the Gestapo 
(hitler's secret police) was looking was a serious crime am 
violated a law of the German government. 
One night Helga heard a knock at the door. When she 
opened it, she found Rachel on the step huddled in a dark 
coat. Quickly Rachel stepped inside. She had been to a 
meeting, she said, and when she returned home, she had found 
Gestapo members all around her house. Her parents and bro­
thers had already been taken away. Knowing her fate if the 
Gestapo caught her, Rachel ran to her old friend's house. 
Now what should Helga do? If she turned Rachel away, 
the Gestapo would eventually find her. Helga knew that most 
of the Jews who were sent away had been killed, and she didn't 
want her best friend to share that fate. But hiding the Jews 
broke the law. Helga would risk her own security and that of 
her family if she tried to hide Rachel. But she had a tiny 
room behind the chimney on the third floor where Rachel might 
be safe. 
Question: Should Helga hide Rachel? 
A good moral dilemma should have three characteristics. It should present a 
real conflict for the central character; it should include a number of moral issues for 
consideration ; and it should generate differences of opinion among students about the 
appropriate response to the situation. Helga's Dilemma involves three such issues: the 
obligation to one's friend and family, the concern for authority and the law, and be­
lief in the sanctity of human life. 
After confronting a moral dilemma, which may be presented through a reading, a 
f ilm, role-playing, or other media, students must respond to a question about what they 
think the main character should do. Each position which the character might adopt has 
some normative support. For example, notice the conflicting norms implied by terms in 
the following question which refers to Helga's Dilemma: Should a Christian girl in 
Nazi Germany break the law and jeopardize her family by hiding her Jewish friend from 
the Gestapo? This question provides the initial focus for a discussion because it en­
courages students to offer yes or no opinions which may be supported by a variety of 
reasons at all six stages of the Kohlberg scale. These reasons become the primary focus 
of a discussion, and the discussion becomes the major vehicle for moral development. 
A LESSON PLAN FOR MORAL DILEMMAS 
Members of the staff of the Social Studies Curriculum Center at Carnegie-M:?llon 
University have developed a teaching plan for leading discussions of moral dilemmas. 
The plan includes three parts: a list of general instructions for presenting the origi­
nal dilemma; a series of alternative dilemmas to use in case the original dilemma fails 
to ~r~mote controversy; and a list of probe questions. Usually students take different 
positions on what a character in a dilemma should do. At other times they may all 
adopt the same position. Disagreement about what a character should do as well as 
~bout reasons for this action leads to lively moral discussion. Hence, a lesson plan 
includes a series of alternative dilemmas which a teacher may see if students appear to 
agree on the initial action decision. Although alternative dilemmas involve the same 
thst0:Y, e same characters, and the same moral issues, they change the situation de­
sc:ibed in the original problem in an effort to promote disagreement about what the 
main character should do. The following lesson plan for Helga's Dilemma provides an 
example of the general instructions and includes several alternative dilemmas: 
Teaching Plan for Helga's Dilemma 
PART I: ORIGINAL DILEMMA 
Distribute the Class Handout which describes Helga's dilemma. Make sure that the stu­
de~ts understand the terminology in the dilemma and can state the nature of the dilemmawhich Helga faced. 
Determine by a show of hands or ;nHel h ~ some other way how the class feels about whether 
ga 5 ould hide Rachel. 
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If the class divides with no less than one-third of the students on each side of the 
issue, choose one of the four strategies listed in the overall instructions for teach­
ing moral dilemmas and proceed with the discussion, skipping the alternative dilemmas. 
PART II: ALTERNATIVE DILEMMAS 
If the class agrees that Helga SHOULD hide Rachel, one of the collowing alternative 
dilemmas can be used to provoke disagreement. 
A. Suppose Helga had only met ~chel once and did not know 
her well. What should she do in that case? 
B. Suppose Helga's father and mother heard what was happen­
ing at the door and told her not to let Rachel in the 
house. In that case what should she do? 
If the class agrees that Helga SHOOW NOT hide Rachel, one of the following alterna­
tive dilemmas can be used to provoke disagreement. 
A. suppose that several of Helga's friends were also hiding 
Jews from the Gestapo. What should Helga do in that case? 
B. Suppose Helga heard the Gestapo coming and knew that 
Rachel would be sho on sight within a few minutes if 
she did not hide her. What should she do in that case? 
When the class divides over one of these alternative dilemmas, choose one of the strat­
egies and proceed with the discussion. 
After different students recommend particular actions for a character in a dilem­
ma, the teacher focuses class discussion on an analysis of their reasons. Discussion 
should focus on the examination and exchange of reasons which students give for sugges t­
ing a particular action, such as hiding Rachel or refusing to hide her. Leading a suc­
cessful group discussion sometimes involves the use of appropriate questions, called 
probe questions, which can help students to think about moral reasoning. A lesson plan 
for a moral dilemma includes a list of probe questions designed to elicit additional 
reasoning about the moral problem under discussion. Probe questions also help student s 
focus their thinking on a particular issue within the dilemma. Finally, probes also 
provide the teacher with appropriate questions to use if the discussion lags. Teachers 
may use one or more of these questions, but they should feel no necessity to use all of 
them. The following probe questions appear in part three of the lesson plan for Helga 's 
Dilemma: 
PART I I I: PROBE QUESTIONS 
1. What is the most important thing that one friend owes to another? 
Why? 
2. Should a person ever risk the welfare of relatives for the welfare 
of friends? Why? 
3. Should a person ever risk his or her own life for someone else? 
Why? 
4. Is a person ever justified to hide someone who is fleeing from 
the authorities? 
5. From Rachel's point of view, what should Helga do? 
6. From the point of view of Helga's father, what should Helga do? 
THE TEACHING PROCESS 
The Carnegie-Mellon University group has identified four steps in a teaching pro­
cess for leading a good discussion of a moral dilemma. Teachers must help students to 
· confront a moral problem involved in a dilemma, to state a position on the dilemma, to 
test the reasoning behind their position, and to reflect on their reasonir-KJ and that of 
others during a discussion. The following diagram represents the four main steps of the 
teaching process and also shows various sub-steps. The circles in the center of the 
diagram indicate what the students should do during each discussion; the branching 








































DIAGRAM OF THE TEACHING PROCESS 





















1. Confronting a moral dilemma: The teacher presents the dilemma to the stu­
dents, helps the class to clarify terminology or conditions in the dilemma, and assists 
the group to understand the moral aspects of the problem. This step usually takes only 
a few minutes. 
2. Stating a position on the original or the alternative dilemma: The teacher 
next encourages each student to think about and take a position on the dilemma. The 
initial question posed by the dilemma focuses on the "action" which Helga should take- ­
to hide Rachel or to refuse to let her in. The discussion will focus on the "reasoning " 
for the action--why should Helga hide Rachel; or, why turn her away? Students must de­
cide both what to do and why to do it. Teachers can help them to make the decisions in 
three ways: by giving them a few moments to think about the issues, by asking them to 
write down both what the character should do and why she should do it, or by encourag­
ing students to brainstorm reasons for the alternative courses of action. 
Next the teacher may ask for a show of hands to determine whether a difference 
of opinion exists among class members. If the class divides over the recommended 
action, a teacher should continue with the discussion. Usually a 70/30 split of opinion 
indicates a sufficient interest in the dilemma situation. If the class seems to agree 
on a course of action, the teacher should introduce an alternative dilemma from the 
lesson plan to stimulate more interest and disagreement and promote a better discussion, 
Step two should take no more than five minutes. 
3. Testing the reasoning for a position on the dilemma: This is the most im­
portant step in the teaching process. It gives the members of the class an opportunity 
to test their reasoning against the thinking of others. Each class session usually in ­
volves a full class discussion; however, deploying students in small groups for several 
minutes can help to involve more students in the discussion, generates additional rea­
sons, and helps to focus on the "best" reasons for action. Meeting in small groups 
prior to a full discussion gives each person a chance to think about and share reasons 
in preparation for an exchange among all class members. Toe task of a small group usu­
ally involves the preparation of a defense for a particular position by listing of all 
of the best reasons for recommending a specific action. We have developed several stra ­
tegies for small group sessions. Here are two of them: 
Strategy A 
Divide the class into groups of five to eight students. 
Each group should consist of individuals who agree about 
the appropriate action on a dilemma. Have the members of 
each group work out a list of reasons for holding the posi­
tion that they do. After the groups have worked for a 
period of time on this initial task, have each one select 
three reasons which reflect the best reasoning for their 
position on the moral dilemma and arrange these in prior­
ity . You should move from group to group helping each 
group develop its list of reasons. After approximately 
fifteen minutes of group work, ask the recorder from each 
group to report on the final list of best reasons. Since 
you will have several groups working on listing reasons 
for opposing positions on the moral dilemma, a general 
class discussion focused on moral reasoning should follow 
the reporting of the groups . Encourage students to chal­
lenge one another's reasoning and to help focus the dia­
logue on why individuals believe one reason is more appro­
priate than another. 
Strategy B 
Organize the class into small groups with each group includ­
ing members who do not agree about the action of the dilemma. 
Ask the members of each mixed group to discuss their positions 
and the reasons for their positions in order to produce a list 
containing the two best reasons on each side of the issue. One 
of the objectives of this strategy is to have students discuss 
the dilemma from each position on action with the taks of the 
group focused on reasoning rather than on the initial position. 
A full-class discussion of Helga's Dilemma should include both exchanges among 
the people who disagree on what Helga should do ("action"), and discussion of points of 









that Helga should not hide Rachel, but disagree over the appropriate reason for not 
h"ding her. A typical class usually includes individuals at different stages of moral1
d velopment. A moral dilemma will evoke different reasons from individuals. This dif­
f:rence in reasoning can be related directly to a difference in stages of development: 
stage 1: "If Helga lets Rachel in she might also get into 
trouble with the Gestapo." 
stage 2: "Helga shouldn't let her in because Rachel prob­
ably wouldn't let Helga in if she got into trouble 
with the Gestapo." 
stage 3: "Helga has an obligation to her family. She will 
really let them down if she gets them all in trouble." 
stage 4: "Helga has an obligation to obey the laws of her society." 
stage 5: "Friendship is not the issue. If Helga was really 
concerned about the problem in her society, she should 
be helping all the Jews in order to protest the govern­
ment action. She should not hide Rachel unless she 
intends to hide other Jews and to make a public pro-
test in opposition to putting Jews in concentration 
camps." 
Although the students should do most of the talking, teachers should pose appro­
priate questions to clarify reasoning. They might also alter the nature or perspective 
of the dilemma to check for consistency of reasoning by using a probe question: From 
the point of view of Helga's father, what should Helga do? This step in the teaching 
process should take approximately 30-35 minutes. 
4. Reflecting on the reasoning discussed during a class: The final step of the 
teaching process involves summarizing of reasons presented during the discussion. The 
teacher may ask students to think about the different reasons which they have heard dis­
cussed and to select the one which they feel represents the best response to the moral 
problem. The objective is not to reach consensus within the class but to think about 
reasoning. The teacher may also ask the students if they think there is a "right" an­
swer to the moral problem. Such a question may provide an opportunity for the teacher 
to introduce some additional reasoning which the students did not volunteer. However, 
the teacher should not present additional reasoning as "the best reason" or as "the 
answer" to a moral problem. Instead, teachers should help students to reflect on al­
ternative responses to moral situations. When a good moral discussion class ends, stu­
dents should feel that it is incornple te. They should leave the classroom still wonder­
ing about the best response to a difficult moral problem. 
THE CLIMATE IN THE CIASSROOM 
This approach to moral education depends on a particular climate in the class­
room, In order to lead a successful moral discussion, a teacher must establish a =m­
:fortable medium between a highly structured discussion and a free-flowing "rap" session. 
Mo~al development occurs primarily because students at a higher stage present arguments 
which attract lower stage students. The teacher must maintain the focus of the student 
exchange and encourage students to express themselves freely. A teacher should not cen­
sure a student for a low stage response but should encourage interaction with students 
at other stages. 
To This teaching process stresses particular roles for the teacher and the students. 
acher~ who lead discussions of moral dilemmas do not have an "answer sheet" and should 
not donunate the b 1 . . as th . v~r a exchange. Teachers should reflect conf1dence 1n the students 
e maJor contr1butors to the discussion. They should develope techniques which en-
courage student t O t lk · . . · Lead s a directly to other students w1thout go1ng through the teacher. 
ers of a moral dis · h ld · di. • · · · •comm t cuss1on sou 1n cate a s1ncere 1nterest 1n l1sten1ng to the 
en s of student -..... h • •clarif s. u,ey s ould ask students to summar1ze a ser1es of =mments or to 
Y conflicting · .neither . d . reason1ng presented by members of the class. In this role, teachers 
represen~nh?ctr1nate students with a bag of virtues nor foster the assumption that values 
dealing w·t~ghly personal and relative matters. Instead, they facilitate a process for 
l. student values in a developmental fashion. 
Thi
of Kohlber:,teaching process has been designed in light of Kohlberg's findings. Because 
issues in a: ;~s7arch, we know that individuals develop their thinking about moral 
e inite sequence and that some development occurs naturally as one becomes 
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older and more intellectually mature. We also know that a person may understand and 
become attracted by reasoning at the next higher stage because it appears more adequate, 
consistent, and integrated in the face of additional moral situations. Preliminary 
results of ongoing research indicate a correlation between the higher stages of moral 
reasoning and individual action in a moral situation. However, the research also re­
veals that each person matures in moral reasoning at an individual pace and may not 
reach the higher stages. Our current research with tiss process of teaching for cogni­
tive moral development suggests that dialogue focused on moral issues can encourage 
thinking about moral decisions and that some movement toward a higher stage may occur 
as a result. 
THE IMPLICATIONS FOR SOCIAL SIDDIES CLASSROOMS 
The reason for posing moral issues in the social studies classroom seems quite 
clear. Social studies teachers have an obligation to help students develop learning 
and inquiry skills, an understanding of analytical concepts, and a base of knowledge 
about society. Social studies teachers also have an obligation to help their students 
by encouraging questioning and intensive interaction concerning social and moral issues. 
Cognitive moral development offers an excellent vehicle to accomplish this objective. 
The strong base in empirically derived research established by Kohlberg and his col­




Adapted from Lawrence Kohlberg and Elliot Turiel, 111\k>ral Development and r.bral 
Education," in Psychology and Educational Practice, edited by G, Lesser (Chicago, 
1971), pp. 415-416. 
2 
Lawrence Kohlberg, "From Is to Ought: How to Cammi t the Naturalistic Fallacy 
and Get Away with It in The Study of Moral Development," in Cognitive Development and 
Epistemology, edited by T. Mischel (New York: 1971), p. 155. 
3
Kohlberg, "The Concepts of Developmental Psychology as the Central Guide to 
Education: Examples from Cognitive, Moral, and Psychological Education," in The Pro­
ceedings of the Conference on Psychology and the Process of Schooling in the Next 
Decade: Alternative Conceptions (Washington, D.C.: United States Office of Education), 
p. 41. 
4
This dilemma appears in the Audio-Visual Kit which accompanies the second edi­
tion of The Shaping of Western Society, a course in The Holt Social Studies Curriculum. 
Each one-semester course in the series contains six moral dilemmas developed at the 
Social Studies curriculum Center at carnegie-~llon University . 
A SELECTED BIBLIOGRAPHY ON IDRAL DEVELOPMENT 
Kohlberg, Law:rence, "The Child as a Moral Philosopher," Psychology Today, v. 7 
(1968), pp. 25-30. This short article may well be the best introduction to the theory 
of moral development for a newcomer to the field. 
Kohlberg, Lawrence and Elliot Turiel, "Moral Development and Moral Education," in G. 
Lesser (ed . ), Psychology and Educational Practice. (Chicago: Scott, Foresman, 1971), 
pp. 410-465. This article includes a discussion of the relationship of moral develop­
ment to other forms of moral education, a presentation of the research findings on 
which Kohlber9 's theory has been built, and a rationale for using moral development in 
the schools. 
Kohlberg, Lawrence, "Moral Development and the New Social Studies," Social Education, 
v. 37, no. 5 (May, 1973), pp. 369-375. This article relates Kohlberg's theory of moral 
development to the new social studies and discusses stages of moral reasoning as they 
relate to high school students. 







carobridge, 1973. This anthology contains sixteen key articles by Kohlberg and his col­
leagues. It can be purchased for $7.00 from Laboratory of Hwnan Development; Roy E. 
Larsen Hall; Appian Way; Harvard University; Cambridge, Massachusetts 02138. 
DO VAWES CHANGE? YES! RE-EVALUATION OF Oill VAWES 
by 
Ronald Mi.zus 
(Reprinted by permission from Penny's Forum, Spring/Summer, 1972, p. 16.) 
"Values" is an elusive concept. When used in a discussion or a presentation of 
ideas, the term often conveys comfort to the audience addressed, for, after all, we are 
all in favor of everyone having values, preferably our own. But what is judged to be 
significantly worthwhile in life varies from culture to culture, society to society, 
person to person. The concept itself begs many questions and issues. One can tell more 
about a person's values in any given situation by what that person does rather than by 
what that persons says. Yet, that statement itself begs a question:_ how can we always 
be sure of another's motivations and meanings? 
rt is one of my assumntions that all values are relative to at least three ex­
perienced facts: the sense of self (I-ness); the existence of others; the environment 
of Nature. These three given aspects of reality are not created by me, but my percep­
tiou of them and their continuously changing and complex interrelationship shapes them 
in part. For I bring to those experiences my imagination, memory, wants, needs, atti­
tudes, goals, knowledge, willing, beliefs, behavior, emotions, and biological inheri­
tance. To some extent, each of us creates a personal and unique reality. 
It is our search for values-as-common-good which prevents our private realities 
from random clashing and mutual destruction. It is possible, of course, to go to either 
extreme of value-as-common-good: Political oppression, war and fanaticism when it is 
overstressed; psychosis or character pathology when it is understressed . There will al­
ways be stress between individual freedom and social order, but this tension can be cre­
ative, especially in a society which allows and protects a pluralism of values. I am 
claiming then, that- it is a social good- a value - for us to take seriously the pur­
suit of meaning-in-community in order to maximize both societal and individual well­
being. Indeed, I recognize and accept for myself a long list of values, virtues or 
goods (versus evils). I expend an extraordinary amount of my time, emotional and in­
tellectual resources, and psychic energy trying to actualize certain deeply held values 
which have to do with personal growth, group joy, and world community. 
However, even if I did believe that there are unchanging values in life and the 
universe, such a philosophical conviction would provide small comfort and little direc­
ti~n for me. I do not believe that there are values outside of persons which are in­
tyited from a Platonic realm, or divinely revealed, or which are applicable to all per­
sons and that valuing is a complex process involving creation, risk and courage; values 
are not something you have but something you do. In other words, I hold values to be 
experiential and situational. We have a choice in the worldview which we will choose as 
our~ and act upon in spite of the awareness of the demonic potential of all idealogies. 
It 15 ours to evaluate, risk, decide and act. Every value is created the moment it is 
chosen, willed and expressed. Friendship, for example, is not a thing which exists be­
tween ~wo people; it is a constantly changing relational dynamic which deepens or dies 
accor~ng to what each person brings to the other to share something of who they are at
that time. And that identical constellation of evaluating, risking, deciding and acting 
may never again oc 1 · h · f · ·Th cur, eaving tat particular moment o being ~nd response unique. 
meo~~h I may use past experiences, resources, memory and institutional supports to guide 
a d rough new experiences, I nevertheless face "new occasions which teach new duties"
1bnut am left in my aloneness to choose among my many value-concepts in order to contri-
e to any situat· ththe t· ion e most creative human response of which I am capable. Most of 
condi~e,_of course, I am not confronted with such momentous decision-making; habit, 
surviva1ninfg, character and personality help me, for better or for worse, in the quiet
0 each day. 
But the time 5 t •requirer d" cer ainly are numerous enough when I encounter experiences which 
times to~ ~ca~ re-eval~ation of old values. There are times to hold on to friends and 
sionate se: t em_go; times to endure suffering and times to fight it; times for pas ­
f or controvean~ ~imes_for g~ntle sensuality; times for disciplined reflection and times 
rsia action; times for involvement and times for detachment; times to trust 
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and times to withold trust; times for privacy and times for openness-in-community. 
And so we could go on and on, not merely imitating the rhetoric of Ecclesiastes, but 
being painfully aware of the paradoxes, absurdities, ironies, inconsistencies, and un­
predictabilities of living which make us vulnerable to hurt and which make it impera­
tive that somehow we find the courage to be in spite of all insecurities and anxieties. 
In our eagerness to hold on to old values in their old contexts we will find no t 
security but cultural and personal stagnation. As the late Abraham Maslow expressed it 
(Easlen Papers, 1968, "the self-actualizing person, for_ the most part, transcends the 
values of his culture." Religious and educational insti tu tions which have responsi­
bility for the nurture of youth and adults should embrace the potential of the future 
and prepare people to =nfront it not with shock but with confidence based on emerging 
values- values which individuals should have the dignity to discover within themselves 
and through their own experiencing. 
The process of education is basically value-venturing, but institutions of edu­
cation seem distrustful of the capacity and desire of learners to explore, discover, 
experiment, and create. Educators often seem more secure in the role of technicians of 
stereotyped truths and values rather than participating in an on-going valuing process. 
The quest for a hierarchy of values or a set of values is, I believe, misleading be­
cause it misses the more critical issue of developing the individual's ability to util ­
ize value-making criteria in ever-changing contexts. Even a value framework at one 
maturational stage of a person will not be the same value framework of another matur­
ational stage of that same individual. And, certainly, the values of the contemporary 
generation are not identical to those of its preceeding generation, for new times bring 
new challenges which require new responses. The contemporary movements for world com­
munity, alternative lifestyles and people's liberation contain the promise of a higher 
order of human being. We can create that reality if we do not fear value-venturing. 
DO VALUES CHANGE? NOi VALUES AS A CONSTANT 
by 
David R. Mace 
(Reprinted by permission from Penny' 's Forum, Spring/Summer, 1972, p 17.) 
I find discussion of values as exasperating as discussions of love, and for the 
same reason-because the words have no precise meaning, so that every speaker invests 
them with meanings of his own. I therefore propose in this article to present a con­
ceptual framework that can be understood even by relatively young children. It may be 
philosophically vulnerable, but it is pedagogically serviceable. 
In order to think clearly and communicate intelligibly about this subject, I 
find I need to consider my relationships to others at three levels - of values, of 
standards, and of behavior. At the top level, clouds in the sky represent vaiues 
they are ethereal and relativeiy formless. At the next level, boxes represent stand­
ards - they are rigid and clearly defined. At the lower level (down-to-earth) people 
interacting represent behavior. 
These three concepts are normally inter-related. The values are the ultimate 
ideals and goals of mankind, which do not undergo basic change. The standards represent 
the atcempts of human communities and groups to make rules which will ensure that the 
values are preserved and expressed. Behavior represents the manner in which individual 
men aud women interact with each other, normally by conforming to the standards in order 
to preserve the values. 
Now let us look at each of these three levels a little more closely. The values 
in my view, do not undergo basic change. They are integrally associated with the goals 
of human life. I hold that man has evolved beyond the animal ievel at which first sur ­
vival, then immediate gratification, are the only consciously sought goals. The devel­
opmen. of the human imagination enables man to step out of the narrow confines of the 
immediate present and to contemplate ' tne past and the future. Thus he sees his life 
moving onward and, hopefully, progressing upward. He dreams of preserving the goods he 
has and of gaining greate r goods in the future. Thus he takes comman of his destiny 
and plans ahead. 
But I cannot plan my life on an individual basis. I am bound to others who 













of my family, tribe, or nation some agreement about our corporate goals. ntis is the 
process of defining our values. 
In this process, we are not free to follow unfettered imagination. There are 
conditions that must be met for mutual survival. This is even true of the animal world, 
as prince Kropotkin demonstrated in his Mutual Aid. Unless individuals cooperate in 
seeking group ends together, they create conditions in which their individual ends are 
finally defeated. The conditions that must be met represent the values, They can be 
described in different ways. some would say the basic value is justice., others would 
say it was love. We often speak of beauty, truth and goodness as values; and though 
they may be associated with quality of life rather than with survival, they are valid, 
because man's goal is to do more than survive. 
we can speak of these values in many words, and that doesn't matter. The clouds 
do not need fixed forms. But they are inherently immutable, because they represent the 
conditions which must be met if human communities are not to degenerate or perish. We 
see a good example in microcosm of a human community degenerating for lack of values in 
William Golding's book Lord of the Flies. 
It would be theoretically possible to have a human community so dedicated to its 
values that behavior would not need to be prescribed or controlled, but could be left 
to individual responsibility. ntis is the policy prescribed by situation ethics, and 
it can be realized in a really good family and even for a time in a larger community. 
But up to now in human history, there have been too many immature and perverse indivi­
duals to make it practicable to give them total freedom and trust them to live by the 
community values. So it has been necessary to establish standards. These are the boxes 
in our diagram and they represent customs, rules, and codes that interpret the correct 
behavior which will lead to the preservation of the values. The boxes have rather dif­
ferent shapes in different communities, varying with the circumstances in which people 
have to live. The boxes have to be rigid in form so that all concerned can see clearly 
what the law is that they have to obey. But in spite of this rigidity, standards are 
always having to be modified to meet special cases and changing circumstances. This is 
specially true in a time of cultural change like that through which we are now passing. 
Our standards today are in confusion. But it is inaccurate to say that this means we need 
no values. It is simply that we are in the process of re-interpreting how our immutable 
values can be most effectively reflected in behavior under the new conditions in which 
we are living. 
The hope of many today is that we may be able, in a free and pluralistic society, 
to dispense with rigid standards and follow the situational mode of living in direct 
individual response to our ultimate values. This represents a novel and daring experi­
ment. Theoretically, in a world of really mature people, there is no reason why this 
should not be possible. In practice, at this stage in human development, the difficul­
ties are formidable. 
ARE THERE UNIVE«SAL VAWES? 
( Reprinted by permission from penny's Forum, Spri ng/Summ~:i:, 1972, pp. 22-23.) 
AN INTERVIEW WITH DOROTHY LEE 
On a brisk, Fall day in September I drove to Connecticut to interview 
Dorothy Lee. This is one experience which would have been valuable 
for all of us. Miss Lee was at her summer home deep in a wooded area 
and we t · f ' . sa in ront of a roaring fire and chatted for a good 4 hours 
(w~th a short break for lunch). While listening to the tape to write 
~his article, the whole day became so vivid to me; the wind was blow­
ing outside and the fire and food gave off very pleasant aromas. I 
only r:gret that all these sensory experiences cannot be conveyd on 
the printed page. 
The interview w · t · ..as so in eresting that much of it is verbatim. I 
express my sin th k .cere ans to Miss Lee for a very memorable day. 
-Grace Richardson 
Before we t • .
have t ge into talking about values, I would like to say that the reason I5 opped writi · 
you talk in . ng is that people read an article as if you were the authority. When 
an interview, such as this one, you can talk tentatively. Sometimes people 
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will say that a certain article helped them to think - but oftentimes they've used the 
information instead of thinking. They need to recognize that the author may be search­
ing also. 
Are there universal values held by all cultures? 
I think to ask me this question is irrelevant to the knowing of value. I like 
to distinguish between cultural values and value. The cultural values would be a soci ­
ety's attempt, successful or not, to express value. Value for me means good -not 
morally good - not morally good or virtue, but good in the sense of true. 
There is basic to all existence the value of being me, of being unique, of wha t 
has been referred to as human dignity. But along with the value of being human is the 
value of community. 
By connnuni ty I mean the other pe·rson or persons around me. For a number of 
groups (the ones we have called "primitive"), community also included the air, water, 
rocks and trees. This is why they didn't pollute or destroy because they loved their 
community and were responsive to it. To respond to my community I must be sensitive to 
it; that is, I must sense my community. It is my community, my parents when I'm firs t 
born and others later, who enable me to grow in tiis sensitivity. 
The value of human dignity cannot exist without community. For instance, I dorl t 
believe I can actualize my dignity unless my community recognizes and honors it. I can 
feel proud that I am I - not arrogant, but proud -when you recognize my existence. 
Many African groups have praise songs - the mother will have a praise-phrase fo 
a little child. This phrase simply greets the existence of the other person (honors 
and recognizes him). For me, this human dignity and community are absolute values. 
Every society has its own different forms of expressing these values. In our 
own society we have many sub-cultures, including the culture of the young, who have 
their own way of expressing these values. When people make lists of values it is these 
forms which they are talking about. 
The forms are what I would call the secondary level of values and it is at thi s 
level whj r.h I can sa_y some values are good and some are not . I can judge them only be­
cause some of these forms (or values) do actually infuse one's life with true value arxl 
some do not. For instance, in our society we have been valuing competitive success or 
even just success. A mother is proud of her son, not because he is this person, but 
because he has been successful in making money, earning grades, playing football, or 
whatever. Even a baby will be priased for having achieved something. This is our way 
of trying to express or recognize human dignity. A lot of people are looking for suc ­
cess so that they can be proud of themselves. I feel that this form is bad and that it 
goes against human dignity in itself. Many of our values are this way - against human 
dignity. 
Everyone wants to be - to have dignity and to be proud of what he is. We, the 
community (the mother, the teacher, the neighbor, the friend) instead of honoring a 
human being-· just as he tries very hard to do something or just as he loves or just as 
he walks down the street - or just as he is - we set standards to measure him by. What 
great thing has he achieved? In this way we s1op him from valuing his own dignity. we 
teach him not to seek who he is, not to increase and strengthen and recognize what he 
is, but rather to do something so he will please someone. 
A study was made recently on athletic group sports. It was found that this com 
petition does not teach people anything beyond the particular athletic form. Competition 
when it is competition for success only, is a travesty of competition when it is there 
to make the individual stronger than he would be without it. For instance, with the 
Sioux and many Indians, a young boy would choose an older boy who was a great runner an 
run against him - not because he wanted to win but because if he had somebody going 
faster than he was he would have to push himself more than if he were dependent upon 
himself. That competition was there to help the individual really exercise his entire 
being. This is competition for human dignity and for this I need community (people 
with whom I am relating). 
This is what I mean when I say that a culture has its own interpretation of 
value. Sometimes its interpretation can be wrong or bad because in the long run it 
doesn't help the individual enhance his dignity. 
AnothE!r thing I have learned from the Indians is that while I am strengthening 


































responsive to my communit~, I realize that if I am strong, the whole community will bene­
fit from my str7ngth. This strengthening of the physical and spiritual being was not done 
as a selfish thing. 
one thing I would like to pick up on is the value of difficult work. In a form­
er issue of your magazine it was men:ioned that now many women w~nt to work for mone~ 
ther than as volunteers. When Indians worked at a hard task, it had two related aims 
~ trengthening themselves (not allowing any part of their emotional, physical or spiri­
tu!l being to be slack) and enriching the community. Children and adolescents sought out 
such tasks on their own. In our society, women who may be ~ccepting work w ich ~as ~oth­
. to do with the self and probably does not have any meaning except the money it will 
~n?ng have gone very far from their own honoring of themselves and also from community. 
Vr~un;eer work can be demanding - like running against someone who goes much faster than 0 • 
you do, and it can also be a loving response to the needs of the community. 
This is one place where I feel the younger generation is questioning our inter­
pretation of the old values. They are the ones who say they are not going to work for 
money, they want to find something which is meaningful, truly needed by the community, 
and hope that it will pay enough to live on. What they mean by meaningful work is some­
thing which is consistent with their own human dignity - so that when they go to bed at 
night they can feel proud, rather than ashamed. 
DO you think, then, that human dignity is the only universal value? 
Human dignity is a universal truth as well as a universal value. I believe that 
everyone is born with human dignity -but that it is oftentimes not recognized or ex­
pressed within a culture. 
A book which I would like to recommend is Never in Anger by Jean Briggs who 
lived with an Eskimo group for about two years. From the very beginning of a child's 
life, she found that the dignity of the other person was taken as a matter of course and 
that the guiding of the child in the rules of behavior was done in such a way that the 
individual was not belittled or degraded. 
Is human dignity a value which has been recognized throughout the history of 
mankind? 
I think that it has always been, and I do not know at what point it has been 
overlooked. By human dignity I don't ever mean being good to you. I mean just recog­
nizing you as existing as a human being. 
In our society we do not allow people to have their own individual style. In 
school we try to teach everyone to be the same. We give an assignment and everyone has 
to finish it by a certain date. But people are different; each has his own rhythm, his 
o~n quirk, his own special curiosity. Someone may take a full week to mull over an as­
signment and then write quickly. Someone else has to do it day-by-day. We try to teach 
people not to be individual. Even when it comes to handwriting. As teachers we have to 
read papers written by students. I used to ask my students to type everything because I 
~ould read their papers faster. But the question is - what is the priority? If read­
~ng _f~st is the priority, that's one thing. But if getting across to my students that 
i ndividuality is paramount, then I will take the time to read their handwriting· this isth e priority. In our society, anything which is individual, or which is what 1' call a 
part of human dignit · t · · b · k · ognize it. Y, is no a priority ecause it ta es too much time or energy to rec-
But if students are permitted to do everything the way they want to do it, 
~ouldn't we have chaos? What then, do you suggest is the role of education and educators
1.n preserving individuali:;:t::-y?:;:_:----".;;c.,'--=-.::.....,,_...;;...:::......;::.::.......ac.:::..::...:.....=..:::_...::..:.:.:::......::.=c:::.......:::..::_.:::..:::.::..:::::.==:_::::.::~===== 
It means worki ·thdo. Hum b. ng w1. people so that they really want to do what they like to do 
work har:nb ~ings are challenged by the difficult, but many children lose the desire to 
ththem_ and ~hor~ ey come to school; their families try to make everything easier for 
to the sup atks partly for the parent's sake. For instance, a mother who could walk 
ermar et with her hild f . .hen she is w lki . c pre ers to drive because walking takes too long. or, 
if time 1.· 5 t ak ng wi 
th her child, she's always saying - -"come on, hurry up 11 whereas 
a en a child · 11 · ' spared, or as wi discover many things while walking. The child is being1 
ent I have gi would say, cheated, of any kind of exercise and exertion. One assign­
easy ( "do it thv~n my students is to spend one day listening and looking for the word -
is way it's ea · 11 ) • • • cou1 d preserve th t f' . 7ier, etc. • This word is used as a good thing. If we 
oi: di:f:ficult or ~ eeling which the child has of doing things, not because they're easy 
ing him maintai wh~tever, but because they're what he wants to do, then we would behelp-
n 1.s human dignity; and also we would not have to worry about motivating 
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him. If I do what I value, no one has to prod me or hold a carrot before my nose. 
In our society, right now, the only place where we don't make things easier is 
in individual sports. '!here, people try to conquer the more difficult - surfing, skiing 
and dangerous sports. No one pays them for it and oftentimes no one else is watching. 
It is not involved with =mpetition with another person. It's like people who go out 
and climb Mt. Everest - no one is making them do it - they are doing it because they find 
it challenging. 
If people are in touch with their own dignity and themselves, then what they 
want from me as a teacher is to challenge them to think as hard as they can and to choose 
the more difficult rather than the easier. By difficult I don't mean hard. '!here is a 
distinction between the two- if I ask students to do something which I want them to do 
then it is hard because they are not following their own bent. If they follow their own 
desires it isn't hard. On their own, they will choose the more difficult path - because 
that means they are really being alive. 
How did we lose this expression of dignity? 
This is what our young people are rebelling against today and are trying to find 
again. Everything which we have done is to protect ourselves from the piercing qualities 
of living - even from great joys. We have reached the point of feeling nothing - of being 
anesthetized. 
Youn9 people are saying - "This is life and I'm going to live it in all its pain 
and joys, etc." They're going back to being human and want to find out what it all means. 
What is relevant to the times is life with meaning, caring, loving. 
The counter culture is exactly what it says - it's counter the superficial values 
of the culture. They don't refrain from bathing so as to force you to like them, how­
ever disgusting they are, they are asking - ''What is disgusting about my not bathing? 
Isn't the odor of a body, human?" 
One of the questions we were concerned about was respect for heritage. What is 
happening now with so many people wanting to embrace some of the aspects of their cultur­
al backgrounds? 
In the past people from foreign countries were forced or persuaded to reject 
their heritage in order to be American, and nothing was given to them to take the place 
of a feeling for their original culture. All the textbooks in our school systems are 
based on the assumption that we are English. If you study literature, you don't study a 
Turkish poet or an African novelist. When you study grannnar - it is English - otherwise 
you study a foreign language (which could, in fact, be your own). 
What's happening now is that people are saying - "My history, which is a part of 
me, has been overlooked and treated as if it didn't exist." People want to be honored 
for being Greek or Black or Scottish and are therefore seeking their history. When I am 
in search of~ and~ dignity, then my history becomes important and I don't want some­
one else's. To reject your history, means to reject yourself. 
How much do you honor other people and how much do you honor yourself? 
When you consider all I have been saying, honoring myself and honoring other 
people are the same thing. In both cases I am honoring human dignity. If an individual 
has the feeling that his uniqueness is respected, then he will never be afraid that he is 
losing a part of himself by doing something which someone else wants. 
Additional Thoughtful Statements 
We try to avoid the unpleasant, but if we cut one-half of the unpleasant things 
out of our lives then we have cut one-half the existence in this area out of life. we 
owe it to our human dignity to really experience disappointment, pain, cold, etc. - this 
is part of being human. 
We usually avoid being involved because it is one of the most effort-demanding 
things-it requires that we care. 
we should not avoid a situation because it is frightening -if it is worth do­






Values are a part of the larger trend in education more commonly referred to as 
"humanistic," "affective," "confluent," or "psychological" education. 
Humanistic education emphasize the non-academic aspects of a student's growth 
and development. The humanistic approach to education aims chiefly at promoting posi­
tive self-concepts, increasing achievement motivation, promoting creative thinking and 
behavior, fostering better human relations and clarifying values. 
our values are of utmost importance. It is our values that determine the 
choices we make and the direction we take in life. 
In our highly complexed, individualized society, we are constantly bombarded by 
numerous decisions. Today people are confronted with more choices than ever before. In 
Future Shock, Alvin Toffler warns that future generations may be faced with the dilemma 
of overchoice. A person who has no value system or a confused value system may not be 
able to cope with the dilemma of overchoice. Therefore, it appears imperative that each 
individual be assisted in establishing a set of values by which he can make rational de­
cisions in unfamiliar situations. 
We may feel that we have a well defined set of values, only to realize thatwhen 
we are faced with a novel situation or a forced choice between two or more agreeable or 
disagreeable alternatives that we become thoroughly confused. 
The concept of values education is not new. There have always been parents and 
educators who have searched for ways to assist the youth in constructing a system of 
values. Numerous approaches may be used in constructing values. In their attempt to 
assist the younger generation in developing values, parents and educators have tradition­
ally used such approaches as modeling, moralizing, laissez-faire and values clarification. 
The adults who use the modeling approach, attempt t o set a living example for 
youth to follow. This approach requires the adult to set examples in words and in 
actions as well as in dress etc. The difficulty with this approach is that our youth of 
today are exposed to so many different adults that it is di f ficult for them to select an 
appropriate model. 
Moralizing is an indoctrinational approach to teaching values. With the moral­
izing approach, the adults assume that they know the "right" set of values that everyone 
should have. The problem with this approach is that it has become ineffective. In our 
pluralistic society, t he youth of today are introduced to many different philosophies. 
The youth become confu sed. In the final analysis, they are left alone to make their own 
decisions about whose advice to follow or values to adopt. The youth who are reared by 
adults who use the mo rali2ing approach in teaching values are not equipped to make ra­
tional choices. They have not had the experiences of selecting what they think is best 
and refraining from the "less desirable" values which others are encouraging them to 
adopt. 
The laissez-faire approach to values education requires everybody to refrain 
from teaching values . The adults who adopt this approach feel that everyone must devel­
op their own val ues without a ny assistance. They feel that everyone will be all right 
in the end. 
The fallacy of the laissez-faire approach is that everything usually does not 
come out all right in the end. Our youth o~ t oday do not need parents and teachers to 
run their lives, but they do need, and in most instances, want assistance in learning how 
to make value. judgments. 
Values clarification is a process approach to helping people develop a system 
of values. The proce ss of values clarification at t empts to assist people in developinJ 
their own system o f values. This process allows a person to learn about himself, to be­
come aware of his beliefs, attitudes, feelings and what it is he values. Values clari­
fication does not provide anyone with a set of values, but rather allows a person to dis­
cover his own values. The adults who use the process of va lues clarification are not 
concerned with the values a person holds, but rather the process by which a person devel­
ops his value s y stem. 
The questions that a person must ask to determin e his own values stem from the 
areas of prizing, choosing and acting. By prizing, a person selects the beliefs, be­
havior and attitudes that he prizes and cherishes and is willing to publicly affirm 
when appropriate. In the process of choosing, the person must have a free choice to 
select from alternatives after the consideration of the consequences of eachalternative. 
By acting, a person must decide if he is to act the way he believes. A person should 
form a pattern, be consistent and repetitious in his actions. 
If a person cannot select what he prizes, make a choice between alternatives 
with a knowledge of the consequences and take action on his beliefs with consistency, he 
does not have a value system. 
The goal of the process of values clarification is to assist people in applying 
the above processes of valuing in their everyday lives; to assist people in applying 
these processes to the beliefs and behavior patterns they now hold and to those they are 
now developing. 
To achieve the goal of values clarification, educators must use techniques 
which will aid the youth of today in becoming aware of the beliefs they prize and would 
be willing to affirm publicly when appropriate. The educators must use materials and 
techniques which encourage one to consider the alternatives of thinking and acting. The 
learners must be encouraged to consider the pros and cons and the consequences of the 
different alternatives in reaching decisions. The teacher aids the learned in discover­
ing whether his beliefs correspond with his actions. If there is a gross discrepancy 
between the learner's stated beliefs and actions, the teacher attempts to assist the 
student in coordinating the two. 
Through simulation exercises, the teacher provides the learners an opportunity 
to work their way through life like situations. The learners are encouraged to use these 
processes in everyday life. People only learn what they are allowed to do. An individ­
ual does not really understand a problem until he has worked his way through it. It is 
only when people are allowed to make their own decisions and evaluate the consequences 
of the alternatives that they develop their own system of values. 
TOWARD 
A IDDERN APPRO/\CH TO VAWES: 
THE VAWING PROCESS IN 
THE MATURE PERSON 
by 
earl R. Rogers 
(Reprinted by permission from Paul Kurtz, ed., M::>ral Problems in Contemporary Society, 
Prometheus Books, Buffalo, 1969, pp. 77-95.) 
There is a great dea l of concern today with the problems of values. Youth, in 
almost every country, is deeply uncer tain of its value orientation; the values associat­
ed with various religions have lost much of their influence; sophisticated individuals 
in every culture seem unsure and troubled as to the goals they hold in esteem. The rea­
sons are not far to seek. The world culture, in all its aspects, seems increasingly sci­
entific and relativistic, and the rigid, absolute views on values which come to us from 
the past appear anachornistic. Even more important, perhaps, is the fact that the mod­
ern individual is assailed from every angle by divergent and contradictory value claims. 
It is no longer possible, as it was in the not too distant historical past, to settle 
comfortably into the value system of one's community and live out one's life without 
e ver examining the nature and the assumptions of that system. 
I n thi s situa t ion it is not surprising that value orientations from the past 
appear to be in a state of disintegration or collapse. Men question whether there are, 
or can be, any universal values. It is often felt that we may have lost, in our modern 
world, all possibility of any general or cross-cultural basi.s for values. One natural 
resul t of t hi s uncertainty and confusion is that there is an increasing concern about, 
interest in, and a searching for a sound or meaningful value approach which can hold its 
own in today 's world . 
I share this general concern. I have also experienced the more specific value 
issues which arise in my own field, psychotherapy. Tue client's feelings and convic­
tions about values frequently change during therapy. How can he or we know whether they 
have changed in a sound direction? Or doe s he simply, as some claim, take over the 
value system of his therapist? Is psychotherapy simply a device whereby the unacknow­
ledged and unexamined values of the therapist are unknowingly transmitted to an unsus­
pecting client? Or should this transmission of values be the therapist's openly held 
purpose? Should he become the modern priest, upholding and imparting a value system 
suitable for today? And what would such a value system be? There has been much dis­
cussion of such issues, ranging from thoughtful and empirically based presentations such 
as that of Glad,1 to more polemic statements. As is so often true, the general problem 
faced by the culture is painfully and specifically evident in the cultural microcosm 
which is called the therapeutic relationship . 
I should like to attempt a modest approach to this whole problem. I have ob­
served changes in the approach to values as the individua l grows from infancy to adult­
hood. I observe further changes when, if he is fortunate, he continues to grow toward 
true psychological maturity. Many of these observations grow out of my experience as a 
therapist, where I have had the rich opportunity of seeing the ways in which individuals 
move toward a richer life. From these observations I believe I see some directional 
threads emerging which might offer a new =ncept of the valuing process, more tenable in 
the modern world. I have made a beginning by presenting some of these ideas partially 
in previous writings,2 I would like now to voice them more clearly and more fully. 
I would stress that my vantage point for making these observations is not that 
of the scholar or philosopher: I am speaking from my experience of the functioning hu­
man being, as I have lived with him in the intimate experience of therapy, and in other 
situations of growth, change, and development. To me these seem to express some core 
human values which a humanistic ethics can support with confidence. 
SOME DEFINITIONS 
Before I present some of these observations, perhaps I should try to clarify 
what I mean by values. There are many definitions which have been used, but I have 
found helpful some distinctions made by Charles r.brris. He points out that value is a 
term we employ in different ways. We use it to refer to the tendency of any living be­
ings to show preference, in their actions, for one kind or object or objective rather 
than another. This preferential behavior he calls "operative values." It need not in­
volve any cognitive or conceptual thinking. It is simply the v alue choice which is in­
dicated behaviorally when the organism selects one object, rejects another. When the 
earthworm, placed in a simple Y maze, chooses the smooth arm of the Y instead of the 
path which is paved with sandpaper , he is indicating an opera tive value , 
A second use of the term might be called "conceived values." This is the pre­
f erence of the individual for a symbolized object. Usually in such a preference there 
is anticipation or foresight of the outcome of behavior directed toward such a symbol­
ized object. A choice such as "Honesty is the best policy" is such a conceived value. 
A final use of the term might be called "objective value." People use the word 
in this way when they wish to speak of what is objectively preferable, whether or not 
it is in fact sensed or conceived of as desirable. What I have to say involves this 
last definition scarcely at all. I will be concerned with operative values and concep­
tualized values. 
TI-IE INFANT'S WAY OF VALUING 
Let me first speak about the infant. The living human being has, at the out­
set, a clear approach to values. He prefers some things and experiences, and rejects 
others. We can infer from studying his behavior that he prefers those experienceswhich 
maintain, enhance, or actualize his organism, and rejects those which do not serve this 
end. Watch him for a bit: 
Hunger is negatively valued. -His expression of this often =mes 
through loud and clear. 
Food is positively valued. But when he is satisfied, food is neg­
atively valued, and the same milk he responded to so eagerly is now 
spit out ·, or the breast which seemed so satisfying is now rejected 
as he turns his head away from the nipple with an amusing facial 
expression of disgust and revulsion. 
He values security, and the holding and caressing which seem to 
communica t e securi t y. 
He values new exper ience f or its own sake, and we observe this 
in his obvious pleasure in discovering his toes, in his searching 
movements, in his endless curiosity. 
He shows a clea r negative valuing of pain, bitter tastes, 
sudden loud sounds . 
All of this is commonplace, but let us look at these facts in terms of what 
they tell us about the infant's approach to values. It is first of all a flexible, 
changing, valuing process, not a fixes system. He likes food and dislikes the same food. 
He values security and rest, and rejects it for new experience. What is going on seems 
best described as an organismic valuing process, in which each element, each moment of 
what he is experiencing is somehow weighed, and selected or rejected, depending on 
whether, at that moment, it tends to actualize the organism or not. This complicated 
weighing of experience is clearly an organismic, not a conscious or symbolic function. 
These are operative, not conceived values. But this process can nonetheless deal with 
complex value problems. I would remind you of the experiment in which young infants had 
spread in front of them a score or more of dishes of natural (that is, unflavord) foods. 
Over a period of time they clearly tended to value the foods which enhanced their own 
survival, growth, and development. If for a time a child go rged himself on starches, 
this would soon be balanced by a protein "binge." If at times he chose a diet deficient 
in some vitam:in, he would later seek out foods rich in this very vitamin. He was util­
izing the wisdom of the body in his value choices, or perhaps more accurately, the physi­
ological wisdom of his body guided his behavioral movements, resulting in what we might 
think of as objectively sound value choices. 
Another aspect of the infant's approach to value is that the source or locus of 
the evaluatin9 process is clearly within himself. Unlike many of us, he knows what he 
likes and dislikes, and the origin of these value choices lies strictly within himself. 
He is the center of the valuing process, the evidence for his choices being supplied by 
his own senses, He is not at this point influenced by what his parents think he should 
prefer, or by what the church says, or by the opinion of the latest "expert" in the 
field, or by the persuasive talents of an advertising firm. It is from within his own 
experiencing that his organism is saying in the nonverbal terms - "This is good for me." 
"That is bad for me." "I like this." "I strongly dislike that." He would laugh at our 
concern over values, if he could understand it. How could anyone fail to know what he 
liked and disliked, what was good for him and what was not? 
THE CHANGE IN THE VAWING PROCESS 
What happens to this highly efficient, soundly based valuing process? By what 
sequence of events do we exchange it for the more rigid, uncertain, inefficient approach 
to values which characterizes most of us as adults? Let me try to state briefly one of 
the major ways in which I think this happens. 
The infant needs love, wants it, tends to behave in ways which will bring a re­
petition of this wanted experience. But this brings complications. He pulls baby sis­
ter's hair, and finds it satisfying to hear her wails and protests. He then hears that 
he is "a naughty, bad boy," and this may be reinforced by a slap on the hand. He is cut 
off from affection. As this experience is repeated, and many , many others like it, he 
gradually learns that what "feels good" is often "bad" in the eyes of others. Then the 
next step occurs, in which he comes to take the same attitude toward himself which these 
others have taken. Now, as he pulls his sister's hair, he solemnly intones, "Bad, bad 
boy." He is introjecting the value judgment of another, taking it in as his own. To 
that degree he loses touch with his own organismic valuing process. He has deserted the 
wisdom of his organism, giving up the locus of evaluation, and is trying to behave in 
terms of values set by another, in order to hold love. 
Or take another example at an older level. A boy senses, though perhaps not 
consciously, that he is more loved and prized by his parents when he thinks of being a 
doctor than when he thinks of being an artist. Gradually he introjects the values at­
tached to being a doctor. He comes to want, above all, to be a doctor . Then in college 
he is baffled by the fact that he repeatedly fails in chemistry, which is absolutely ne­
cessary to becoming a physician, in spite of the fact that the guidance counselor assures 
him he has the ability to pass the course. Only in counseling interviews does he begin 
to realize how completely he has lost touch with his organismic reactions, how out of 
touch he is with his own valuing process. 
Let me give another instance from a class of mine, a group of prospective teachers. 
I asked them at the beginning of the course, "Please list for me the two or three values 
which you would most wish to pass on to the children with whom you will work." They 
turned in many value goals, but I was surprised by some of the items. Several listed 
such things as "to speak correctly," "to use good English, not to use words like ain't." 
Others mentioned neatness - "to do things according to instructions"; one explained her 
hope that "When I tell them to write their names in the upper right-hand corner with the 
date under it, I want them to do it that way, not in some other form" 
I confess I was somewhat appalled that for some of these girls the most impor­
tant values to be passed on to pupils were to avoid bad grammar, or meticulously to 
follow teacher's instructions. I felt baffled. Certainly these behaviors had not been 
experienced as the most satisfying and meaningful elements in their own lives. Toe list­
ing of such values could only be accounted for by the fact that these behaviors had 
gained approval - and thus had been introjected as deeply important. 
Perhaps these several illustrations will indicate that in an attempt to gain or 
hold love, approval, esteem, the individual relinquishes the locus of evaluation which 
was his in infancy, and places it in others. He learns to have a basic distrust for his 
own experiencing as a guide to his behavior. He learns from others a large number of 
conceived values, and adopts them as his own, even though they may be widely discrepant 
from what he is experiencing. Because these concepts are not based on his own valuing, 
they tend to be fixed and rigid, rather than fluid and changing. 
SOME INTROJECTED PATTERNS 
It is in this fashion, I believe, that most of us accumulate the introjected 
value patterns by which we live. In this fantastically complex culture of today, the 
patterns we introject as desirable or undesirable come from a variety of sources and are 
often highly contradictory in their meanings. Let me list a few of the introjections 
which are common held. 
Sexual desires and behaviors are mostly bad. The sources of this construct 
are many- parents, church, teachers. 
Disobedience is bad. Here parents and teachers combine with the military 
to emphc,size this concept. To obey is good. lb obey without question is 
even better. 
Making money is the highest good. The sources of this conceived value 
are too numerous to mention. 
Learning an accumulation of scholarly facts is highly desirable. 
Browuing and aimless exploratory reading for fun is undesirable. 
The source of these last two concepts is apt to be the school, the 
educational system. 
Abstract art is good. Here the people we regard as sophisticated 
are the originators of the value. 
Communism is utterly bad. Here the government is a major source. 
To love thy neighbor is the highest good. This concept comes from 
the church, perhaps from the parents. 
Co operation and teamwork are preferable to acting alona. Here 
companions are an important source. 
Cheating is clever and desirable. The peer group again is the 
origin. 
Coca-colas, chewing gum, electric refrigerators, and automobiles 
are all utterly desirable. This conception comes not only from ad­
vertisements, but is reinforced by people all over the world. From 
Jamaica to Japan, from Copenhagen to Kowloon, the "Coca-Cola culture" 
has come to be regarded as the acme of desirability. 
This is a small and diversi f ied sample of the myriads of conceived values which 
values which individuals often introject , and hold as their own, without ever having con­
sidered their inner organismic reactions to these patterns and objects. 
COMMON CHARACTERISTICS OF ADULT VALUING 
I believe it will be clear from the foregoing that the usual adult - I fell I 
am speaking for most of us - has an approach to values which has these characteristics: 
The majority o f his values are introjected from other individuals or groups sig­
nificant to him, but a re regarded by him as his own . 
The source or locus of eva luation on most matters lies outside of himself. 
The criterion by which his values are set is the degree to which they will cause 
him to be loved or accepted. 
These conceived preferences are either not related at all, or not clearly re­
lated, to his own process of experiencing. 
Often there is a wide and unrecognized discrepancy between the evidence sup­
plied by his own experience and these conceived values . 
Because these conceptions are not open to testing in experience, he must hold 
them in a rigid and unchanging fashion. The alternative would be a collapse of his 
values. Hence his values are "right" - like the law of the Mades and the Persians, which 
change th not. 
Because they are untestable, there is no ready way of solving contradictions. 
If he has taken in from the community the conception that money is the summum bonum and 
from the church the conception that love of one's neighbor is the highest value, he has 
no way of discovering which has more value for him. Hence a common aspect of modem life 
is living with absolutely contradictory values. We calmly discuss the possibility of 
dropping a hydrogen bomb on Russia, but then find tears in our eyes when we see headlines 
about the suffering of one small child. 
Because he has relinquished the locus of evaluation to others, and has lost 
touch with his own valuing process, he feels profoundly insecure and easily threatened 
in his values. If some of these conceptions were destroyed, what would take their place? 
This threatening possiblity makes him hold his value conceptions more rigidly or more 
confusedly, or both. 
THE FUNDAMENTAL DISCREPANCY 
I believe that this picture of the individual, with values mostly introjected, 
held as fixed concepts, rarely examined or tested, is the picture of most of us. By 
taking over the conceptions of others as our own, we lose contact with the potential 
wisdom of ·our own functioning, and lose confidence in ourselves. Since these value con­
structs are often sharply at variance with what is going on in our own experiencing, we 
have in a very basic way divorced ourselves from ourselves, and this accounts for much 
of modern strain and insecurity. This fundamental discrepancy between the individual's 
concepts and what he is actually experiencing, between the intellectual structure of his 
values and th~! valuing process going on unrecognized within him - this is a part of the 
fundamental estrangement of modern man from himself. This is a major problem for the 
therapist. 
RESTORING CONTACT WITH EXPERIENCE 
Some individuals are fortunate in going beyond the picture I have just given, 
developing further in the direction of psychological maturity. We see this happen in 
psychotherapy where we endeavor to provide a climate favorable to the growth of a person. 
We also see it happen in life, whenever life provides a therapeutic climate for the in­
dividual. Let me concentrate on this further maturing of a value approach as I have seen 
it in therapy. 
In the first place, let me say somewhat parenthetically that the therapeutic 
relationship is not devoid of values. Quite the contrary. When it is most effective, 
it seems to mi, it is marked by one primary value; namely, that this person, this client, 
has worth. He as a person is valued in his separateness and uniqueness. It is when he 
senses and realizes that he is prized as a person that he can slowly begin to value the 
different aspects of himself. Most importantly, he can begin, with much difficulty at 
first, to sen~e and to feel what is going on within him, what he is feeling, what he is 
experiencing, how he is reacting. He uses his experiencing as a direct referent to which 
he can turn in forming accurate conceptualizations and as a guide to his behavior. 
Gendlin has elaborated the way in which this occurs. 3 As his experiencing becomes more 
and more open to him, as he is able to live more freely in the process of his feelings, 
then signific&nt changes begin to occur in his approach to values. It begins to assume 
many of the characteristics it had in infancy . 
INTROJECTED VALUES IN RELATION TO EXPERIENCING 
Perhaps I can indicate this by reviewing a few of the brief examples of intro­
jected values which I have given, and suggesting what happens to them as the individual 
comes closer to what is going on within him. 
The individual in therapy looks back and realizes, "But I enjoyed 
pulling my sister's hair - and that •doesn't make me a bad person." 
The student failing chemistry realizes, as he gets close to his 
own experiencing..J'I don't value being a doctor, even though my 
parents do; I don't like chemistry; I don't like taking steps toward 
being a doc to; and I am not a failure for having these feelings." 
The adult recognizes that sexual desires and behavior may be 
richly satisfying and permanently enriching in their consequences, 
or shallow and temporary and less than satisfying. He goes by his 
own experiencing, which does not always coincide with the social 
norms. 
He considers art from a new value approach. He says, "This 
picture moves me deeply, means a great deal to me. It also happens 
to be an abstraction, but that is not the basis for my valuing it." 
He recognizes freely that this communist book or person has 
attitudes and goals which he shares as well as ideas and values 
which he does not share. 
He realizes that at times he experiences cooperation as meaning­
ful and valuable to him, and that at other times he wishes to be 
alone and act alone. 
VAWING IN 1HE MAWRE PERSON 
The valuing process which seems to develop in this more mature person is in some 
ways very much like that in the infant, and in some ways quite different. It is fluid, 
flexible, based on this particular moment, and the degree to which this moment is exper­
ienced as enhancing and actualizing. Values are not held rigidly, but are continually 
changing. The painting which last year seemed meaningful now appears uninteresting, the 
way of working with individuals which was formerly experienced as good now seems inade­
quate, the belief which then seemed true is now experienced as only partly true, or per­
haps false. 
Another characteristic of the way this person values experience is that it is 
highly differentiated, or as the semanticists would say, extensional. As the members of 
my class of prospective teachers learned, general principles are not as useful as sensi­
tively discriminating reactions. One says, "With this little boy, I just felt I should 
be very firm, and he seemed to welcome that, and I felt good that I had been. But I'm 
not that way at all with the other children most of the time." She was relying on her 
experiencing of the relationship with each child to guide her behavior. I have already 
indicated, in going through the examples how much more differentiated are the individual's 
reactions to what were previously rather solid monolithic introjected values. 
In another way the mature individual's approach is like that of the infant. The 
locus of evaluation is again established firmly within the person. It is his own exper­
ience which provides the value information or feedback. This does not mean that he is 
not open to all the evidence he can obtain from other sources. But it means that this 
is taken for what it is-outside evidence-nd is not as significant as his own reactions. 
Thus he may be told by a friend that a new book is very disappointing. He reads two un­
favorable reviews of the book. Thus his tentative hypothesis is that he will not value 
the book. Yet if he reads the book his valuing will be based upon the reactions it stirs 
in him, not on what he has been told by others. 
There is also involved in this valuing process a letting oneself down into the 
immediacy of what one is experiencing, endeavoring to sense and to clarify all its com­
plex meanings. I think of a client who , toward the close of therapy, when puzzled about 
an issue, would put his head in his hands and say, "Now what is it that I'm feeling? I 
want to get next to it. I want to learn what it is." Then hewould wait, quietly and 
patiently, trying to listen to himself, until he could discern the exact flavor of the 
feelings he was experiencing. He, like others, was trying to get close to himself. 
In ge ·tting close to what is going on within himself, the process is much more 
complex than it is in the infant. In the mature person it has much more scope and sweep, 
for there is involved in the present moment of experiencing the memory traces of all the 
relevant learnings from the past. This moment has not only its immediate sensory impact, 
but it has meaning growing out of similar experiences in the past.4 It has both the new 
and the old in it. So when I experience a painting or a person, my experiencing con­
tains within it the learning s I have accumulated from past meetings with paintings or 
persons, as w,~11 as the new impact of this particular encounter. Likewise the moment of 
experiencing contains, for the ma tu:ce adult, hypotheses about consequences. "I feel now 
that I would enjoy a third drink, but past learnings indicate that I may regret it in 
the morning." "It is not pleasant to express f orthrightly my negative feelings to this 
person, but past experience indicates that in a continuing relationship it will be help­
ful in the long run." Past and future are both in this moment and enter in to the valu­
ing. 
I find that in the person I am speaking of (and here again we see a similarity 
to the infant) the criterion of the valuing process is the degree to which the object of 
the experience actualizes the individual himself. Does it make him a richer, more com­
plete, more fully developed person? This may sound as though it were a selfish or un­
social criterion, but it does not prove to be so, since deep and helpful relationships 
with others are experienced as actualizing. 
Like the infant, too, the psychologically ma ture adult trusts and uses the wisdom 
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of his organism, with the difference that he is able to do so knowingly. He realizes 
that if he can trust all of himself, his feelings and his intuitions may be wiser than 
his mind, that as a total person he can be more sensitive and accurate than his thoughts 
alone. Hence he is not afraid to say- "I feel that this experience (or this thing, or 
this direction) is good. Later I will probably know why I feel it is good." He trusts 
the totality of himself. 
It should be evident from what I have been saying that this valuing process in 
the mature individual is not an easy or simple thing. The process is complex, the choices 
often very perplexing and difficult, and there is no guarantee that the choice which is 
made will in fact prove to be self-actualizing. But because whatever evidence exists is 
available to the indicidual, and because he is open to his experiencing, errors are cor­
rectable. If this chosen course of action is not self-enhancing this will be sensed and 
he can make an adjustment or revision. He thrives on a maximum feedback interchange, and 
thus, like the gyroscopic compass on a ship, can continually correct his course toward 
his true goal of self-fulfillment. 
SOME PROPOSITIONS REGARDING 
THE VALUING PROCESS 
Let me sharpen the meaning of what I have been saying by stating two propositions 
which contain the essential elements of this viewpoint. While it may not be possible to 
devise empirical tests of each proposition in its entirety, each is to some degree capa­
ble of being tested through the methods of science. I would also state that though the 
following propositions are stated firmly in order to give them clarity, I am actually 
advancing thein as decidedly tentative hypotheses. 
1. There is an organismic base for an organized valuing process within the 
human individual. 
It is hypothesized that this base is something the human being shares with the 
rest of the animate world. It is part of the functioning life process of any healthy 
organism. It is the capacity for receiving feedback information which enables the or­
ganism continually to adjust its behavior and reactions so as to achieve the maximum 
possible self-enhancement. 
2. This valuing process in the human being is effective in achieving self-en­
hancement to the degree that the individual is open to the experiencing which is going 
on within himself. 
I have tried to give two examples of individuals who are close to their own ex­
periencing: the tiny infant who has not yet learned to deny in his awareness the pro­
cesses going on within; and the psychologically mature person who has relearned the ad­
vantages of this open state. 
There is a corollary to this second proposition which might be put in the follow­
ing terms. One way of assisting the individual to move toward openness to experience is 
through a relationship in which he is prized as a separate person, in which the experi­
encing going on within him is empathically understood and valued, and in which he is 
given the freedom to e:xperience his own feelings and those of otherswithoutbeing threat­
ened in doing so. 
This corollary obviously grows out of therapeutic experience. It is a brief 
statement of the essential qualities in the therapeutic relationship. There are already 
some empirical studies, of which the one by Barrett-Lennard is a good example, which 
gives support to such a statement.5 
PROPOSITIONS REGARDING 
TI-IE OUTCOME OF THE VALUING PROCESS 
I come now to the nub of any theory of values or valuing. What are its conse­
quences? I should like to move into this new ground by stating bluntly two propositions 
as to the qualities of behavior which emerge from this valuing process. I shall then 
give some of the evidence from my own experience as a therapist in the support of these 
propositions. 
3. In persons who are moving toward greater openness to their experiencing, 
there is an organismic commonality of value directions. 
4. These conmon value directions are of such kinds as to enhance the develop­
ment of the individual himself, of others in his community, and to make for the survival 
and evolution of his species. 
It has been a striking fact of my experience that in therapy, where individuals 
are valued, where there is greater freedom to feel and to be, certain value directions 
seem to emerge. These are not chaotic directions but instead have a surprising common­
ality. This commonality is not dependent on the personality of the therapist, for I have 
seen these trends emerge in the clients of therapists sharply different in personality. 
This commonality does not seem to be due to the influences of any one culture, for I have 
found evidence of these directions in cultures ad divergent asthose of the United States, 
Holland, France, and Japan. I like to think that this commonality of value directions 
is due to the fact that we all belong to the same species - that just as a human infant 
tends, individually, to select a diet similar to that selected by other human infants, 
so a client in therapy tends, individually, to choose value directions similar to those 
chosen by other clients. As a species there may be certain elements of experience which 
tend to make for inner development and which would be chosen by all individuals if they 
were genuinely free to choose. 
Let me indicate a few of these value directions as I see them in my clients as 
they move in the direction of personal growth and maturity. 
They tend to move away from facades. Pretense, defensiveness, putting up a front, 
tend to be negatively valued. 
They tend to move away from "oughts." The compelling feeling of "I ought to do 
or be thus and so" is negatively valued. The client moves away from being what he "ought 
to be," no matter who has set that imperative. 
They tend to move away from meeting the expectations of others. Pleasing others, 
as a goal in itself, is negatively valued. 
Being real is positively valued. The client tends to move toward being himself, 
being his real feelings, being what he is. This seems to be a very deep preference. 
Self-direction is positively valued . The client discovers an increasing pride 
and confidence in making his own choices, guiding his own life. 
One's self, one's own feelings come to be positively valued. From a point where 
he looks upon himself with contempt and despair, the client comes to value himself and 
his reactions as being of worth. 
Being a process is positively valued. From desiring some fixed goal, clients 
come to prefer the excitement of being a process of potentialities being born. 
Perhaps more than all else, the client comes to value an openness to all of his 
inner and outer experience. To be open to and sensitive to his own inner reactions and 
feelings, the reactions and feelings of others, and the realities of the objective world 
- this is a direction which he clearly prefers. This openness becomes the client's most 
valued resource. 
Sensitivity to others and acceptance of others is positively valued. The client 
comes to appn?ciate others for what they are, just as he has come to appreciate himself 
for what he is. 
Finally, deep relationships are positively valued. To achieve a close, intimate, 
real, fully communicative relationship with another person seems to meet a deep need in 
every individual, and is very highly valued. 
These then are some of the preferred directions which I have observed in indi­
viduals moving toward personality maturity. Though I am sure that the list I have given 
is inadequate and perhaps to some degree inaccurate, it holds for me exciting possibili­
ties . Let me try to explain why. 
I find it significant that when individuals are prized as persons, the values 
they select do not run the full gamut of possibilities. I do not find, in such a climate 
of freedom, that one person comes to value fraud and murder and thievery, while another 
values a life of self-sacrifice, and another values only money. Instead there seems to 
be a deep and underlying thread of commonality. I dare to believe that when the human 
being is inwardly free to choose whatever he deeply values, he tends to value those ob­
jects, experiences, and goals which make for his own survival, growth, and development, 
and for the survival and development of others. I hypothesize that it is characteristic 
of the human organism to prefer such actualizing and socialized goals when he is exposed 
to a growth-promoting climate. 
A corollary of what I have been saying is that in any culture, given a climate 
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of respect and freedom in which he is valued as a person, the mature individual would 
tend to choose and prefer these same value directions. This is a highly significant hy­
pothesis which could be tested. It means that though the individual of whom I am speak­
ing would not have a consistent or even a stable system of conceived values, the valui~ 
process within him would lead to emerging value directions which would be constant across 
cultures and across time. 
Another implication I see is that individuals who exhibit the fluid valuing pro­
cess I have tried to describe, whose value directions are generally those I have listed, 
would be highly effective in the ongoing process of human evolution. If the human specie·s 
is to survive at all on this globe, the human being must become more readily adaptive to 
new problems and situations, must be able to select that which is valuable for develop­
ment and survival out of new and complex situations, must be accu;ate in his appreciation 
of re·.aJ.ity .i .f . he; .is tq ..make such selections •.The psychologically .mature person as I have 
described him has, I believ~, the ·qualities whlch wouia · cause him to value those exper­
iences which would make for the survival and enhancement of the human race. He would be 
a worthy participant and guide in the process of human· evolution. 
Finally, it appears that we have returned to the issue of universality of values, 
but by a different route. Instead of universal values "out there," or a universal value 
system imposed by some group- philosophers, rulers, or priests-we have the possibility 
of universal human value directions emerging from the experiencing of the human organism. 
Evidence from therapy indicates that both personal and social values emerge as natural, 
and experienced, when the individual is close to his own arganismic valuing process. The 
suggestion is that though modern man no longer trusts religion or science or philosophy 
nor any system of beliefs to give him his values, he may find an or9anismic valuing base 
within himself which, if he can learn again to be in touch with it, will prove to be an 
organized, adaptive and social approach to the perplexing value iseues which face all of 
us. 
SUMMARY 
I have tried to present some observations, growing out of experience in psycho­
therapy, which are relevant to man's search for some satisfying basis for his approach 
to values. 
I have described the human infant as he enters directly into an evaluating trans­
action with his world, appreciating or rejecting his experiences as they have meaning for 
his own actualization, utilizing all the wisdom of his tiny but complex organism. 
I have said that we seem to lose this capacity for direct evaluation, and come 
to behave in those ways and to act in terms of those values which will bring us ~ocial 
approval, affection, esteem. lb buy love we relinquish the valuing process. Because the 
center of our lives now lies in others, we are fearful and insecure, and must cling ri­
gidly to the values we have introjected. 
But if life or therapy gives us favorable conditions for continuing our psycho­
logical growth, we move on in something of a spiral, developing an approach to values 
which partakes of the infant's directness and fluidity but goes far beyond him in its 
richness. In our transactions with experience we are again the locus or source of .val­
uing, we prefer those experiences which in the long run are enhancing, we utilize all the 
richness of our cognitive learning and functioning, but at the same time we trust the 
wisdom of our organism. 
I have pointed out that these observations lead to certain basic statements, 
Man has within him an organismic basis for valuing. lb the extent that he can be freely 
in touch with this valuing process in himself, he will behave in ways which are self­
enhancing. We even know some of the conditions which enable him to be in touch with his 
own experiencing process. 
In therapy, such openness to experience leads to emerging value directions which 
appear to be common across individuals and perhaps even across cultures. Stated in old­
er terms, individuals who are thus in touch with their experiencing come to value such 
directions as sincerity, independence, self-direction, self-knowledge, social responsi­
vity, social responsibility, and loving interpersonal relationships. 
I have concluded that a new kind of emergent universality of value directions 
becomes possible when individuals move in the direction of psychological maturity, or 
more accurately, move in the direction of becoming open to their experiencing. Such a 
value base appears to make for the enhancement of self and others, and to promote a. pos­
itive evolutionary process. 
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HELPING CHILDREN TO CLEARIFY VAWES 
by 
Louis E. Raths and Sidney B. Simon 
(Reprinted by persmission from N.E.A • .J:>urnal, October, 1967, pp. 12-15.) 
Modern life in the United States is rich with choice s and opportunities, but it 
is also very confusing. It is far more difficult for a child to develop clear values 
today than it was in the simpler, more austere life of the turn of the century . 
One major reason for this is the change in the family, where, many believe, 
values develop. In recent decades, Americans have seen dramatic, if not frightening, 
changes in the family-working mothers (one out o f three) , broken homes (estimated at 
one out of five), and geographic mobility (about one family in five moves every year). 
Family sharing has decreased. The consequence, we submit, has been a growing confusion 
in the life of children. 
When the family defaulted , society passed the buck to the schools. To avoic con­
troversy, many schools began to stand for nothing. Teachers turned toward "teaching the 
f acts." Administrators tended to prefer teachers who did not raise issues. In communi­
ties consisting of strangers with many different backgrounds, it became easier to have 
schools which represented no moral consensus. 
The question we must answer today, then, is: What can schools in a heterogeneous 
society do in the teaching o f values? Before arriving at an answer, it is necessary to 
define the terms and say not only what values are but by what processes people acquire 
them. 
Individuals have experiences. Out of these may come certain general guides to 
behavior- values-which tend to give direction to life. Values evolve and mature as 
experiences evolve and mature. 
Because values are a part of living, they operate in very complex circumstances 
and usually involve more than simple extremes of right and wrong, good and bad, true and 
f alse. Ihe conditions in which values work typically involve conflicting demands, a 
weighing and balancing, and finally an action that reflects a multitude of forces. 
Since each person's experiences are different, we cannot be certain what values, what 
style of life, would be most suitable for any person. we do, however, have some ideas 
about what processes might be most effective for obtaining sound values. 
we see values as based on three processes: choosing, prizing, and acting. From 
t hese we derive seven criteria, all of which must be satisfied if something is to be 
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called a value. An adult who wants to help children develop values should, we believe: 
Encourage children to make choices, and allow them to choose freely 
Help them discover and examine available alternatives when faced 
with choices 
Help them weigh alternatives thoughtfully, reflecting on the conse-
quences of each 
Encourage them to consider what it is that they prize and cherish 
Give them opportunities to make public affirmations of their choices 
Encourage them to act in accordance with their choices 
Help them to examine repeated behaviors or patterns in their life. 
In this way the adult encourages the process of valuing. The intent of this pro­
cess is to help children clarify for themselves what they value. This is very different 
from trying to persuade children to accept some predetermined set of values by limiting 
their choices, enforcing rules and regulations, or teaching cultural or religious dogma, 
as some of the traditional approaches do. 
We have no doubt that such methods have in the past controlled behavior and even 
formed beliefs and attitudes, but we assert that they have not and cannot lead to values 
in the sense we are concerned with them-values that represent the free and thoughtful 
choice of intelligent hwnans interacting with complex and changing environments. 
The traditional approaches listed above would receive a low grade in terms of 
their effectiveness in promoting such values as honor, courage, self-control, and love. 
All have the air of indoctrination: free inquiry, thoughtfulness, and reason seem to be 
lost. The approach seems to be to persuade the child to adopt the "right" values rather 
than to help him develop a valuing process. 
One reason for the continued use of the old methods is that no clear and testable 
alternative has been provided. We suggest an approach to clarifying values that rests 
on a specific method of responding to things a student says or does. The strategy, 
called clarifying response, is to respond to a student so that he considers what he has 
chosen, what he prizes, and/or what he is doing. 
The clarifying response is usually aimed at one student at a time, often in brief, 
informal conversations held in class, in hallways, on the playground, or any place else 
where a student does or says something to trigger such a response from the teacher. 
Especially ripe for clarifying responses are expressions by students of atti­
tudes, aspirations, purposes, interests, activities, convictions, worries, and opinions. 
Typical keywords that signal a statement of attitudes include I'm for, I'm against, 1. 
think, if you ask me, my choice is, my way of doing it is, I believe. 
As a teacher listens to students, he may mentally plus and minus their state­
ments-plus for what they are for and minus for what they are against. Students are not 
always aware when they have revealed what they are for or against and are quite sur­
prised to see their inconsistencies. 
Teachers must avoid making students feel they will lose face as they expose their 
feelings. It is essential to maintain an accepting atmosphere and to say sincerely over 
and over again, "All of us are inconsistent from time to time, and all of us tend to be 
confused about certain things we are for and against. One of the things we hope to learn 
is how to think about our attitudes and clarify them." 
The purpose of the clarifying response is to raise questions in the mind of the 
student, to prod him gently to examine his life, his actions, and his ideas. The respon­
ses lead the student to no specific value; he does not need to deliver a "right" answer 
to a clarifying response. 
All of the exchanges will be brief, for an extended series of probes might give 
the student the feeling that he is being cross-examined and make him defensive. Also, a 
long exchange might give him too much to think about. The idea is to raise a few ques­
tions, leave them hanging in the air, and then move on without moralizing. The student 
to whom the questions are addressed, and others who might overhear, may well ponder th 
them later. These gentle prods stimulate students, and our research indicates that a 
number of such exchanges add up and make large differences in some students' lives. 
Miny of the responses will be geared directly to one of the seven valuing 
processes: For example, when choosing freely is involved, the teacher may ask, "Where 
do you suppose you first got that idea?" or "Are you the only one in your crowd that 
feels this way?" If the student has chosen from al ternatives, the teacher may say, "Wia t 
else did you con sider before you picked this?" or "What's really good about this choice?" 
To help the student in choosing thoughtfully, the teacher may ask, "What would be the 
consequences of each alternative available?" or "What assumptions are involved in your 
choice?" 
If prizing and cherishing are involved, the teacher may ask, "How long have you 
wanted it?" or "In what way would life be different without it?" Another issue is wheth­
er the student is willing to affirm publicly his choice- "Would you tell the class the 
way you feel some time?" In reference to acting upon a choice, a teacher may ask, "What 
are your first steps? Subsequent steps?" or "Have you examined the consequences of your 
act? Questions a teacher might ask in relation to the repeating of an action include, 
"Have you felt this way for some time?" "Have you felt this way for some time?" "Has 
it been worth the time and money?" "How long do you think you will continue?" 
The following brief exchange shows how a teacher may use clarifying responses. 
MARY: Some day I'd like to join the Peace Corps. 
TEACHER: What are some good things about that, Mary? 
MARY: Oh, the chance to be of service excites me, and going to faraway places 
does too. 
TEACHER: Of those two, which is first? 
MARY: I guess the faraway places part. 
TEACHER: Are you glad that that one. is first? 
MARY: No, I guess people would respect me more if the service part was first , 
TEACHER: Well, it's been interesting talking to you, Mary, but I must get 
back to my papers. Perhaps we can talk about it another time. 
Students are accustomed to having teachers ask questions, both academic-Who 
founded Jamestown?- and behavioral-Didn't I tell you to be quiet? These questions, how­
ever, have nothing to do with the interchange between Mary and the teacher, with the 
clarifying approach which repsects the individual's rights to make decisions. 
Because many questions teachers customarily ask are really statements of the 
teachers' decisions, students often assume that a question is actually a concealed dir­
ective. To combat this, the teacher begins to use clarifying questions at times when the 
student knows that the teacher is not trying to disapprove of what he is saying or doing. 
The simplest guide in the beginning is for the teacher to use clarifying respon­
ses in situations of which he either approves or has no preferences. After students be­
come familiar with the clarifying responses, they will begin to use them on one another 
and on other friends. 
Before defining a clarifying response, it may be helpful to say what it is not. 
Clarifying is not therapy. 
Clarifying is not used on students with serious emotional problems. 
Clarifying is not a single one-shot effort: it depends on a program 
consistently applied over a period of time. 
Clarifying avoids moralizing, preaching, indoctrinating, inculcating, 
or dogmatizing. 
Clarifying is not an interview, nor is it done in a formal manner. 
Clarifying is not meant to replace the teacher's other educational 
functions. 
Clarifying is an honest attempt to help a student look at his life and to en­
courage him to think about it in an atmosphere in which positive acceptance exists. 
Students will probably not enter into the perplexing process of clarifying values for 
themselves if they perceive that the teacher does not respect their viewpoint. If trust 
is not communicated, the student may well play the game, pretending to clarify and think 
and choose and prize but being as unaffected by the exchange as by a tiresome morality 
lecture. 
For many teachers, working with clarification of values will mean much less 
talking and a lot more listening. Teachers who are able to do this and to ask the right 
questions begin to have small miracles happening in their classrooms. They often see at­
tendance go up, grades rise, and interest and excitement in learning crackle. They see 
encouraging changes in students who have been classified as apathetic, listless, and in­
different. 
The teacher fits the clarifying response into the value clarifying method by do­
ing the following: first, looking and listening for statements or actions which suggest 
a value issue may be involved (he notes especially children who seem to be very apathe­
tic, indecisive, flighty, or inconsistent or who tend to overconform o.r drift from here 
to there without reason); second, keeping in mind the goal-youngsters who have clear, 
personal values; third, responding to a value indicator with a clarifying question or 
comment designed to help the student use one or more of the seven valuing processes. 
Though a number of students may overhear a student-teacher exchange and profit 
from it, the clarifying response focuses on one student. Some techniques for value clar­
ification can be used with a whole group. For example, a teacher may give each member 
of the class a value sheet which, in its simplest form, consists of a provocative state­
ment and a series of questions. 
The purpose of the statement is to raise an issue that may have value implica­
tions. lhe purpose of the questions is to carry each student through the value clarify­
ing process with that issue. since valuing is an individual matter, each student com­
pletes the value sheet by himself. Later, his answers may be shared with the teacher or 
other students and/or used as a basis for large or small group discussions. 
Some value sheets consist of nothing more than a series of probing questions that 
are keyed to a common reading or experience. lhe questions on the value sheet are in the 
style of the valuing theory. Th.at is, the questions do not try subtly to convince a stu­
dent to believe what the adult believes but to help him take the issue at hand through 
the value criteria. 
Among the many other classroom methods which a teacher may use to help children 
escape from value confusion are role-playing, devil's advocate (presenting the unpopular 
side of an issue), and time diary (each student keeps a record of how he spends his time 
and analyzes the record). 
How can a teacher begin to incorporate value clarifying into his teaching? We 
suggest that he start by working toward a classroom climate in which students feel they 
are respected and accepted and feel secure enough to think logically and speak honestly. 
At the same time, the teacher must work to eliminate his own tendencies to moralize. 
With valuing processes of choosing, prizing, and acting ever in mind, the teacher 
experiments, slowly but steadily, to find which strategies fit him and work best with his 
students. In a few months he will be able to see results in the way his students make 
and act upon their choices. He may also find he has clarified some of his own values. 
WHAT IS VALUING? 
by 
Nicholas Rescher 
(Reprinted by permission from Penny's Forum, Spring/Summer 1972, p. 3.) 
Man is a creature that not only does things but thinks about what he does. Ac­
cordingly, we do things for reasons- because we regard them as leading to certain bene­
fits for ourselves or others. Values represent the ultimate reasons people have for act­
ing as they do- their basic aims, objectives, aspirations, ideals. They cover the whole 
domain or rational human action and range from our lowest to our most elevated concerns. 
The little things in life- the good manners and ordinary politeness of social interac­
tion- manifest values no less sharply than the big crises. 
Values are intangibles in the final analysis, they are things of the mind that 
have to do with the vision people have of "the good life" for themselves and their fel­
lows. Each of a persons's values-be it "loyalty" or "economic justice" or "self-ag­
grandizement"- plays a role in his concept of human well-being by providing a standard 
by which he assesses the extent of his satisfactions in and with life. Abstract in char­
acter, these values manifest themselves concretely in the ways in which people talks and 
act, and especially in the pattern of their expenditure of time and effort, in their 
actions at work and leisure and in their choices in the marketplace. It is primarily 
through these concrete manifestations that values secure their importance and relevance 
in human affairs. 
Values have to do with the rationalization of behavior-its justification and its 
explanation. Precisely because these two key factors o f action and rationalization can 
get out of line, we come to the problem of the hypocrite ; the person who verbally sub­
scribes to a value but violates it in action. Since we tend to prize authenticity in our 
fellows nothing "turns us off" faster toward someone than this form of hypocrisy- talking 
a value up without implementing it in action. 
Values are worth bothering with because they make a diff erence. When we know 
someone's values · we are able to grasp ''what makes him tick." We are better able to un­
derstand him and to deal with him. Ihe possession of diverse values set people apart and 
shared values simplify their working together. 
As biological organism all men share certain basic values relating to the main­
tenance of life, values enshrined in the rules of all civilized societies. But, of course, 
social and personal variation makes for a wide divergence in human values. 
Values can change. When this happens-when changes in the conditions of life are 
such as to cast from the pedestal of the true and genuine some heretofore accepted value 
that once belonged there, there lies before us a (Nietzche-reminiscent) "transvaluation" 
of values. But, of course,to say this is not to deny that it is unlikely to the point of 
inconceivability that many of our historic social or personal values- "justice," "in­
telligence," and "kindness," to give just three examples- could ever, under any realist­
ically foreseeable circumstances, are likely ever to be dethroned. 
Why bother to clarify our values? Knowing our own values is a crucial part of 
learning about ourselves. What sorts of things are really meaningful to us? What are 
we striving for and working towards? What sort of a world do we want to see come into 
being? To the extent that we cannot answer such questions we have failed to come to 
terms with ourselves. The mark of an immature person lies exactly here, in that he still 
"has a great deal to learn about himself." 
The single most important fact about values is that t hey themselves can be eval­
uated in turn. There are good values and bad values- cure l o r callous or self-aggran­
dizing values and those that are cooperative or kindly o r humane. 
It is especially important to equip children with a "sense of values." They must 
not only have values (that is pretty well inevitable) but should have an intelligent at­
titude towards them . Not only should they be taught good values, but they should learn 
to be critically aware of their own values and o f the need to keep their actual life­
style properly attuned to them. 
The big values in our lives are called ideals. The importance of having them 
cannot be exaggerated. They are the basis of vision and aspiration in our lives. As 
the popular song put it, if you don't have a dream you can't make a dream come true, In 
the kingdom of nature, man alone has a capacity for spiritual growth- for becoming bigger 
than life-size. All significant human achievement, great and small, is the product of 
intelligence guided by the vision of an ideal . 
Whether we choose t o confront it or not, all of us face the basic question: What 
really are my values? It is well worth reflecting about. For it is close to impossible 
to come away from such re f l e ction without an enhanced understanding of ourselves and our 




(Reprinted by permission from Richard Reichard , Self-Awareness Through Group Dynamics, 
Pflaum/standard, Dayton, Ohio, 1970, pp. 39-45,) 
Definition of Values 
This topic could be approached from two points of view. Since all values have 
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moral implications, we might say the topic is concerned with morality. On the other 
hand, since all values serve as motivations for actions, the topic could be interpreted 
as a study in motivation. In either case, the goal is the same: to help the students 
become more aware of the values that are operative in their own lives and to help them 
clarigy the hierarchy of values they presently hold. 
It has always been surprising to me to discover that many students, while ob­
viously possessing a "set of values" which both motivate them and which they use to judge 
the right and wrong of their actions, have never critically analyzed these values. Often 
their values have been acquired gradually, as if through familial and cultural osmosis, 
The students are not aware that these values have been acquired. To them it seems they 
have always been there. "That's the way it is," they remark. 
The values they consciously hold are usually in direct conflict with those of 
their parents, their religion or the Establishment- a reflection of their rebellion with 
the accepted values of the society. Even in this instance, though, students are often 
not aware of how they acquired these differing values. Again they feel that "that's the 
way it really is." 
Thus, a discussion in values should include two things. First, the conscious 
awareness of the values that are operative in our lives and the ordering of these values 
from most important to least important. Second, an examination of how we develop values 
in the first place. The exercise in this lesson aims primarily at becoming aware of the 
values we have. Through the discussion that follows, the students should be led to the 
second question of how values are acquired. 
This latter question deserves a little comment. We tend to acquire values on 
several levels. First, through society-which includes for the student his youth culture 
of disc jockeys, fads, "what the other kids are doing," etc. In this regard it would 
make an interesting study if someone were to examine the effects that youth on the east 
and west coasts have on youth in middle America. It seems that the two coasts (specifi­
cally California and New York) initiate much of what eventually becomes "in" in the Mid­
west a few months later. The fact is that for the adolescent, who is usually rejecting 
the various norms acquired as a child, many of his values come from this peer culture 
and from the college culture he aspires to enter. As such, this is neither bad norgood. 
What is critical is that young people become aware of how greatly they are influenced by 
this youth culture. 
A second source of values lies in the various psychological needs the adolescent 
experiences, many of which are not conscious. For example, a boy may place a higher 
value on athletics than on studies because of his need to be considered "manly" by his 
peers. Or an unattractive girl may place a high value on studies to compensate for her 
inability to get into the social swing. In these instances, a youth's values may become 
quite distorted unless he becomes aware of the kinds of psychological needs that are mo­
tivating him. Th.is can be treated in general terms in a classroom setting, but specific 
problems are best handled in a one-to-one counseling situation. 
Finally, many of a student's values have been acquired through his family and 
through his formal religion training. His surface rebellion against some of these does 
not indicate that he is actually free of them. These values are often more operative 
than he would care to admit to his parents or to his peers and are often a source of in­
ner conflict and guilt. For example, "down deep" he still may hold to traditional values 
regarding the importance of religion, but he fears that he would be labeled "pious" if he 
expressed these values. If students are to be both conscious and critical of their own 
values, they will have to become aware of these various ways in which they acquire them. 
Importance of Values 
Since a person's values are at the heart of his actions, the more conscious he is 
of them the more conscious- and human-will be his actions. That's the rather obvious 
importance of studying values. More immediate, though, is the fact that our society is 
undergoing a severe upheaval regarding its own values. The resulting confusion both old 
and young experience makes a discussion on the nature of values and how they are acquired 
very timely and helpful. While this topic can help put the whole social question of val­
ues into some perspective, it also serves to give the student an opportunity to look at 
and question his own values. 
Problems Related to Values 
It is important to keep i~ mind that the topic deals with the nature and devel­
opment of values, not with particular values. Certainly, particular values will have to 
be discussed by way of example or to demonstrate a point, but the lesson is not intended 
to indoctrinate students regarding any particular set of values. If you give the im­
pression that this is what you are about, the chances are good that the students will 
turn you off very quickly. For them values are very personal, even if they haven't 
thought them through, so you should avoid the idea that you are challenging the values 
they do have. Rather, you are attempting to create a situation in which they themselves 
can become more conscious and critical of their values. 
Second, since many values have religious origins and overtones, it's important 
to avoid giving the impression that you are criticizing or promoting a particular reli­
gion. While common sense makes this obvious to any experienced teacher, it is good to 
give yourself a personal reminder, and to make it clear to the students before they be­
come defensive about their own religious beliefs. In some instances, I've seen a dis­
cussion on values end up in a religious debate, which ruins the chance to achieve the 
goal intended by the topic. 
Finally, it may appear phony to the students to initiate this topic on its own 
merits. Often it is better to use it after some form of debate has begun around a par­
ticular value related to another subject. For example, the students may become very in­
volved in a discussion of the value their parents place on money. In that kind of con­
text it is safe to raise the question of values in general-what we mean by them, the 
values we have, the order we would place them in, how we acquired them. To start out 
cold on the topic of values often produces stereotyped responses which the students feel 
the teacher expects of them. If they begin with a very real question regarding values, 
their responses later about values in general are more likely to reflect how they actu­
ally feel. 
Cultivating an Awareness of Values 
We've stressed that the lesson does not deal with teaching particular values. 
Values are acquired or learned through a complex of influences, usually over a long 
period of time. No one classroom experience is enough to form a person in a particular 
value. But sometimes one class is sufficient to make the students more conscious and 
critical of their values, which is what we hope to achieve. It is after they see the 
importance of being aware of their values (motives) and how they acquire them, that you 
can afford to initiate discussion on particular values. Such a discussion is what will 
keep alive and develop in students a criticalawarenessof values in general and the in­
fluences that shape the formation of their values , 
For that reason, it is often best to introduce the general topic of values as 
early as possible in a course. This can establish a foundation and a framework of com­
mon understanding for investigating the particular values which the course deals with 
throughout the year. Each time a discussion on one of these particular values comes up 
-e .g., the value of aesthetic appreciation in a course on literature- you are developing 
a more conscious, critical attitude in students regarding the general question of values 
in their life. 
Suggested Exercise for Experiencing values 
Purpose: 
To involve the students in the process of examining their values in a non­
threatening way and to open the door for a meaningful discussion of values 
in general. 
Preparation: 
If the group is small it is good to gather the actual items listed below so 
the students have something tangible to work with. However, if you are dealing 
with a whole class, divide it into several groups of six to eight and give them 
slips of paper with the name of the items listed below: 
dollar bill 
TV Guide or Movie Guide 
aspirin 
toy gun (to represent real gun) 
car keys 
a text book or encyclopedia 
a Bible 
copy of the Bill of Rights or the Declaration of Independence 
a valentine 
Instructions: 
1. Each group is to first come to an agreement as to what value each of the 
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objects above symbolizes for them. For example, aspirin may symbolize good 
health, or it may symbolize hallucinogenic drugs. The gun may symbolize 
power or it may symbolize self-defense. 
2. After each group has decided what the objects symbolize in terms of possible 
values, each individual in the group should arrange the objects according to 
his own hierarchy of values. 
3. Next each group should come to an agreement as to how these objects are to 
be ordered. This requires that each individual menti-on his own ordering, 
and why he followed it. · 
When several groups are involved, each group can present its list to other 
groups for comparison, both of interpretation of the symbols and the order­
ing of the values they represent. It would be interesting to see if any 
consensus emerges. 
Note: There is a great deal of learning that can take place in the groups 
as they discuss their interpretation of the symbols and the hierarchy 
of values, so ample time should be provided. Also, their interpreta­
tion of symbols can be very enlightening for the teacher. 
4. When all the comparing is completed you may want to stimulate further dis­
cussion by some of the following questions. 
Discussion of Values 
1. In discussing the symbolism of the various objects, were you surprised either 
by the disagreement or agreement of interpretation? For example, that money 
could be approached in so many different ways? 
2. How did you feel when you realized that you were not always in agreement with 
others? Did you want to convince them of your interpretation or were you 
eager to agree with them? Could you agree with the final list? 
3. How about the ordering of the objects? Did you find it hard coming to agree­
ment? Did you have to back down often? Were you able to convince others of 
the correctness of your suggestions? 
4. Do you think your final ordering of the objects would be acceptable to your 
parents? In what ways do you think they would differ? Do you think they 
would have interpreted the symbols differently? 
5. How does your list compare with the values presented to you by your parents, 
or by society at large? Do you find there are any serious differences? How 
do you feel about that? 
6. Do you think others influence you very much in forming the values you have? 
Who? How? Is this a good influence s far as you are concerned? How do you _ 
judge that? 
7. Do you think someone from a different culture would come up with a different 
ordering of the same list of values, for example, a Russian? Is this good 
or bad? Does it indicate anything? 
8. Do you think you will change the ordering of these values as you grow older? 
Why or why not? What would be areas where you doubt if you would ever 
change? 
9. How much do you think our inner needs determine the values that we hold? Do 
you feel there are some values that are important to you that aren't repre­
sented on the list? What are they? 
10. Do you think, if we re-arranged the groups and did the exercise again, we 
would come up with some new values and some new ordering? Why? 
A WORLD OF CONFUSION AND CONFLICT 
by 
Howard Kirschenbaum 
How does one know how to guide his life through a world full of confusion and 
conflict? How relevant are the moral and ethical standards of the past? Will the new 
ones work any better? How does one find himself and build heal thy relationships with 
others? 
The family, community, school and church used to present a homogeneous environ­
ment with obvious and constantly reinforced values. But, today we are bombarded from a ll 
sides by many points of view and brought in contact with others with different life 
styles from our own. 
''Whereas earlier generations slipped through a stage of idealism into an accept­
ance of the existing order, more and more of today's youth are not accepting their so­
ciety. In simplest terms, if would seem that traditional values are not very palatable 
to vast numbers of today's youth." 
"The result, it seems to us, is that more and more of our young people are be­
coming valueless, aimless, empty of commitment. That is a frightening state to be in, 
for it is not easy to live in aimless drift, feeling that life has no purpose. This 
sometimes leads to psychological damage (a feeling of self as a meaningless unit) and 
sometimes to more visible damage (a frustrated, acting out of rage against the institu­
tions that helped produce such emptiness)." 
Very accessible communication and transportation have caused part of the problem 
and have created dilemmas never imagined by traditional societies, where only one set of 
beliefs and one set of behaviors were accepted. Advances in technology and changes in 
institutions have added alternatives, but have also made visible many inconsistencies in 
what we see and hear. 
The problem is simply stated: What is to be done with one's life? What does one 
value? Once questions mainly for philosophers, in these times of increasing complexity, 
change and abundance, they are questions that challenge almost all of us, although often 
we move through our lives unaware of them. And, this can be its terrible power: For 
they are questions that cripple us as long as they remain unanswered. A growing tragedy 
is that they are not usually even asked. Witness the teenager who does little other than 
escape to temporary, sometimes desperate, excitements . Witness the job-hopper who seems 
unable to find any work satisfying. Witness the student who daydreams, unmoved by the 
combined exhortation of teachers and parents. Witness, took the successful adult who 
achieves what he was supposed to achieve only to wonder what it was all for: "if this 
is success, why did I want it?" 
People who have not clarified for themselves what they value cannot have clear, 
consistent purposes, cannot know what they are for and against, cannot know where they 
are going and why, They lack criteria for choosing what to do with their time, their 
energy, their very being. They simply are not clear as t o wh a t their lives are for and 
are therefore unable or unwilling to marshall up their full intellectual resources for 
use in the crucial game of living. 
Some typical areas of confusion and conflict in values are: 
family money religion death 
love leisure Eolitics friendshiE 
sex work aging Eersonal 
tastes (music, clothes, etc.) 
Given the complexities of o ur time, given the staggering number of choices to be 
ma de , given the crying need o f individuals and systems for a direction toward which to 
move, is there anything we can do to help each other build a value system by which to 
live? 
We believe there is. It is one of several important movements taking place to­
day in the field of humanistic education. It is called "the value claridication approach." 
To look more clo sely a t the need for "value clarification," let us make use of an 
image. Imagine a giant road with persons standing at various points along it- some in 
clusters, some alone , some in motion and some quite immobile. Also imagine a sign above 
the road saying, "Clarity o f Relationship To self And To Society." At one end of the 
road , we see a smaller sign that says, simply, CLEAR, while the other end is similarly 
labelled UNCLEAR. 
CLARITY OF RELATIONSHIP 
TO SELF AND TO SOCIETY 
CLEAR UNCLEAR 
A large cluster of persons are near the Clear end of the road and as we look 
closely, each person at this end does seem to be clear about who he is and what his re­
lationship is to the society that he is in. Each appears to know what he wants in life 
and how to work for it. Although in somewhat different styles, each person in this clus­
ter seems to relate to the forces and events and persons around him with considerable 
verve, purpose and pride. It's not at all as if these people have "adjusted" to their 
environments in any passive sense, In fact, many of them have misgivings about large 
parts of their surroundings, but there is a strong interest in dealing with those dis­
pleasing elements constructively. 
The picture is quite different at the other end of the road. Here, the people do 
not seem to be clear about how to relate to the things and people around them . There is 
much personal confusion. Rather than being positive, purposeful, enthusiastic and proud 
like those at the Clear end, the group at the Unclear end seem apathetic, flighty, un­
certain or inconsistent; they are drifters, over-conformers, over-dissenters or role­
players. The Unclear group's members could be viewed as having failed a critical test; 
for, to use the words of Hunt and Mataalf "The critical test of a person's insights is 
whether they provide him with a set of beliefs about himself in relation to his social 
and physical envirornnent which are extensive in scope, dependable in action, and compat­
ible with one another." The differences between the lives of persons who pass and fail 
this test are dramatic and, we think, important. 
One goal of value clarification then is to help people move along this road from 
confusion to clarity (Unclear to Clear) using an intellectual approach of choosing,priz­
ing and acting upon values. It helps people evaluate the values and beliefs given to 
them in the past and weigh them in light of their personal experiences and of present 
day life. Value clarification helps people sort through the thoughts in their heads and 
make a conscious effort to determine where they stand and why. For a value system has to 
be thought through and chosen by the individual in order to give direction to life. If 
individuals learn to use the process of value clarification, they are likely to behave in 
ways that are less apathetic, confused and irrational and in ways that are more positive, 
purposeful and enthusiastic. 
The first step in the value clarification process is to open up the area, to 
stimulate a person to think about value-related issues and to share those thoughts. (Toe 
value clarification strategies, some of which are used in the previous and the succeeding 
articles, are effective ways of doing this.) The second step is for the person and the 
helping people around him to accept his thoughts or feelings, non-judgmentally. This 
step tells him that it is safe to be honest with himself and with others, no matter how 
confused or negative his thoughts or feelings might be. The third step is to stimulate 
the person to do some additional thinking, so that he moves toward more comprehensive 
levels of valuing. 
What are these levels of valuing? We see valuing as being a process, and the 
seven sub-processes of valuing define the term "a value." 
Choosing 
1. choosing freely- -values must be freely selected if they are to be really 
valued by the individual. 
2. choosing from among alternatives-only when a choice is possible, when there 
is more than one alternative from which to choose, can a value result. 
3 . choosing after thoughtful consideration of the consequences of each alterna­
tive- impulsive or thoughtless choices do not lead to values; only when the 
consequences of each of the alternatives are clearly understood can one make 
intelligent choices. 
Prizing 
4. prizing and cherishing- values are prized, respected and held dear; they 
come from choices we are glad to make. 
5. affirming- when we have chosen something freely after consideration of the 
alternatives, and when we are proud of our choice, we are likely to affirm 
that choice when asked about it. 
Acting 
6. acting upon choices-where we have a value, we are likely to budget time and 
energy in ways that nourish this value. 
7. repeating-values tend to have a persistency, they tend to make a pattern in 
life. 
In general, the purposes of value clarification are to sensitize people to value 
issues, to give them experience in thinking critically about such issues, to give them 
opportunities to share perceptions with others and learn cooperative problem-solving 
skills and to help them learn to apply the valuing processes in their own lives. 
With changes taking place so rapidly and new issues requiring consideration, one 
needs to constantly (or at least from time-to-time) re-examine his purposes, aspirations, 
attitudes, and feelings if he is to strive toward a life which will be rich and full for 
him in the times in which he is living. It is a never ending quest to sort out what's 
important in one's life. 
In a worl0 full of. confusion and conflict, what classroom, school, church or home 
can afford not to be a forum for value clarification? 
VAWES 
SCHOOL ACCOUNTABILITY AND THE AFFECTIVE DOMAIN 
by 
John E. Morris 
(Reprinted by permission from School and Society, April, 1972, pp. 228-229.) 
The setting is an 11th-grade American history class. The students are taking a 
test. It is near the end of the period, and all but one student has completed the test 
and left the room. The lone remaining student is working feverishly when the teacher 
walks up to his desk and yells: "if you don't hurry and turn in your paper I am going 
to knock you up beside the head." 
The setting is a first-grade classroom. Students are working individually and in 
small groups, while the teacher and several students are in the "reading circle." One 
child is reading aloud laboriously. The child pauses because she can not pronounce a 
word. The teacher ·asks: "Don't you remember that word? You should because it was in 
yesterday's lesson." Then the teacher yells: "Can't you remember anything? Stick out 
your hand." The teacher proceeds to give the child a "ruling" because she can not re­
member the word. 
The setting is a ninth-grade civics class and, since it is Friday, the discus­
sion centers around current events. One student just has read from the local paper re­
porting the number of people in the county receiving food stamps and decrying the loss of 
such virtues as work and individual effort and the evils of the welfare system. The 
teacher, anxious to stimulate discussion, says: "Why is it that you niggers (the class 
was composed of about 60% Negroes add 40% whites) seem to be ashamed to spend food 
stamps? Yesterday I was in the grocery store (there is only one such store in this com­
munity) where some of you and your parents were shopping. You seemed to want to back up 
t o the checkout counter. Why?" There were some snickers from white students, and then 
silence. 
These three actual scenes portray teacher behavior dominated by their attitudes 
and values. The current demand for accountability, with its emphasis on performance con­
tracts, performance objectives and educational audits, has concentrated on knowledge 
(cognitive domain) and skills (psychomotor domain) while largely ignoring the importance 
of the affective domain (attitudes and values). Yet, this area is a major determiner of 
one's success o r f ailure, not only in school, but in life as well. In the cases cited, 
the teachers may have mastered a prescribed body of knowledge, for each one holds a mas­
ter's degree. Also, each teacher possesses a variety of skills, as evidenced by several 
years of teaching experience and the appearance of the classroom. Yet, these teachers 
are failures, and many others like them fill our classrooms and, in turn, our society 
With failures, mainly because of their attitudes and values.1 
Why are we so eager to come to grips with the teaching and measuring of facts 
and skills and so reluctant to examine the issues and debate the questions which are the 
core elements of our society, our continued exis t ence as human beings-in short, our hu­
maneness? It is not because we do not know what values generally are held by individ­
uals, groups, and institutions in our society , for these have been identified by many 
Writers . 2 It is not because we do not have many tools and techniques with which to work. 3 
It is not because we are not aware of the value crisis in society, for we have the mass 
media to remind us of this constantly. It is primarily because we do not have the guts 
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to examine ourselves and our connnitment to children, the educational profession, and 
society, and to act on these commitments. 
Values constitute only one area of the school curriculum, but it is the most ne­
glec1ed area. Brameld sta~es that " ... values are education's most neglected problem."· 
Getzels refers to values as " .•. the central serious issue facing the schools today .... " 
He further states that "For whatever else the child may be expected to do in school, he 
is inevitably exposed, explicitly and implicitly, to some system of values. And whatever 
else the child may be expected to learn as he grows up, he inevitably assimilates~ 
~ystem of values. Indeed, the nature of his self-identity-his answer to the problem of 
who he is and where he belongs- depends on the nature of the values he interiorizes. 
Moreover, whether he will it or not- in fact whether we know it or not- the decisions 
teachers and parents make with respect to objective, curriculum, methods, personnel, and 
even the buildings we construct, are founded on some system of values, however sublimi­
nally these may function in any particular case." 
Values are learne_d_, and also unlearned. Since they are learned, they ca:n.. be, and 
are, : taught, but there is very little concre~ kno~ledge about· how they are taught or 
learned. Anthropologists, psychologists, and specialists in child development have 
studied the child in his culture, home , and school, and suggest that he assimilates the 
values of his society. Possibly, he imitates the values and attitudes he experiences in 
his home, school, neighborhood, and the larger society. In the early years particularly, 
the child imitates the values of those adult models he admires. The teacher serves as a 
model, and determines the value tone o f his classroom. Students infer the values of the 
teacher from his behavior. The scenes described above provide many opportunities for 
inferences about the values of these teachers. 
There should be no doubt that public education collectively, and teachers and 
administrators individually, are partially responsible for the value profile of our na­
tion's youth. Since there is no prescribed set of values which is superior to another, 
and since education stresses individual differences , emphasis should be placed on the 
provision for a valuing process. Simon states that this process should consist of a 
series of strategies which"· .. raise issues, confront the student with inconsisten­
cies, and get him to sort out his own values in his own way and at his own pace." An 
individual school, and an individual teacher within a particular school, then could be 
held accountable for the existence and quality of the valuing process provided for stu­
dents. Here are some suggestions for the initiation of a valuing process and for estab­
lishing accountability within a school. 
The school system, and the board of education and superintendent in particular, 
should be accountable for establishing objectives within the affective domain consistent 
with the connnunity it serves and the larger democratic society. The principal of each 
school should be accountable for providing a system for auditing or evaluating the ex­
tent to which objectives are implemented and the results of their implementation. A sys­
tem should provide for periodic observation for the purpose of recording indicators of 
attitudes of administrators and teachers; student opinionnaires constructed by use of 
the Q-sort, Likert, or other techniques; analysis of unit and lesson plans to insure that 
provisions for a valuing process are provided; analysis of administrative politics and 
actions t o insure that provisions for, and support of, stated objectives are provided; 
provisions for, and support of, a communications system which is open to students, teach­
ers, and the school's publics; and provisions for, and support of policies which make it 
possible for all concerned to participate in the decision-making process insofar as this 
can be done within the framework of the school, its functions, and policies. The teacher 
is accountable for understanding the school's objectives as they relate to the larger 
democratic society; instituting instructional techniques and methods which offer varied 
strategies and alternatives in the process of value clarification; knowing his own value 
system so that he understands his own attitudes and behaviors; coalescing his value sys­
tem with sound principles of teaching, learning, and human relationships; and consis­
tently exhibiting behavior which positively reinforces the objectives of the school and 
the larger democratic society. 
These suggestions could be used to initiate, over a period of time and by the 
school faculty, an index of value effectiveness for a school. Such an index could be 
very helpful in determining the contribution of the school to the affective domain. 
While this may seem to border on behavioral engineering, it is not intended to do so. 
Our primary concern must extend beyond knowledge and skills to include the quality of an 
individual's life. The school can not continue to deny students opportunities to learn 
to make choices which are, at least to some degree, a result of their own reflective an­
alysis of a situation. 
It these suggestion? for initiating accountability in the affective domain were 
applied, continually evaluated, and supplemented, the result might not be the instant 
production of good citizens. Neither would it be possible to measure all the efforts a 
school or a teacher contributes to the affective domain of the curriculu, and it is not 
necessary to do so. However, to say that what we do or do not do is so intangible that 
it cannot be evaluated carefully and critically is to say, in essence, that each teacher 
or school is to do as he or it pleases . This is largely what we have done in the past, 
and this is what accountability is all about. 
For obvious reasons, I have not suggested specific classroom practices for the 
development of values, or listed specific moral, democratic, and spiritual values. My 
primary concern has been to assert that accountability only for knowledge and skills is 
not acceptable; to advance the proposition that administrators and teachers are, or 
should be, accountable for their attitudes and values and the resulting consequences of 
behavior growing out of these; to present some suggestions f or establishing accounta­
bility in the affective domain; and to stimulate some thinking and possible action to­
ward accountability in the affective domain. 
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Introduction 
There is good reason to wonder if our schools have sufficiently helped students 
with value development. We see young people with substantial knowledge who do not know 
what to do with that knowledge. We see others who chronically react in a negative and 
unthinking way to almost everything in their surroundings. In general, we see many stu­
dents who are confused about what their values are or should be. 
Given the condition of the world, such value confusion is quite understandable. 
The contrasts and changes that surround all of us today are dramatic. 
Look at these social realities, for example: Support for the arts is hard to 
come by. Educated men insist that our leaders twist the truth for their own purposes. 
The crimes rate goes up and up. !barning mobs face riot-trained police. And American 
soldiers in foreign lands are accused of rounding up old men, women, and children, and 
shooting them. 
At the same tine there is new concern for the plight of the American Indian, the 
elderly, and the slum dweller. People no longer look aside as the air, streams, and 
lakes become polluted. The courts strengthen the individual's freedom of speech. The 
rich are asked to pay more taxes; there is new support for the poor. And people are 
wondering aloud if America is on the right track. 
One can see how it is difficult for students to relate to this inconsistent 
world. Traditional values are not accepted the way they used to be; some students plain­
ly reject them. But many students cannot seem to find replacements for traditional 
values. The result is often an absence of values. Students are unsure of what to do 
with the knowledge they find in school. Some are not sure that knowledge has any use at 
all. And some seem to confuse knowledge with wisdom ~d adopt a life-style of either 
chronic conformity or impulsive rebellion.I 
M:>re precisely, a value problem is indicated for a student if, in the absence of 
a prior emotional disturbance, he finds it very difficult to face typical life situa­
tions and to make choices and decisions. or if he typically makes choices without the 
awareness that some natives may be more worthy than others. Or if he does not behave in 
ways that are consistent with this choices and preferences-that is, if there is a gap 
be tween his creeds and his deeds. 
What Teachers Can Do About Values 
There are other ways of characterizing value problems among youth. 2 But however 
one sees value problems, the question of what, if anything, teachers can do remains. 
That is the subject of this article. What alternatives are open to a teacher who would 
help students with value development? We will address that question by listing several 
of the more common approaches to values and commenting briefly on each. There is no as­
sumption that the list is exhaustive or that any one approachshouldbe usedexclusively, 
For example, although the authors favor the last approach introduced, we would use other 
approaches in certain circumstances, as we note in our concluding remarks. 
Teachers have three main alternatives in dealing with value development. One 
alternative is to do nothing about such development. Another is to transmit a pre-exist­
ing set of values to students. A third is to help those students find their own values. 
Doing Nothing About Values 
Some choose the first alternative because they believe that values are the do­
main of the family and religious institutions. Others choose it because, practically, 
they do not know what to do. S>me educators choose to do nothing about value develop­
ment because they are trained for and are interested in teaching only subject matter. 
A few educators believe that values come from trial-and-error interaction with life, and 
that there is nothing a school can do other than provide an array of useful experiences 
and encourage students to use those experiences the best way they can. 
But the reality of schooling is that it is impossible to do nothing. 3 When a 
teacher says that it is important to master a lesson to get good grades to get into col­
lege to get a good job to earn a good salary, he is obviously promoting several values­
a work ethic, a future orientation, and materialism, to name a few. When a textbook 
constantly pairs communism with autocracy and capitalism with democracy, values are 
clearly suggested. And, simply, when schools talk about safety, good manners, and good 
health, they are usually trying to promote these values. Thus it is unreal to say that 
schools should do nothing about values. The question is, should they continue to work 
at values the way they currently do? 
There is a special problem facing those who would leave the teaching of values 
to the family or to religious institutions. M:>st parents probably do not know how to 
impart values, and most religious institutions have only minimal impact on the values of 
youth. 4 One could, of course, argue that these institutions should learn to be more ef­
fective. Until that happens, however, it is unlikely that parents or religious institu­
tions will change the way young people perceive and deal with values. 
Transmitting Values 
Some educators who are concerned with the state of youth's values believe that 
we must work more effectively to transmit the values we know are right, desirable, and 
good. They assume that such values are known, at least in part, and that the task of the 
educator is to learn better ways of passing those values along to students. 
Two general problems face such educators: being certain that their values 
really are universally right, desirable, and good; and finding ways to transmit them. 
The problem of value certainly is beyond the scope of this article, but it is dealt with 
in a book by Abraham Maslow. 5 The question fo transmittal is considered below in a dis­
cussion of six common approaches to transmitting values: the model approach, the reward­
and-punishment approach, the explanatory approach, the nagging approach, the manipulation 
approach, and the transmittal liberal arts approach. 
The M:>del Approach 
Some people who assume that what is right and wrong can be identified and com­
municated to others believe that one should model desirable val~es. Such people try to 
behave in ways that reflect the values they want to transmit. 
There is much evidence that modeling has a strong influence on children's be­
havior. If we assume that one absorbs values as one absorbs behavior patterns, we can 
say that modeling affects children's values as well as their behavior. 
There is a parallel between modeling and what is sometime called imprinting. 
Thus some experiences, especially those repeatedly or strongly presented to a suscepti­
ble subject, are deeply imprinted in the growing organism.6 
The most serious problem for the modeling approach to value development is that, 
in our complex society, conflicting models exist for almost every value one could name. 
A parent or teacher could model hard work, for example, but a friend or television star 
or storybook character might present the opposite model. The modeling approach by it­
self provides no means of helping youngsters deal with the conflicting and inconsistent 
models that they are almost certain to perceive in a world drawn closer and closer to­
gether by modern communication devices. 
The modeling approach is also weak in dealing with values that are only imper­
fectly reflected in public behavior. It is difficult to model certain very personal 
values and internal phenomena, such as aspirations, faith, or loyalty. 
The Reward-and-Punishment Approach 
Some educators believe that one does not so much influence values as shape be­
havior. In the reward-and-punishment approach, the teacher or parent first identifies 
desirable behavior and then, by judicious rewards, encourag~ment, and the like, encour­
ages the repetition of that behavior. Thus one might reward punctuality, reflective 
thinking, and kindness, and ignore their opposites. 7 
Sometimes teachers try to develop certain value habits by giving students 
materials or activities that channel behavior in desired ways . For example, a teacher 
might give students round pencils and tilted desks to encourage the habit of tidiness; 
the built-in penalyt for a pencil left carelessly on a desk is a pencil rolling away. 
However, proponents of this approach have the problem of explaining how it can 
influence internal operations of humans, operations below the observable behavior level. 
One can shape much behavior, but can one shape feelings and thought processes? 
A somewhat different problem is that humans are not completely malleable. 
Humans have certain innate and early-learned drives and limitations. They have their 
own individual processes of thought and evaluation, drives for activity and power, and 
needs for self-expression. How does the notion that adults can shape children's behavior 
come to terms with children's internal powers and inclinations? What happens if there 
is a conflict between the two?8 
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The Explanatory Approach 
Some educators propose that children be provided explanations such as the fol­
lowing for values that are to be promoted: 
"If you do not wait your turn, people will not be happy to have you in their 
groups." 
"If we steal from one another, we will all be insecure about our property." 
"If we didn't have rules, aggressive people might take advantage of others." 
"If you do that, your conscience may bother you." 
The explanatory approach to value development is obviously useful; many students 
appreciate knowing the reason for existing standards and adult beliefs. M:>reover, it is 
likely that children will more deeply accept those standards and beliefs that are sup­
ported by understandable reasons. 
Unfortunately, almost all explanation .is bound to be incomplete and to rest on 
prior assumptions, which are seldom explained. "If you do not wait your turn, people 
will not be happy to have you in their groups"- the assumption here is that it is val­
uable to have people want you in their groups. One could explain this by saying that if 
people do not want you, you will be cut off from much human support. But then one may 
ask why it is valuable to have a lot of human support. "One will feel lonely," the re­
ply might be. "Why is it valuable not to feel lonely?" One might ask, in an endless 
series of questions. 
There is another problem with the explanatory approach. Values presumably in­
fluence an individual's decisions, and many decisions we face involve a conflict between 
two or more desirable elements. Knowing why honesty and politeness are both worthy does 
not often help us when we are faced with the choice of being either dishonest or impolite. 
The Nagging Approach 
Less :recommended than practiced is what we call the nagging approach. Educators 
employing this approach frequently remind students what is right and wrong and what is 
expected of them, without attending to whether or not the students understand the rea­
sons for those standards. Often this approach is based on the assumption that values 
emerge from authority: "We are in charge here and we know what is best." Although such 
educators sometimes praise compliance, they more often punish and . complai~ about devia­
tions from accepted standards. 
The problems with this method are obvious. Students are more annoyed than edu­
cated by this negative approach, and there is the real possibility that educators using 
it will find themselves disaffiliated from and "turned out" by their students. 
The Manipulation Approach 
The manipulation approach is also less often recommended than practiced. Edu­
cators use it when they manipulate the environment or the experiences to which students 
are exposed so as to favor certain value outcomes. 
One manipulatory approach is to withhold knowledge of alternatives from students. 
Students might not be told about the alternative of telling the truth sometimes, or of 
the alternative of conducting a campaign of persuasion to change a school's policy. 
Students might then assume that the choices are between complete truthfulness and com­
plete untruthfulness, or between acquiescence and revolution. Teachers probably influ­
ence student values more than is usually appreciated merely by restricting the alterna­
tives that enter students' awareness. 
Another way of manipulating situations is to distort the consequences of certain 
actions. When a teacher suggests to a student that he cannot hope to be happy in life 
unless he graduates from high school, he is distorting reality in favor of a value that 
he wants to promote. M3.ny educators are quick to paint rosy pictures of things they 
favor and dark pictures of things they disfavor. 
A third manipulatory approach is to restrict a student's experiences in ways 
that have value consequences. Some persons prevent racial integration and thus sustain 
racial myths. Others restrict the books students read- not because they want to protect 
students from emotionally difficult experiences but because they want to insulate them 
from sympathetic accounts of certain value positions. 
In a sense, it is even manipulatory for teachers to fail to raise controversial 
issues in school, for that perpetuates the status quo. Forces for change do not have a 
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fair change. Thus, schools that do not raise such issues as the role of women in soci­
ety, the problems of minority groups, and the forms of real political power in the coun­
try might be accused of manipulating values. (sec. 7.8. "Minority Problems," 7.10, 
"Curriculum in Perspective." 7.15. "Studnet Power and Student Unrest," and 7.16, "sex 
and Drugs.") 
The manipulation approach has several disadvantages. It is uncomfortable for 
those who believe that man's rational processes need to be fully utilized. And it runs 
counter to current trends in society, as more people are being exposed to more ideas 
through increased communications. It is increasingly difficult to keep ideas away from 
students, to sustain distorted consequences, and to limit student experiences . 
The Transmittal Liberal Arts Approach 
Some educators believe that right values exist and will be revealed to those who 
are immersed in what is often called the liberal arts. These right values, these basic 
goods, might not be the ones currently accepted, it is asserted, but they do exist and 
will most likely be found by those who study man's thoughts and accomplishments with an 
open mind. Educators who take this position, called the transmittal liberal arts ap­
proach, want students to read widely, think deeply, and experience broadly. They trust 
that life experiences and thoughtful study provide a route to absolute goods and values. 
However, because values are complex and because man's thoughts and accomplish­
ments are both abundant and complicated, it is difficult to recommend that the average 
student rely upon this approach. It takes substantial mental stamina and ability, and 
much time and energy, to travel this road. While the study of our cultural heritage can 
be defended on other grounds, we would not expect it to be sufficient for value educa­
tion. 
clarifying Values 
The two approaches outlined below are not based upon the assumption that abso­
lute goods exist and can be known. They view values as relative , personal, situational. 
The main task of these approaches is not to identify and transmit the "right" values, but 
to help a student clarify his own values so he can obtain the v a lues that best suit him 
and his environment; so he can adjust himself to a changing world; and so he can play an 
intelligent role in influencing the way the world changes . 
Proponents of these approaches have at least two problems. First, they must 
learn methods whereby, without promoting particular values, they can help students obtain 
values that will work for them and for those around them. Second, they must devise 
methods o f controlling behavior so that, while students are in the process of developing 
values, they and others are protected against destructive behaviors. The usual soluticn 
here is to have behavior rules that are not defended as values, but merely as devices for 
protecting individuals and groups against pressures from others. 
The Clarifying Liberal Arts Approach 
The clarifying liberal arts approach is similar to the transmittal liberal arts 
approach; both utilize the records o f man's thoughts and accomplishments. But the pur­
po se of the clarifying liberal a rts approach is different: it is aimed at exposing stu­
dents to the best in the culture so that a student may find the best values for himself 
and his environment, not s o that he may discover the "right" values for all times . In 
the clarifying liberal arts approach, students read widely, think deeply, and experience 
broadly- not fo find universal values, but to f ind themselves. 
Unfortunately , it is p robably not much easier to use all of culture to find one­
self than it is to use it to f ind eternal truths. Our cultural heritage is too broad, 
too complex, and too inconsistent to expect the average student to grasp it and relate it 
to his life and times with any degree of comfort and comprehension. 
The value Skills Approach 
Another approach holds that the problem is not so much helping a student find 
values as it is helping him learn skills to continue the clarifying value approach through­
out his life, and to apply his values in ways that are personally and socially useful. 
Proponenets of this value skills approach often note that the world is changing rapidly 
and recommend t.ha t we provide students with skills to change values as the world changes 
a nd as students become more knowledgeable. Noting that it is easy to mouth creed and not 
perform the acc ompanying deeds, they recommend that we teach how to apply values in real 
situations, so that behavior re f lects value thinking. 
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Pragmatic philosophers after Dewey9 favor developing in students an experimental 
attitude toward life. They believe that value questions should be treated like other 
questions, with thoughtful consideration of alternatives and _cpnsequences, both social 
and personal. They assert that moral issues are as susceptible to rational processes as 
are other issues. Persons who take this position believe that, just as one learns crit­
ical thinking skills, so one learns value skills. They often favor in schools a non­
moralizing examination of current real-life issues, what is sometimes called the prob­
lems approach, usually not in place of academic study, but in addition to it. 10 
Some children's readers have been built around value issues and are meant to en­
courage value thinking. 11 And some curriculum approaches have been built in this style. 
In this connection, special note should be made of the work of Donald W. Oliver and 
James P. Shaver. 12 They have identified specific skills useful for dealing with poli­
tical controversy, and especially the ethical problems that arise out of such contro­
versy. Measuring instruments for those skills are also identif ied. 
In general, the purposes of these approaches are to sensitize children to value 
issues, to give them experiences in thinking critically about such issues, to give them 
opportunities to share perceptions with others and learn cooperative problem-solving 
skills, and to help them learn to apply value skills in their own lives. 
Some educators approach value skills from a psychological perspective. Many so­
called humanistic psychologists, such as earl Rogers, say that if a person is put into a 
supportive social environment and encouraged to tune into his feelings and the feelings 
of others, and if he is taught communication skills that minimize communication distor­
tion, he will naturally tend to make wise judgments and will use experience to correct 
judgments that are unwise.13 Such psychologists place a good deal of trust in man's in­
ternal evaluation mechanisms and in the ability of groups who share data to arrive at 
wise decisions. A key implication is that teachers should be helped to become more hon­
est, warm, and empathetic. 
A more comprehensive methodology, built on the positions of the pragmatic phil­
o sophers and humanistic psychologists, has identified seven broad value skills and has 
gathered a ser ies of classroom techniques to help students learn those skills. The 
skills are (1) seeking alternatives when faced with a choice, (2) looking ahead to prob­
able consequences before choosing, ( 3) making choices on one's own, without depending on 
others, (4) being aware of one's own preferences and valuations, (5) being willing to 
affirm one's choices and preferences publicly, (6) acting in ways that are consistent 
with choices and preference, and (7) acting in those ways repeatedly, with a pattern to 
one's life. Those skills and the exercises to develop them are presented by Louis E. 
Raths, Merrill Harmin , and Sidney B. simon in Values and Teaching. 
There are, however, problems with this approach, too. When one focuses upon 
processes of valuing and not upon the values themselves, one is faced with the problem 
of what to do with students whose processes are faulty, or who for other reasons (some­
times emotional pressures) come to adopt values that are, for them or for others, count­
erproductive. 
There is the additional problem of knowing which skills best prepare persons to 
clarify and revise values. Could it be that those who advocate a particular list of 
skills are saying that they have found a new set of universal values (which happen to be 
in the form of processes rather than products)? 
Conclusion 
Research on the e ffec t iveness of the various approaches to values is lacking. 
Researchers to date have no t agreed on goals for value education, especially on the bal­
ance between value indoctrination and value clarification. They need better measuring 
instruments, especially to distinguish values expressed on paper-and-pencil tests from 
values woven into behavior. 
We conclude from what sketchy research does exist, and on the basis of rather 
consistent observations of young people's difficulties with values, that value confusion 
is growing in the United sta tes. Teachers can help students avoid substantial drift and 
ambivalence by giving them value-clarifying experiences. A combination of the clarify­
ing liberal arts approach and the value skills approach is probably best. The former 
provides data often useful for making choices, and the latter provides a climate and ex­
periences for practicing value choice-making. 
M:,dels are also useful, but not as prescriptions of behavior to be emulated. 
They are useful as illustrations of what a life~ be, not what a life should be. 
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Students should be helped to examine models critically and to consider what is recom­
mended by them, and not be led to believe that they should try to plan their existence 
as an imitation of the models. 
Explanations are likewise useful if they inform a student's thinking, not if they 
are delivered as the last word on a value. When a teacher explains why he supports a 
certain value, he is being honest and open and responsive to students' needs to know. 
Explanations, as long as they are offered as personal or consensual statements of posi­
tions and not as dogma, encourage rational processes and thus develop value skills. 
No matter what approach to values one takes, there will be some students who will 
behave in ways that contradict the teacher's, the school's, or the society's values. 
These students must be taught that there are limits to accepted behavior. But they 
should not be led to believe that they must accept the values upon which those limits 
are based. Thus a student should be told that we cannot accept his disturbing the work 
of others, even though we can accept the fact that his disturbing behavior is motivated 
by a strongly held value. Of course, we also believe that this position is relative; 
sometimes the value that the student is defending is more important than the disturbance 
he is causing (as many felt was the case with the black sit-ins at Southern lunch count­
ers a few years ago). The point here is that one may view values as situational andper­
sonal without believing that society slx:>uld be lawless or chaotic. Indeed, observations 
of children who have learned to be rationally self-disciplined suggest that value clari­
fication approaches, based as they are on individual responsibility, are more likely to 
produce lawful and orderly environments than are approaches for transmitting values, 
which too often leave students feeling confused and valueless. 
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17. Stahmer, Harold. "Religion and Moral Values in the Public Schools." Religious 
Education, 61 (January 1966). pp. 20-26. 
Stahmer presents theory, rationale, and suggestions for 
learning about religion in public schools. 
18. Thomas, Walter L. Project on Student Values: Available Materials and Services. 
Grand Rapids, Michigan: Project on student Values. Undated. 
The Project on Student Values, 3869 Plainfield, N.E,, Grand 
Rapids, Michigan, collects and disseminates various kinds of materials 
and methods useful for teachers and researchers concerned with value 
development. An extensive bibliography of classroom materials is 
available. 
19. Thomas, \valter L. A Comprehensive Bibliography on the Value Concept. Grand Rapids, 
Michigan: Project on Student Values, 1967. 
Some eight hundred articles and books dealing with values, 
mostly appearing after 1945. 
20. Wilson, William J., and F. Ivan Nye. "some Methodological Problems in the Empiri­
cal Scudy of Values." Washington State University, College of Agriculture 
Bulletin, No. 672, 1966. 
Discusses problems of measuring values. Values are often 
measured by paper-and-pencil tests, but if values are thought to 
be indicated by behavior, not by intentions, such tests have in­
herent limitations. 
* * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * 
89 
VAWE-SEEKING IN THE CLASSROOM: 
The Creative Conspiracy of Teacher and Curriculum 
by 
Nancy W. Bauer 
(From "Value seeking in the Classroom: The Creative Conspiracy of Teacher and Curriculum" 
by Nancy W. Bauer, from '.reacher's Notebook in Elementary Social Science, Copyright © 
1970 by Harcourt Brace Jovanovich, Inc., Reprinted by permission of the publisher.) 
In our western, multi-ethnic democracy we value reason and equality within a 
framework of freedom. A school curriculum must be structured to examine, discuss, and 
build on these values. One of the difficulties for us as teachers in structuring such a 
curriculum- a curriculum that teaches about values, for values, and with values- is that 
we must be willing to be judged for our teaching efforts by the behavior of the children 
when they are not in our classes, thereby finally bridging the gap between the classroom 
and the world outside and byond. 
What goals should we set up for every child in value-seeking in the classroom? 
What goals are we obliged to set because we live in a pluralistic democracy which is en­
gaged in the risky task of facing up to the gap between philosophical hopes and our adult 
sense of reality? 
There are three goals or products we can set of our classroom teaching in the 
area of values. Each of these goals exists outside the classroom. Teaching toward them 
takes skill; and with skillful teaching the goals can be reached. 
What are these goals? 
1. That each child will be a reflective decisionmaker. 
Whatever the lottery of heredity and environment provide for him, he should be able to 
analyze a problem-situation in his own setting, decide what the issue is, generate enough 
alte·rnatives to allow himself and others an educated choice, and then make a choice based 
on recognized values and probable consequences. A reflective thinker can not only think 
but he can al30 take a realistic and forthright stand and defend it. 
2. That each child can think and work toward consensus with others whose self­
interest and values may differ from his own. 
Majority rule is not enough. There are more than two ways (a winner and a loser) out of 
a problem situation. Voting down the opposition often loses them to the total society. 
In America and in the world community we need all the skills we can get. We need those 
with whom we disagree. A 51% vote is a temporary victory but not a resolution of con­
flict . The Golden Rule is not good enough for a mature society made up of such differ­
ing ethnic, racial, and religious groups with such different cultural traits and such 
different ways of making a living and spending time. We must teach children so that they 
can "do unto others" who may never directly "do unto them." 
The goal is sensitive behavior of individuals; recognizing differences in per­
ception, values, and life styles- but able to use those differences to create solutions 
which will include the skills and insure an active cooperative effort by everyone. 
3. That each child will work actively in our society to resolve social issues 
in ways that will move us toward two of society's major goals, maximum freedom and max­
imum equality. 
From the beginning of our history, we have been groups in search of freedom from people 
who disagreed with us. The colonial laws protected the founding group from challenges 
to their traits and values. The Puritans were not seeking consensus within pluralism. 
Groups in America today are politically and economically interdependent and are now 
faced with the need for recognizing that maximum freedom for one individual is only guar­
anteed by maximum equality for another and that equal freedom is "necessary and proper." 
These are the goals. By identifying them as behavioral objectives of the curri­
culum we come face to face with a question continually and understandably asked of teach­
ers by parents: are we pushing certain values? 
Of course we are. In a western, multi-ethnic democracy we must. We frankly 
value reason and equality within the framework of freedom. A curriculum must be struc­
tured to examine, discuss, and build on these values. 
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The Ecology of the curriculum. The environment includes two kinds of hope: what the 
world needs (the goals) and what the children want (their own motivation). These forces 
- the world's needs and the children's wa·nts- operate simultaneously with the forces of 
the present: who the child is, who the teacher is, and what the community is. These 
forces make up the living environment and must be part of classroom value-seeking or the 
teaching effort is either useless or damaging. 
It is vital that the curriculum not be used to turn the children against their 
parents and the community, even if the parents and community stand against reason, free­
dom, and equality. This may seem like a contradiction but there is an important connec­
tion between being capable of reaching goals and at the same time being accepting of the 
limitations of others. If there is to be consensus and resolution of social issues, they 
children must learn to strive for goals within the reality of environmental differences. 
We are teaching children to respect the speech of their parents and to understand that 
those speech patterns are results of their parents' past. We are teaching children tobe 
bi-lingual. We now need to teach them to be bi-social in their understanding. How can 
we help children to respect their parents, understand what their parent's attitudes are 
and why they have them and still work towards our three goals of reason, consensus, and 
a free and equal society? 
The Process. How is it done? Through a sequence which rombines confrontation withprob­
lem-resolving, reflection with action. 
seeing meaning in raw data or random experience. 
The children must observe a concept being formed from the similarity among 
several experiences in different times and places. 
For example: By noting that leaders represent norms and values of dominant ele­
ments within a group or society, the children learn which generalizations about leader­
ship are supportable and how a generalization is uncovered and tested for validity. 
The children should investigate the events of their own lives which involve lea·d­
ers, and should then test the scientist's generalization in their own environment as well 
as in other cases in time and space. 
How can it be done? With selected data about leaders in different settings, 
showing different ways of getting into office and different values in the uses of their 
power; with questioning strategies employed by the teacher which help the child become 
aware of the similarities among the data. Here are some questions for awareness: What 
roles does each person play in the society? What group did each belong to? Who had 
leadership before? How did each of these men berome leaders? Questions for values 
awareness through analysis: Does a leader have to be rich? Does a leader have to be 
smart? Does a leader have to be good? To whom? Is there one best way to become a 
leader? Questions for values awareness through synthesis: What do all the leaders have 
to have? What do all the leaders seem to want? 
What has concept-forming, investigating, and testing to do with values education? 
Children must learn the role of logic or reason in scientific method so that they can 
recognize a point of view arrived at rationally from one that is drawn from inadequate 
data or from data contrived to match a prejudged ronclusion. 
Value·-seeking without sound, up-to-date knowledge of concepts and the process of 
concept-forming out of fact becomes sharing of ignorance. If children are not armed 
with what is known and verifiable, they are at the mercy of the biases of the strongest 
of their peers and of their teachers. 
If th£?y are studying leadership, then they can understand why some people are 
chosen more than others , why leaders who are elected may turn out not to represent the 
views of thos£i who voted for them, and why some people who get into office for one rea­
son may change their views once in office. 
Treating concepts this way is a value in itself. Facing facts in conceptual 
structures is traditional armor against the misuse o f facts through fear, for propaganda 
p urposes. Selected data and analytical teaching of concepts prepare children for honest 
value-seeking on their own. 
Value-•seeking without conc epts is wasteful and open to pressure and to attack. 
Concepts withou t value-seeking, however, is just another form of rote learning which 
will not necessarily stick a ,1 will most probably bore children who don't see its use­
f ulness. 
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A Curriculum of Confrontation. Once the children have been involved in concept-forming, 
they are still going to ask "so what?" 
They are right. If what they are learning does not help them interact with their 
peers, they haven't time for it. If what they are learning c:besn't help them learn to 
resolve social issues with maximum freedom and equality, the world hasn't time for it. 
What can the Monday to Friday classroom do about conflict resolution? A great 
deal, The teacher can guarantee the children practice in problem analysis, reflective 
thinking, and decision-making if the curriculum guarantees it to the teacher: a bank of 
problem-situations appropriate to the age range of the children; questioning strategies 
for helping the children to think through alternatives, va lues, and consequences; ways 
of handling possible hostile, evasive, partial, and irrelevant responses of children; 
ways of evaluating the strategies to see if they are indeed helping the children to han­
dle issues and values conflicts. 
How is it done? A problem-situation dealing, for example, with applications of· 
the concept of leadership would be: 
"A fifth-grade class is trying to organize a project to turn a messy vacant 
lot into a mini-park and garden. l,\k>st of the children in the class like to 
play baseball. The best baseball team captain in the area, who is very pop­
ular, wants to be chairman of the Park Committee. Several of the class mem­
bers think it would be better to choose someone who is better able to per­
suade adults, figure out ways to get a new job done, and handle the money 
that is needed for the project." 
The curriculum o f fers this case to the teacher; she can use it as a case story 
(read, taped, or mimeographed), or several children can role-play these hypothetical 
class meetings. 
The teacher is responsible for confronting the children with the case and help­
ing them with a questioning strategy designed to encourage their thoughts and feelings 
into reflective modes: What is happening? What does the team captain think? What makes 
him think so? What does the other group think? What makes them think so? 
Up to this point the questions focus on confrontati o n wi t h differences in views 
and behaviors. Each child is forced to compare conflicting views a nd recognize their 
origin. Answering ''What makes him think so?" i~ easy and r e alistic. Answers will vary 
a s the children vary: Maybe his father tells him he should be chief of everything. Why 
shouldn't he be? If he can lead a team, he probably thinks he can lead everything. 
Others make him think so because they always do everything he s ays. From this point of 
analysis of differences, the children are ready to try t o size up the problem. The teach­
er asks: What is the problem? The children's perceptions will cause their responses to 
differ: 
a. That kid who's captain is the proble:im. He's pushy. 
b. No. The park is the problem, Who knows how to make one? 
c . The fuzzy thinkers are the problem. They can't decide whether they want to 
be popular or get the job done . 
d. Who should they pick for the job? 
e. It's a dumb problem. Who wants a park anyway? 
f. Toe problem is leadership . 
The greater the variety of responses, the more real the problem probably is to 
the children. In the discussion s imulated here, the children see the problem situation 
from the vantage point of their own experiences and values. Some of them are more ana­
lytical than others , some are more verbal, some more able to abstract a core idea. 
In each case the teacher has learned something about each child . The somewhat 
hostile child (e. above) who refuses to "play the game" is signalling. The teacher now 
needs to find out whether his snag is fear of criticism from teacher or peers or lack 
of interest in that particular case or worry about whether he will be chosen himself. 
Or many other possibilities. Teachers are like physicians, they diagnose from the spe­
cific responses that they get. Then they prescribe and evaluate the effect of the pre­
scription. It is the same in helping children seek values. The teacher can ask the 
child: ''What do you think would be a really important project for the class? or "If 
the class thinks the mini-park is important, how do you think they should pick a leader?" 
Or he can be put in a small group with a close fiend and an active debater or two and be 
a sked to come up with a Plan for Getting New Jobs none by a Class. 
Each of these ways (and there are, no doubt, many more) accepts the hostile 
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response, does not ignore it, and uses it as a diagnostic clue to that child. This is 
individualized value-seeking: not alone with a programmed packet, but in open discussion 
with peers and with the help of a supportive adult. 
The children can and should role-play the alternative ways out they can think of 
and note the values associated with each alternative. 
For example: 
Alternative Pick the team captain or you'll be left out of everything. 
Values Being "in. 11 Being safe. 
Alternative Pick a leader for the task who is really smart, even if 
he has no friends. 
Values Getting the task done. Skills. 
Alternative Pick a leader who can do the job and at least plays 
baseball with "in" gang; then people will follow. 
Values Getting the task done. Skills. 
From open discussion of these alternatives the children can observe that people 
sometimes choose the same alternative for different values or different alternatives for 
the same values. How often we have found people on our side whose support we really re­
gretted! 
The Process and the Products. As the children play out their alternatives and observe 
the sometimes surprising consequences, they are forced to work at all three of the goals 
or products we delineated earlier. 
They think reflectively about the problem and its possible solutions. They have 
had to opt for a definite decision and stay with it until its consequences were clearly 
evaluated by the values it was supposed to enhance. 
By wo~king in groups of varying sizes, they are learning to analyze others' per­
ceptions of issues. This is absolutely necessary to consensus among differences; children 
need practice in looking for alternatives which meet everyone's needs and still get the 
task done or the problem resolved. 
Active participation, to and through the awesome moment of taking a stand in de­
fense of your own values, then becomes a classroom reality and a practiced effort in 
real-world situations. The children learn to judge their own solutions by the key ques­
tions: "What difference does it make what he (or you) does? To whom?" 
The teacher and the curriculum are partners in confrontation with reality. Rec­
ognizing the existence and origins of differences and identifying the impactof decisions 
on oneself and others take the children a long way toward empathy. When they do take 
action, they will take it knowing what effect it may have on others. 
The Questions We Must Face. There are some recurring questions which teachers and cur­
riculum designers face in such a strategy: Do the children "have to" debate and role­
play such problems? Shouldn't we wait until children ask a values question before bring­
ing it up? Is there an obvious moment of value-readiness? This strategy argues "no" for 
several reasons: 
1. The prejudiced child will bring up a value-laden topic without enough data 
organized into concepts for the class to discuss it, leaving the teacher to agree, dis­
agree, or worse yet, ignore the child or silence him. 
2. The apathetic child will not see the values question as relevant to the use 
of concepts. He may learn about people in other societies but not be able to face the 
decisions he himself has to make. 
3. The frightened child will wait to see where everyone else stands-morality 
by consensus. 
4. The quiet, thoughtful child may be troubled and receive no help. 
What clo young children know about values? They know a great deal about the 
suffering of a values conflict-on the playground, in the family, between home and 
school. 
Perhaps one can apply Piaget's suggestions that young children need to be 
1confronted with new points of view in a concrete, active way. That is how they develop 
more mature structures, especially through interaction with their peers. Is everything 
open for debate? Is every alternative equally acceptable? 
Problems need to be child-centered to be relevant. Placing peer group problems 
in the early grades make sense. The first and second grader is more concerned with his 
own new learning and his own choices. 
If the problem is real, then all alternatives must get an equally reflective ap­
proach. Some alternatives cannot stand up to the question, "Does it make a difference? 
To whom?" from the point of view of equality and freedom for all. Such alternatives, in 
addition to being clearly unfair and unjust, are also obviously impractical in a plural­
istic society where we need support. 
Does the teacher have to reveal her own opinions? 
This is a matter of personal teaching style. Employing the strategy discussed 
here, the teacher does not need to choose one way out of a problem, suggest alternatives 
beyond the children's experience level, or summarize what "we" think. Value analysis 
(What do you think and what makes you think so?) and confrontation with consequences 
(What difference does it make? To whom?) will bring each child to his own values posi­
tion at his own level of emotion and action. 
A teacher who insists on his own view must submit his views to the same questions 
and the same scrutiny. Children will learn to insist on that. 
The teacher, the children and the parents all have values. In such a learning 
environment all of these aspects of reality can come to the fore without preaching and 
without fear of dogma on the one hand or "it-doesn't-make-any-difference-what-anyone­
thinks" skepticism on the other. 
We have looked at both products and process. Each is inherent in the other. 
The reflective individual who is aware of the role of concepts can identify problems and 
the reality of his environment. The reflective individual sees problems as opportuni­
ties because he knows how to recognize differences and judge alternatives by their prob­
able effect on particular values. He is a competent and compassionable decision-maker. 
The skills of consensus and the skills of problem-resolving through action can be 
learned and practiced. We live in a multi-group society; we must agree in advance to 
resolve our issues in accord with freedom and eguali ty. Childre;1 can be helped to be 
analytical, realistic, and courageous. 
F001NOTES 
1Equilibration theory and his views on the development of moral judgment. 
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A MODEL FOR TEACHING VAWING 
by 
Thelma F. Adams 
(Reprinted by permission from Clearing House, April, 1971, pp. 507-509.) 
Should I adopt my parents' value system? 
If not, what ~ I to do about choosing my own values? 
Alert ·teen-agers are asking themselves these questions today, but far too many 
of them are drifting along, following their peers, without defining their own values . 
The ne:ct questions, then, follow naturally: 
Should teachers, playing the roles of significant adults in the lives of these 
teen-a9ers, assist them in identifying their value systems? And if their means 
of valuing is inadequate, what ought to be done to improve it? 
These two words- should and ought- are the key words in the te ching of valuing, which 
is gaining increasing importance in today's educational objectives. If teen-agers are 
to learn what they value, they should be taught what kinds of questions to ask them­
selves. 
Although the Taxonomy of Educational Objectives, Handbook II: Affective Domain 
(2) was published in 1964, the use of these objectives has developed slowly in the 
nation's school systems. Many teachers fear that here they are encroaching on parental 
duties; others have not been informed of the needs in this area. Krathwohl, Bloom, and 
Masia (2) list the categories in the affective domain as follows: 
1.0 Receiving (attending) 
2 .0 Responding 
3.0 Valuing 
4.0 Organization (including organization of a value system) 
5.0 Characterization by a value or value complex 
In referring to values, the authors define valuing in its usual sense: "that a 
thing, phenomenon, or behavior has worth. 11 If our educational system is to meet the 
needs of presentday society, it is important that every teacher, regardless of the sub­
ject or subjects he is teaching, have access to Handbook II: Affective Domain as well as 
the companion volume, Handbook I: Cognitive Domain (1), before he plans his course ob­
jectives. In both areas the objectives have changed considerably in the past ten years. 
For constructing a model in valuing, an interesting book to consider is Two 
Blocks Apart, 1965, edited by Charlotte Leon Mayerson, which is available in both hard­
bound and paperback editions (3). School libraries should be able to furnish several 
copies of this important little book. In addition, teachers who wish to instruct stu­
dents in learning to value may want to have a classroom set or to have their students 
buy individual copies. M:>st teen-agers who read the book like it so well that they pre­
fer having their own paperback copy if they can afford it. 
Using this book as a basis, a unit may be constructed in the social sciences or 
the language arts program. It should be used as early as is feasible in the secondary 
school so that the students may begin to have the practice they need in valuing. As a 
springboard for this experience-type unit, the teacher should orient the students con­
cerning the meaning of values, and with their assistance name realistic reasons for 
learning to value. 
The next step involves the reading of the book, Two Blocks Apart. As each stu­
dent reads through it, he will find a strong identification with some of the qualities 
of the two boys, Juan Gonzalez and Peter Quinn, who are both 17 years old and live in the 
same New York City area. Peter is from a white, middle-class family and delivers clothes 
for the dry cleaner in his neighborhood to earn spending money. Juan's family are poor 
Puerto Rican immigrants. His parents are divorced, his mother is remarried, and he runs 
errands for a social service agency to earn extra money for the family's support. Mrs. 
Mayerson, the editor, is involved in social service work, and through tape recordingswas 
able to have the boys describe their family situations, their respective neighborhoods, 
their schools, their ideas concerning politics, and their hopes and ideals. In each of 
these five areas the reader is able to see the emerging value systems of Peter and Juan, 
which are brought to a climax in the last section, "Hopes and Ideals." 
The contrasting values described in the interviews should lead almost every teen­
ager into his own search for values. First, Juan is a member of a minority ethnic group. 
He has a mother and stepfather, a married sister, and a younger brother; he is very con­
cerned with trying to implant important values in his younger brother's life. Peter is 
one of four children in a conservative Irish catholic family. His father has an impor­
tant position with a large industrial firm. 
Juan lives in a New York Housing Authority Low Income Project, which he hates. 
He says it is not safe to live among the hoods in his neighborhood. Peter lives in a 
luxurious apa:rtment house with a doorman in attendance. He describes the atmosphere as 
friendly and likes his life there. Concerning school, Juan attended the local public 
elementary sd1ool in a 90 per cent non-white neighborhood. He now attends a vocational 
high school which offers the automotive course he was advised to take, but he does not 
value his school work. He knows he cannot afford college; he says he may join the Navy 
and try to learn some other type of work for his career. Peter attended a parochial ele­
mentary school and now attends a strict academic high school for boys who are interested 
in preparing for the Ivy League colleges and universities. Almost all of the students in 
his school are white. 
Juan has a keen interest in politics. He spends much of his time talking about 
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it and developing his political values. He wants to try to help people in the ghetto 
areas to have a better life. Peter has little interest in politics. He knows that re­
forms are needed in his community, but doesn't plan to take any active part in bringing 
them about. He seems to think that what is needed will come about without his assist­
ance. 
Finally, the two boys from distinctly different cultures define their goals and 
ideals. In this section the reader sees their values clearly: Juan wants to have a 
house in the country where he can get away from the aspects of society that have hamp­
ered him through the years. Also, due to his insecurity at home and in school, his 
goals and ideals change frequently. He wonders whether he should try to rise above his 
present class and what he ought to do about his future. Peter has definit educational 
goals, but his ideas about a career are changeable. Right now his major goal is to be 
accepted by the college his father and brother attended. He admires his older brother 
and wonders whether he should follow in his footsteps. If not, what ought he to do about 
choosing a career. 
Between the two boys who live so near and yet so far apart, one can view two com­
pletely differing value systems. Using this basic pattern, many young people will be 
able to decide what they do or do not value and from that point they can begin to organ­
ize their own value systems. Usually their values will change as they mature, but having 
defined a value system, each one will know that he has a place in society and that he 
needs to learn more about himself if he is to reach his goals. 
The culminating activity of this unit may be handled according to the teacher's 
best judgment. Certainly after reading the book there should be discussions of the 
values of Peter and Juan which hopefully will lead to the students stating some of their 
own values, though not at as great length as in the book. It would be well to have these 
stated in writing if the teacher can accept them for content alone without too much at­
tention to grammar and punctuation, because at this point the objective is to have the 
students learn to value and to recognize a value system. 
If the students are enthusiastic and want to exchange ideas, a good activity is 
to have them tape record their own ideas after they have written them down. Then the 
class can listen to a contribution from each member. If an opaque projector is avail­
able, each student can find a suitable illustration of his ultimate goals and, while the 
tape is being played, the class can listen and watch the screen, which will reinforce the 
learning situation in valuing and also give each student a sense of achievement in mas­
tering his objective. As the class members hear comments concerning their presentations, 
they will be able to answer in their own minds such questions as: Where am I going? 
Where have I been? How are my past and present life affecting my future? Should I 
strengthen my value system? What else ought I to do to achieve my long-term goals? 
The reflective model designed by Massialas and Cox in their Inquiry in Social 
studies (4) will serve as an excellent guide to the teacher who is beginning this type 
of class instruction 




Orientation ---l► Exploration 
E 'd t .v, enc,ng 
Here its six steps are adapted to the preceding unit of work. 
(1) Definition: What is valuing? 
(2) Orientation: Direct students' attention toward the fact that values are 
an important influence. Would they like to learn more about valuing? 
Decide on their own value systems? Study other teen-agers' value systems? 
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(3) Hypothesis: Values influence the direction of a person's life. 
(4) Exploration: Reading 'IWo Blocks Apart and discussing it gives insight 
into what two teen-agers value. 
(5) Evidences: How have the values of Peter and Juan and their families 
influenced the lives of these two boys? L.ook for evidences of your own 
and your family's values to determine why you are where you are now and 
why you feel as you do about your home, family, school, nation, hopes, 
and ideals. Has you milieu influenced your life? In what ways? 
(6) Generalization: Valuing is an important influence in shaping a person's 
total personality. 
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GROUP DYNAMICS AND VALUES CLARIFICATION 
by 
Leland Howe 
(Reprinted by permission from Penny's Forum, Spring/Summer, 1972, p. 12.) 
97 
How do group dynamics in a classroom affect the process of value clarification? 
Why is it, for example that one type of group arrangement in the classroom facilitates 
discussion of value issues while another inhibits communication? 
The group dynamics in a classroom are often very complex. In such a brief arti­
cle as this, one can not hope to develop any real expertise in group dynamics; partici­
pation in university group dynamics courses or human relation labs can provide this kind 
of training. However, with just a little knowledge of some of the simpler dynamics, the 
teacher can improve the quality of interaction that occurs during the value clarifying 
process. 
One of the most common group dynamic problems teachers encounter in helping stu­
dents clarify their values is selecting the appropriate group arrangement to facilitate 
student discussion and involvement. Teachers who do not realize the importance of the 
classroom seating arrangement often continue to use a didactic seating pattern. (See 
Figure 1.) TI1is works well for presenting material with the purpose of informing; how­
ever, it is hardly appropriate to the value clarifying approach. 
One of the problems in the didactic arrangement is that students, arranged in 
rows facing the front of the room, are forced to speak to each other's backs or turn in 
their seats to talk to one another during a values discussion. (As a result, much of the 
non-verbal communication expressed in the face and body is lost.) In addition, should the 
teacher remain in front of the class, as many do, the very fact that all eyes face for­
ward tends to put the teacher in control of the discussion whether she likes it or not. 
Of course, thE, teacher may feel comfortable in this role, but it does little to encour­
age students to feel that they and the teacher are searching together as equals for the 
best values; instead, it is likely to foster the image that only the teacher knows what 
are the true, right and wrong values that should be held. This, of course, violates one 
of the basic tenets of value clarification- that the student must, of his own free choice, 
arrive at his own values. 
Of those teachers who do realize the importance that group arrangement has on a 
values discussion, some of them attempt to improve the situation by providing tables 
around which students are seated in a discursive type group. This is, indeed, an im­
provement over the didactic arrangement. However, there are still some problems to be 
encountered. For example, if students are seated around rectangular tables (See Figure 
2), those at the ends, unless they are the group leader(s) or the teacher, are likely to 
find that the focus of the discussion centers in the middle of the table and they are 
left out. Or, on the other hand, if the teacher or a strong leader is seated at one end 
of the table, he or she is likely to command the groups' attention, as "the head of the 
table," and dominate the discussion. 
One way to correct this, of course, is to provide round tables. However, the 
tables themselves often create a psychological barrier to the value clarifying process . 
It is as if people use the tables to hide behind so as not to reveal personal informa­
tion about themselves. During the early stages of value clarification, as students are 
learning to trust one another, the tables may help to create a climate of psychological 
safety, but once a trusting climate has developed in the classroom, the tables may well 
keep students apart who, in fact, desire to be more personally involved with one another 
in the search for values. When the tables begin to act as barriers, they should go. 
Figure 3 represents one of the most effective seating arrangements for a group 
discussion of value issues. In this arrangement, students pull their chairs into a cir­
cle so that each is an equal member of the group. As simple as it sounds, the teacher 
may have to help students see that those who do not pull their chairs fully into the cir ­
cle are usually not full members of the group; their participation is likely to be min­
imal- a fact that students, once it is pointed out, can observe for themselves. The same 
thing tends to hold true even in the smallest groupings of pairs or trios. For example, 
students often sit side by side in a diad instead of facing each other, or in a trio, 
swinging their chairs around so that each is an equal member of the group. When this 
happens, the teacher should help students develop more appropriate spacial relationships . 
Note that the teacher in Figure 3 has not joined the group, but instead, makes 
her contributions from outside. By not joining the group she is non-verbally communi­
cating her desire that students learn to carry the weight of the discussion and not be 
dependent upon the teacher to do all the clarifying. Of course, she may also verbalize 
this expectation, but the important thing is that she acts to encourage students to be­
gin to develop the clarifying skills which she is modeling. 
However, it would be a mistake for the teacher to always remain outside the 
group. Once the group is able to function on its own and no longer looks to the teacher 
for comolete guidance or total clarification, the teacher should attempt to join the 
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circle (see Figure 4) as simply another group member (as much as this is possible). To 
remain outside the group after it is functioning on its own may well communicate to stu­
dents, again non-verbally, that the teacher can not benefit from an ongoing search for 
better values- that, perhaps, the teacher has already arrived at her values and no long­
er needs to examine them. The point is, that if we are to teach students that value 
clarification is a life long process, as the theory holds, we teachers must be willing 
to participate actively, as one human being with another, in the search for values . 
EXAMINING VAWES IN THE UPPER GRADES 
by 
Jean Bernstein, Marilynn Tannebaum, 
Larry Chase, and Grace Yeagle 
(Reprinted by permission from Social Education, December, 1971, pp. 906-910.) 
One hundred years ago, Walt Whitman, the poet of democracy, hailed the United 
States as a "nation of nations." No phrase better sums up our history. From its begin­
nings America has been a land of many peoples and many cultures. This diversity of cul­
tural values has created not only a dynamic pool of ideas that stimulated growth and 
change but also a continuous clash of interests that encouraged separatism and conflict. 
No study of historical issues of social problems can be complete without the examination 
of value positions and value conflicts. 
For the past three years, the Center for Ethnic Studies in School District #163, 
Park Forest, Illinois, has been involved in developing curriculum programs in the areas 
of ethnic studies and human relationships.! Center programs are designed to give stu­
dents accurate information about racial and cultural differences and to help them under­
stand the values issues that stem from these differences. Our work with values has been 
fourfold: (1) to encourage teachers to establish classroom climates that support open 
discussion of personal and social values; (2) to involve teachers and students in the 
identification of personal value positions; (3) to design curriculum activities that 
facilitate the examination of value conflicts; (4) to test new programs and approaches 
that allow students to experience value choices . 
Creating a Classroom Climate 
As we have worked in classrooms throughout our district, we have discovered that 
teachers of different personality types and teaching styles can effectively promote the 
open discussion of values. Classroom effectiveness seems directly related to the tea­
cher's ability to respect student ideas and accept student value positions. Comments 
such as these tend to destroy the potential for honesty: "You don't really believe that, 
do you?", "I doubt that many people would agree with you," "Does anyone have a better 
idea?" 
Most importantly, effective teachers recognize the legitimate differences be­
tween their own value positions and those of students. This is critical when the family 
or cultural values that guide student thinking conflict with middle-class standards. 
Often attitudes and behaviors frowned upon at school are condoned or even praised by par­
ents and peers. Certain kinds of aggressive actions, for example, may be seen as necess­
ary forms of independence. 
The willingness of teachers to tackle value-laden issues can be strengthened by 
the interest and support of administrators who legitimize the use of class tillJZ for this 
purpose. Confidence can also be gained when teachers are offered specific curriculum 
approaches as guides or are able to receive training in values-clq~ification or role­
playing techniques. These techniques can be applied to traditional subject matter and 
provide the mechanics for handling controversial issues. They reduce the danger of stu­
dent-teacher confrontation and promote intelligent and active student participation. 
Identifying Personal Values 
The identification of personal values can help teachers and students to deal more 
rationally with value issues. This identification can be a form of self-encounter, an 
illuminating experience that clarifies behaviors and goals. One technique for examining 
personal values is found in the Value Survey developed by social psychologist Milton 
Rokeach.2 The survey, a simple method for measuring value priorities, consists of 18 
terminal values, end-states of existence, and 18 instrumental values, modes of behavior. 
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Terminal values include such goals as "a sense of accomplishment," "family security," 
and "true friendship" while instrumental values invlude such traits as "honesty," "imag­
ination," and "selfcontrol." survey respondents rank each set of values to form a value 
system, an arrangement of values in order of importance. 
Individual teachers have found the survey process a valuable personal experience. 
Social studies teachers as a group, or as part of a total school staff, may use the sur­
vey to identify similarities and differences among individual value priorities. The ad­
ministration of the survey to a teacher group can be paired with a report on the work 
done by Milton Rokeach in his study of adult values.3 
The Value Survey may also be administered to seventh and eighth grade students. 
Survey results can be tabulated to develop group norms: subnorms may be developed for 
distinct groups-boys, girls, blacks, whites. Students may also use the Rokeach lists of 
terminal and instrumental values to analyze the value systems of other peoples and/or 
other cultures. How might these values have been ranked in Roman times? How might a 
colonial teenager have ranked them? Would they be ranked differently today by citizens 
of China and the United States? 
' Open-ended writing activities can also be used to help students clarify value­
oriented goals and behaviors. We have found these three writing activities to be stimu­
lating starters: 
1. All people throughout time have tried to achieve "the good life." 
What does "the good life" mean to you? 
2. Have you ever thought about your future life as an adult? 
What kind of life do you want? 
3. If someone were to write a short description of your personal 
qualities, what would you like them to say about you? 
Students should also be encouraged to own and act upon their identified personal 
values. Friendship, for example, is a value that often ranks high on student lists. 
What specific student behaviors bear out the importance of this value? What behaviors 
run counter to this value? 
Understanding Value Conflicts 
Beyond the identification of personal values, teachers and students can find 
within the social studies curriculum opportunities for study of value issues and value 
conflicts. A careful review of course content will point up ways to help students in­
terpret and understand different value positions. We have found that value conflicts can 
be examined within the context of the curriculum through the use of logical analysis, 
values-clarification strategies, and role-playing activities. 
Many of the learning tasks that students undertake as they study materials de­
veloped by the Center staff are designed to take them through a thinking process that 
sharpens their perception of value cofflicts. These specific examples are taken from 
unit activities at three grade levels: 
1. Fifth graders begin the study of racial and ethnic groups in the 
United States with the listing of the ideals articulated early 
in our history in the Declaration of Independence and Bill of 
Rights. Their list provides a values touchstone against which 
to examine the experiences of minority groups. What differences 
do they see in the application of these ideals to people of Euro­
pean and non-European backgrounds? 
2. Sixth graders use statistical data to compare educational levels 
of Mexican-Americans and Anglo-Americans. They read about the 
educational experiences of a teenager caught between the values 
of two worlds. How does the school-home conflict affect the 
change for success of l\lc?xican-American students? 
3. Seventh graders look at African society before the entry of Euro­
peans. They analyze the values of the African social system and 
compare them with the values of European society of that time. 
Does this Akan proverb (Ghana) accurately characterize the value 
conflicts between the two societies? 
I call Gold. 
Gold is mute. 
I call Cloth. 
Cloth is mute. 
It is mankind that matters. 
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In other unit activities, we have employed some of the value clarification 
strategies developed by Louis R'-1.ths, Merrill Harmin, and Sidney Simon.4 These activi­
ties illustrate the use of three different value-clarification strategies: 
1. Sixth-grade students, following the study of the Southwest, use value 
ranking to answer this question: 
Which group helped most in building up the Southwest­
Pioneers who came from the eastern United States 
or 
People in the Southwest of Mexican descent 
or 
Indians who originally lived in this area? 
After ranking these groups in the order of their individual choices, 
students explain the value positions on which their choices were based. 
2. Seventh graders work with this values continuum on colonialism: 
Benny Beneficial- Co­ Danny Detrimental-Co­
lonialism may have had lonialism was completely 
some bad points but its detrimental and its bene­
overall effect was bene­ fits to Africans were exag­
ficial. gerated. 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Individual students place themselves on this continuum and then state 
the basis for their value positions, their statements provide both a 
check of oontent knowledge and a clarification of personal values. 
3. Eighth-grade students read the poem "Incident" by Countee Cullen 
as the beginning for a values sheet and write answers to these 
questions: 
What incident is this poem about? 
How did the writer of the poem feel? 
Do you think his feelings are representative o f black people today? 
Why or Why not? 
Have you ever witnessed an incident like this one? 
If so, describe it. 
What did you do? 
What could you have done? 
Students discuss their responses to these questions so that they may 
come to terms with the gap between their own values and their behavior 
in real-life situations. 
We have also found role playing an invaluable techniques for helping students 
deal with value conflicts. An excellent resource book for teachers who wish to employ 
this technique is Role Playing for Social Values by Fannie and George Shaftel.s Almost 
any situation where a values choice is involved can be used as the basis for a role­
playing session. These role-playing situations taken from our fifth-grade curriculum 
unit may serve as examples: 
1. Patrick Murphy and his son Michael started out early in the morning 
to look for jobs. At the first factory they came to, they saw a big 
sign on the gate: No Irish Need Apply. Mr. Murphy said to the gate­
keeper, "I'm a good worker and so is my son. Why can't I apply for a 
job here?" The gatekeeper laughed and said, "On with you! We don't 
want your kind here." What should Mr. Murphy and his son do? 
2. The Yashima family had worked hard and had saved a little money. They 
decided to buy a piece of land so that they could own their own home 
and start a small farm. Mr. Yashima went to the owner of the land and 
offered to buy it. "I'm sorry," the owner said, "but they just passed 
a new law. Japanese people can't buy land in this state." Mr. Yashima 
returned to his family. His son Taro said, "Why should we work hard 
if we aren't allowed to have the same things other people in this country 
have?" What should Mr. Yashima do? 
3. sammy Glazer sat on the edige of the group and listened to the boys 
talk about the club where they went to swim and play games. He 
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decided to go there and see how to become a member. He walked up 
to the man at the desk and said, "I'd like to join this club." 
"What's your name?" the man asked. "Sammy Glazer," replied Sammy. 
"I live in the flat just down the street." "Are you Jewish?" 
asked the man. "What difference does that make?" sammy asked 
Angrily. "I'm sorry, son, but we don't allow Jewish members in 
this club." What should Sammy do? 
Of course, implicit in the use of role playing is the posing of alternative ac­
tions, the exploration of alternatives for consequences, the discussion of the values on 
which each alternative is based, and the decision as to the best alternative. 
Classroom teachers can adapt these techniques and strategies to other content 
situations. In addition, the study of any issue or event can be raised to the values 
level by the use of appropriate questions. What values were involved in this action? 
What alternative actions could have been taken? What value positions do these alterna­
tives represent? Under the same circumstances, what would you have done? 
Experiencing Value Choices 
The school classroom, with its mix of individual personalities and life styles, 
can also be an appropriate setting for value activities that break through the limits of 
curriculum scope and sequence. We have found upper-grade students enthusiastic partici­
pants in programs that deal directly with feelings and attitudes and in discussion groups 
that force confrontation of personal value positions. Two on-the-spot descriptions of 
student involvement illustrate the potential of these approaches. 
1. Fifteen sixth graders sit on a small rug in the corner of their social 
studies class while their classmates finish a reading assignment. They are 
joined by their teacher who begins a discussion of "Three Wishes" by telling 
the group about one of his wishes. In the course of the 20-minute discussion, 
each student who desires a turn will tell the group about his wishes. He 
will receive reassurance from the group as several students remember and re­
state what he has said. Finding the teacher would be a difficult task for he 
will be right in the middle of the action, sharing his own wishes, remember­
ing, and gently facilitating the discussion. As the session ends, each stu­
dent will be more aware of his own ideas and values and more sensitive to the 
ideas of others. On other days, discussion topics might by "How I protected 
some person from harm," "I made a promise and kept it," or "I knew the truth 
but lied anyway." Though the topics change as the class meets daily, the 
pattern of sharing, remembering, and examining will remain constant. 
This is a living social studies class in which the content for part of the 
period is not history or geography but the students' own lives. Through the 
medium of the "magic circle," these students are confronting and clarifying 
their values. They are learning not by being preached to but by talking 
about their feelings, thoughts, and behaviors, by talking about what they can 
do, and by learning to take responsibility for their own actions. 
The term "magic circle" has become the informal name for the Human Develop­
ment Program, a curriculum program enhancing emotional growth, developed by 
Uvalde Palomares and Harold Bessell. 6 The program was field tested during 
the 1970-71 school years in School District #163 and has since been made 
available to all teachers in the district. Though the program is being used 
effectively with students in kindergarten through eighth grades, it is upper­
gr.ade students who feel a real need for time each day to talk about the prob­
lems of growing up. 
The process of developing values includes making choices and taking respon­
sibility for these choices. In circle sessions, students are often faced 
with direct-choice situations as they play "What can I do for you?" or "I 
can make you feel bad or good." They are encouraged to make choices involv­
ing others in the group, to make commitments to others and to talk about the 
commitments they have made. As they work together, they learn that their 
fears, wishes, and value conflicts are shared by others. The come to under­
stand and accept human differences and similarities. 
Although the Human Development Program deals directly with the affective 
dimension of learning, the techniques and strategies employed can also be ap­
plied to content areas. Teachers interested in this approach may wish to re­
fer to two excellent books on this subject: Human Teaching for Human Learn­
ing_ by George I. Brown7 and Learning to Feel- Feeling to Learn by Hal Lyon. 8 
2. Thirty-six students sit on the floor in small groups. Some express themselves 
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excitedly; others talk quietly but intently. An observer walking around the 
room might overhear these remarks: 
"When you have two groups, one is always cutting the others down. They 
don't know how bad they are themselves because they never evaluate them­
selves, only others." 
"Nobody likes to be put down, black or white." 
"Everybody's afraid they' re going to make the wrong move." 
"I don't have to act like you but try to understand why you act that way." 
The comments were made by seventh- and eighth-grade students attending an 
all-day junior high speakout. This day was the culmination of a series of 
meetings devoted to identifying and seeking solutions to school human rela­
tions problems. The school, formerly an all-white suburban junior high, had 
recently become racially mixed. As black and white students attended school 
together, hall, gym, and bus incidents occurred with increasing frequency. 
Both student values and student tempers clashed. 
Conventional problem-solving techniques did not seem to be working. New 
rules were made only to be broken repeatedly. School personnel became con­
cerned about the increase in student tensions and their apparent negative ef­
fect on the learning environment. The staff, under the leadership of the 
principal and the counselor, recognized that the very students who were cre­
ating the problems needed to be involved in the search for solutions. 
The staff identified the informal leadership of the school, those students 
who could influence others. A small group of informal leaders met as a 
steering committee with the counselor. Together they arrived at the idea for 
an all-day meeting. It was hoped that a meeting planned, organized, and im­
plemented by students could provide a forum for an exchange of ideas and a 
sharing of feelings. Perhaps the students involved could deal with the basic 
values questions that caused daily conflicts. 
The steering committee planned a series of events that included communica­
tion games, role playing, a human relations film, and a rumor clinic. Facul­
ty members conducted two of the formal sessions while small and large dis­
cussion groups were led by students. The groups were asked to identify 
school problems during the morning meetings and to suggest specific solutions 
in the afternoon sessions. Although group discussions frequently began on a 
superficial level, participants soon began to share real feelings and honest 
reactions. Questions that concerned students were raised openly: Why do 
blacks seem to fight more? Why do whites get so scared? Why do you act the 
way you do? Students risked personal confrontations by discussing specific 
incidents that had taken place. Many of the discussions involved clarifying 
particular values important to individual students. 
A frustration level was reached during the mid-afternoon. One participant 
summed up the feeling of the group when he said, "Finding the problems is 
the easy part. Even understanding why isn't so hard. It's getting solutions 
that's really hard." Another responded by saying that meetings like this 
that gave students a chance to talk together were the best solution. Student 
evaluations of the day generally reflected this feeling. Students indicated 
that operating with other people from a position of understanding provides a 
better basis for value choices. 
We believe that "magic circle" disucssions and student-to-student interaction are 
as important a part of the s ocial studies experience as the study of historical events 
and geographic places. As one emphatic principal put it, in anwer to the criticism that 
these activities took time away from more structured study about the world, "Maybe our 
students have to know why they are before they can find out where they're at." 
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(Reprinted by permission from Media and Methods, February, 1970, pp. 36-38. For a bibli­
ography of other materials available in the humanistic education field, write: Adiron­
dack Mt. Humanistic Education Center, Upper Jay, New York, 12987.) 
"You never really know a man until you stand in his shoes and walk 
around in them." 
In every school building there is a wall which keeps the rain and cold out and 
the children in. It is a wall made of concrete, steel, wood or asbestos, and glass. We 
have all seen this wall, would readily acknowledge its existence and usefulness, and 
therefore need not dwell upon it. 
However, there is another wall which separates the school from the outside world 
-one which deserves our more serious attention. This is a wall which many people say 
they cannot see and many others do not want to see; although research shows -that it is 
seen more easily by students than by their parents or teachers. It is called the wall of 
unreality, and it prevents students from making any vital connection between what they 
learn in the classroom and what they know is happening in the seething world outside the 
school. 
One recent study showed that from September, 1968 to March, 1969, there were over 
2000 student disruptions in secondary schools across the country. It seems that if we, 
as teachers, do not do something quickly to tear down the unreal walls of our school 
buildings, then the students are very likely to tear down the real ones. 
In one mostly white, suburban classroom, an eleventh grade, social studies class 
was discussing poverty, race, guaranteed annual income, police brutality, welfare and 
other related issues. This , in itself, was a positive first step toward relevance and 
away from unreality. But the teacher sensed his students had no real feeling for or 
experience with the issues they were discussing. Their comments seemed to reflect a 
cross between their parents' opinions and the 6 O'clock News-nothing personal. The 
teacher felt the need for a greater reality-orientation in his classroom, so he gave the 
following assignment: 
Do two of the following within two weeks. At that time we will discuss your 
experiences in class and relate them to the subject at hand. 
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Wear old clothes and sit 
in the waiting room of the 
State Employment Office. 
Listen. observe. talk to 
some of the people sitting 
next to you . Read the 
the 
Go to an inner-city ele ­
mentary school and read 
a story to a chi Id in kin­
dergarten or first grade. 
The child must be held 
on your lap.t 
Go to magistrate•s court 
and keep a I ist of the 
kinds of cases brought 
before the magistrate . 
Who are the ..custom­
ers"? How are they 
handled? I 
Spend a few hours in a 
prowl car traveling with a 
team of pol icemen . Listen 
to the squad car radio. 
Ask questions. If the 
pol icemen park and walk 
a beat , walk with them. 
Sit in the waiting room 
of the maternity ward of 
a city hospital whose 
patients are mostly char­
ity cases . Strike up a 
conversation with any 
other persons in the wait­
ing room . 
Go to the community 
health center and take a 
seat in line . Watch the 
attitude of the personnel 
who work in the health 
center. Talk to some of 
the other patients coming 
for help. 
Live for three days on the 
amount of money a typ­
ical welfare mother re­
ceives to feed a son or 
daughter closest to your 
own age . 
Read Autobiography of 
Malcolm X or Monchild 
in the Promised Lond or 
some other book which 
tells what it is like to grow 
up black in America.I 
Compare the prices of 
the same brands and 
models of record players , 
TV sets , and transistor 
radios at your local 
stores with those on dis­
play in a credit store in 
the downtown area. 
Read at least two 
issues, cover to 
cover, of the Tri­
bune , Afro -Ameri­
can, Monitor or 
other Negro news­
paper . 
Spend a morning 
making the rounds 
with a visiting 
nurse. 
Turn the heat off in
your own house 
some night in Jan­
uary or February 
and spend the 




day in a store-front 
church. I - ITry to call City Hal I with 
a complaint that your 
landlord did not give you 
heat, or has not repaired 
a roof leak. or that the 
toilet is not working. 
Better yet . find a neighbor 
with a real complaint 
and offer to he Ip him get 
it fixed . 
Spend a weekend with 
the American Friends 
Ser v ice Committee on 
one of their weekend 
workcamps, which are a 
combination of seminar 
and clean-up. paint-up
projects .
Walk four or five blocks 
Attend a meeting of a 
civic group such as the 
Human Relations Com­
mittee. the Welfare Rights 
0 r g an i z at ion, or the 
Neighborhood Associa ­
tion. 
between 13th and 18th on
Broadway at lunch hour 
and buy a sandwich and 
a cup of coffee in a 
luncheonette in which 
you wi 11 be the only white
person . 
1Note : Whites will not be overly welcome these da ys if they come a-slumming in 
black ghettos. This issue needs to be examined and all the r ealities explored clearly 
before any team goes out on the first module. 
Two weeks later, after doing many of these sensitivity modules, the students had 
developed a personal concern for the subject, a wealth of experiences to draw upon and 
dozens of pertinent questions needing answers. Had it been an all-black school, the sen­
sitivity modules would have been constructed accordingly, so as to enable the black stu­
dents to become more sensitive to the realities of the white world. Needless to say, such 
experiences generate many powerful feelings and often considerable confusion in a stu­
dents-especially when their preconceptions about the world are challenged. But then, 
what is learning all about? 
Yet, sensitivity modules do not all have to be on such controversial subjects. 
One teacher, when the class was reading Helen Keller's Story of My Life, had her 
class walk around the school and their homes blindfolded for a day, so they might be more 
sensitive toward Helen Keller's way of experiencing the world. 
An elementary school teacher who was doing a unit on inventions and inventors 
''who have changed our way of life" asked each class member to invent some useful object 
for his home. 
A math teacher tried to bridge the gap between the reality of the classroom and 
that of the outside world by asking his students to help their parents calculate the 
family's yearly income tax- using the long form. 
A history teacher had the members of his class work for political candidates of 
their choice, during an election yea r, as one way of studying how politics work- a real­
istic addition to the textbook version. 
In fact, for just about any subject we teach, and at just about any level, sen­
s itivity modules can be created. 
I 
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Some students wonder why they have to learn to write formal letters in junior 
high school. So some teachers ask that those letters take the form of letters-to-the­
editor or to Congressmen, and they actually get sent. Of course, the students are en­
couraged to learn more about the subject they are writing on, and the letters contain the 
students' own views, not the teachers'. 
In teaching elementary children the period of world exploration and the discovery 
of America, one teacher had her children go out and actually "discover" new parts of the 
city. One instruction was to "find a new and faster route to the ball field." She 
stayed a half block behind them, but they had to do the discovering themselves. And the 
gap between the world of Columbus and their own risk-taking work in the city was narrowed. 
One high school class studying the second world war took a trip to a Veterans' 
Hospital wher,~ the students interviewed many of the patients. 
A good book or movie, a trip to a museum, a guest speaker-any number of tradi­
tional teaching devices can serve as a sensitivity module- if the student is truly in­
volved in the experience and if it is a new experience for him. All new experiences are 
risk-taking experiences, because we never know how they might turn out. Generally, the 
more the student has to do, the newer the experience is for him, the greater the risk, 
he has to take, the deeper will be the sensitivity which results from it. The more pas­
sive the student's role is in a sensitivity module, the less he gets out of it. Natural­
ly, students' ages will be an important factor in creating sensitivity modules, as will 
be an intelli9ent concern for their safety. But risk cannot, and should not, be elimi­
nated, because it is central to the experience. Teachers who take fewer risks in their 
classroom and in their own lives will probably be less disposed toward the newer, more 
unpredictable modules than teachers who frequently experiment, try out new behaviors and 
ideas and otherwise take risks in their own lives. 
One word of caution for the teacher: Experience does not necessarily lead to 
wisdom or sensitivity. We humans are notoriously capable of translating new experiences 
and information so as to fit neatly into our old, fixed and often prejudicial way of 
thinking. That is why it is essential that students have the opportunity to validate 
their experiences and learnings with those of their peers and to check out these learn­
ings with thoi;e of their peers and to check out these learnings with the accumulated body 
of knowledge which we can make available to them. The sensitivity module, then, is only 
one aspect of a more encompassing learning experience. 
Many parents and teachers will probably object to the sensitivity module- if not 
its conception, then in its application. They might argue that there are enough unpleas­
ant realities which their children cannot avoid in this world, without having to seek out 
new ones. Th<W might also say that the schools really have no right to ask students to 
take risks, that is, to put themselves in situations where the outcomes are uncertain and 
may be unsettling. 
We believe that, although these arguments are probably offered for the children's 
own good," they do a great disservice to those same children and to our society. In a 
world that seems ready to explode because of lack of understanding and communication 
among groups and nations, it is frightening to think what sheltered lives most of our 
students lead. 
Roger is white, wealthy, suburban, and until his twelfth year in school, had 
never shaken hands with a black person. Denise is twelve and has never had more than 25 
cents of her own . Ellen has never been hungry a day in her life. Mike, when he dropped 
out of his inner-city school, had never ridden on the city's subways, for fear he might 
get lost underground. Geraldine believed that every family who lives in the suburbs has 
a sleep-in maid. 
Are these children exceptions? We wonder. Over the years, as we have got ten to 
know our studE,nts, we have continued to be amazed at what little experience they have in 
worlds outsidE• their own neighborhoods or communities. But, really, this should not be 
so surprising. 
As small children, their friendships follow the socio-economic patterns of their 
neighborhoods and their families' social circle. Thus, their friends are of the same 
race and social class and frequently of the same religion. When there are exceptions to 
this rule, it is not unusual for the parents to intervene and subtly or explicitly ex­
plain that "we don't play with them" In many areas, the neighborhood school perpetuates 
this pattern of homogeneous socio-economic grouping, as does ability grouping in schools, 
By the time the student reaches high school, he still probably has little feeling for how 
most people in the country or world, aside from his own closed circles, live. That is 
why the first year in a college dormitory is usually such an eye-opening experience for 
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freshmen. 
But the problem goes even deeper than these structural realities of scmol and 
society- social class, friendship patterns, neighborhood schools, ability grouping . As 
we view the schools' curricula and teaching methods, it seems as though the schools had 
a stake in keeping their students ignorant of many of the realities of the world around 
them. 
Why else would the reading matter be so carefully screened, lest real ideas or 
real language influence the students? Why is controversy, certainly the norm in the 
real world, still frowned upon in more schools than it is welcomed? Why are students 
still allowed such little choice in sdlool subjects, while in the real world they have 
to make all sorts of important choices about how they will· spend their lives? Why are 
students often burdened with so much homework, especially the brighter ones, that they 
have little time to discover the real world on their onw, in their own fashion? What are 
we trying to protect? 
It's as though schools were afraid that students might develop the "wrong" ideas, 
the "wrong" attitudes and beliefs. Wasn't it Jefferson who asked, "Who ever knew truth 
to be the loser on a free and open market of ideas?" Yet, apparently this is the fear 
that runs our schools- the fear that constructs a wall around the school to keep the rea­
i ties of the outside world from intruding and interrupting "business as usual." 
But the students in the 1970's, even more so than in the '60's, will not allow 
that artificial wall to stand. They want desperately to get an education that will help 
them make sense out of and live in the world around them, and they will try to get it 
with or without the school's help. 
The sensitivity module is only one of many methods teachers have for helping stu­
dents in a search for real understandings, based not only on academic knowledge, but on 
life's experiences as well." Harper Lee wrote, "You never really know a man until you 
stand in his shoes and walk around in them." By helping students to walk around in many 
men's shoes, the sensitivity module helps to tear down the wall of unreality that too 
often separates schools from life. 
VAWES-CLARIFICA TION vs. INDOCTRINATION 
by 
Sidney B. Simon 
(Reprinted by permission from s:>cial Education, December, 1971, pp. 902-905, 915. For 
information about current Values Clarification materials or nationwide training workshops 
contact Values Associates, Box 43, Amherst, Ma., 01002.) 
Whatever happened to those good old words we once used when we talked of values? 
Remember, how comfortable it was to say inculcate? It was a nice, clean, dignified, 
closely shaved work if there ever was one. Then there was the old standby, to instill­
usually followed by "the democratic values of our society." Doesn't anyone instill any­
more? And what about the word foster? In schools, not so very long ago, we used to "fos­
ter" all over the place. But nobody does that much anymore. What has happened to the old 
familiar jargon of value teaching? 
What happened was the realization that all the inculcating, instilling, and fos­
tering added up to indoctrination: and despite our best efforts at doing the indoctri­
nating, we've come to see that it just didn't take. Most of the _P,eopl~ who expe_rienced 
the inculcation, instillation, and fostering seem not the much better for it. They appear 
to play just as much hanky-panky with income taxes as anyoue else, and concerned letters­
·to-the-edi tor are not written by them in any greater profusion. They pollute and defoli­
ate; move to the suburbs to escape integration; buy convertibles with vinyl tops that 
collapse in roll-over accidents; fail to wear seat belts; and commit all kinds of sins 
even while they are saying the very words that have been dutifully inculcated, instilled, 
and fostered in them. It is discouraging. 
At this point, one might ask: "Is it all that bad?" "Aren't they also among the 
good people who go to the polls in November, read the current events weeklies, and pay 
their BankAmericard charges on time?" Yes, of course. But in these troubled confused, 
and conflicted times, we need people who can do much more than that. we desperately need 
men and women who know why they are, who know what they want out of life, and who can 
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name their names when controversy rages. we need people who know what is significant and 
what is trash, and who are not so vulnerable to demagoguery, blandness, or safety. 
The indoctrination procedures of the past fail to help people grapple with all the 
confusion and conflict which abound in these baffling days. For example, in val_ues­
clarification, we apply a strategy which is deceptively simple. We ask students to spend 
some time listing the brand names in their home medicine cabinets. Just think of your 
own medicine cabinet as you are sitting reading this. Wha t 's in it? How many creams, 
ointments, and salves have you been sold? Do you use a bran d-name, buffered product in­
stead of plain old aspirin? How did you get started on that? What about the spray cans? 
How many are in your aerosol arsenal? What did you use before the product you now spray? 
How did all those brand names get there? Who bought them? What was the motivating force 
force? How did you learn what to value as seen in your medicine cabinet? As long as you 
have the door to your cabinet open, why don't you pull out the cosmetic tray? How vul­
nerable are you to avoiding the hysteria surrounding all of us about getting a wrinkle? 
Getting old has become such a negative value. Who are the people who fear it? 
In place of indoctrination, my associates and I are subs ti tuting a pro_ces_s ap­
proach to the entire area of dealing with values in the schools, which focuses on the 
process of valuing, not on the transmission of the "right" set of values. We call this 
approach values-clarification, and it is based on the premise that none of us has the 
"right" set of values to pass on to other people's children. Yes, there may be some 
things we can all agree upon, and I will grant you some absolutes, but when we begin to 
operationalize our values, make them show up in how we live our days and spend our nights, 
then we begin to see the enormous smugness of those people who profess they have the 
right values for others' children. The issues and hostility generated around hair length 
and dress and armbands are just the surface absurdity. 
More dangerous is the incredible hypocrisy we generate when we live two-faced 
values and hustle the one right value to children. Think about the hundreds of elemen­
tary school teachers who daily stop children from running down the halls. I close my 
eyes and I see them with their arms outstretched, hands pressing against the chest of kids 
who put on their "brakes" in order to make the token slowdown until the teacher ducks in­
to the teacher's room for a fast cigarette before all the kids get back to hear the can­
cer lecture. Think of those teachers preaching to children about the need to take turns 
and share. "We wait on lines, boys and girls, and we learn to share our crayons and 
paints in here. And, I don't want to see anybody in my class being a tattletale- except 
in cases of serious emergency, naturally." The words are all too familiar. I have used 
them in the old days. I have also seen myself cut into the cafeteria lunch line ahead of 
third graders. (Take turns? Well, not when we have so few minutes for lunch and always 
so much to do to get ready for afternoon classes.) 
The alternative to indoctrination of values is not to do nothing. In this time 
of the anti -hero, our students need all the help we can give them if they are to make 
sense of the confusion and conflict 1.nheri ted from the indoctrinated types. Moreover, we 
all need help in grappling with the chaos of the international scene, with the polariza­
tion of national life- not to mention the right-outside-the-door string of purely local 
dilemmas. 
An approach to this problem is to help students learn a process for the clarifi­
cation of their values, which is a far cry from indoctrination. The theory behind it can 
be found in Values and Teaching (Louis E. Raths, Merrill Harmin, and Sidney B. Simon, 
Columbus: Charles E. Merrill, 1966). In the remainder of this article, I will describe 
some of the strategies we are presently using to help students learn the process of val­
ues-clarification and begin lifelong searches for the sets of personal values by which 
to steer their lives.I 
Five Value-Clarifying Strategies and Their use 
Strategy #1- Things I Love to Do 
Ask students (teacher does it with them) to number from 1-20 on a paper. Then 
suggest they list, as rapidly as they can, 20 things in life which they really, really 
love to do. Stress that the papers will not be collected and "corrected, n and that there 
is no right answer about what people should like. It should be emphasized that in none 
of values strategies should students be forced to participate. Each has the right to 
pass. Students may get strangely quiet; and, at first, they may even be baffled by such 
an unschoollike task as this. Flow with it, and be certain to allow enough time to list 
what they really love to do • Remember, at no time muis t the i ndivi dual ' s privacy be in­
va <ied I and that the right of an indivi'dual to pass is sacrosanct. 
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When everyone has listed his 20 i terns, the process of coding responses can be 
started. Here are some suggested codes which you might ask the students to use: 
1. Place the$ sign by any itme which costs more than $3, each ·time you do it. 
2. Put an R in front of any item which involves some RISK. The risk might be 
physical, intellectual, or emotional. (Which things in your own life that 
are things you love to do require sane risk?) 
3. Using the code letter F and M, record which of the items on your list you 
think your father and mother might have had on their lists if they had been 
asked to make them at YOUR age. 
4. Place either the letter P or the letter A before each item. The "P" to 
be used for i terns which you prefer doing with PEOPLE, the "A" for i terns 
which you prefer doing ALONE. (Stress again that there is no right answer. 
It is important to just become aware of which are your preferences.) 
5. Place a number 5 in front of any item which you think would not be on your 
list 5 years from now. 
6. Finally, go down through your list and place near each item the date when 
you did it last. 
The discussion which follows this exercise argues more eloquently than almost 
anything else we can say for values-clarification. 
Strategy #2 - I Learned That I . . . 
This strategy fits in with the one above. After students have listed and coded 
their 20 items , the teacher might say, "Look at your list as something which tells a lot 
about you at this time in your life. What did you learn about yourself as you were going 
through the strategy? Will you please complete one of these sentences and share with us 
some of the learning you did?" 
I learned that r. 
I relearned that I . 
I noticed that r. 
I was surprised to see that r. 
I was disappointed that I. 
I was pleased that I. . 
I realized that I. 
The teacher must be willing to make some "I learned that r. ..." statements, 
too. And they must not be platitudinous, either. Every effort is made for the values­
clarifying teacher to be as honest and as authentic as possible. 
"I learned that I ...•" statements can be used after almost any important val­
ue clarifying strategy. It is a way of getting the student to own the process o~ the 
search for values. It should be clear how diametrically opposed "I learned that I. • • • " 
statements are from indoctrination, although it is possible to misuse this or any clari­
fication strategy to get kids to give back the party line. On the other hand, using this 
strategy can begin to build that lifetime search for personal meaning into all of our 
experiences. 
Strategy #3- Baker's Dozen 
This is a very simple strategy which teaches us something about our personal pri­
orities. The teacher asks each student to list 13, a baker's dozen of his favorite items 
around the house which use PLUGS, that is, which require electricity. 
When the students have made their lists, the teacher says, "Now, please draw a 
line through the three which you really could do without if there were suddenly to be a 
serious power shortage. It's not that you don't like them, but that you could, if you 
had to, live without them. o.K., now circle the three which really mean the most to you 
and which you would hold onto until the very end." 
It should be clear that again there is no right answer as to what "good" people 
should draw lines through and circle. The main thing is for each of us to know what we 
want and to see it in the perspective of what we like less. 
strategy #4- "I urge" Telegrams 
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The teacher obtains blank Western Union telegrams blanks. Or simply has students 
head a piece of paper with the word Telegram. He then says, "Each of you should think of 
someone in your real life to whom you would send a telegram which begins with these words: 
I URGE YOU TO. . . Then finish the telegram and we' 11 hear same of them." 
A great many values issues come out of this simple strategy. Consider some of 
these telegrams: 
To my sister: "I urge you to get your head together and quit using drugs." 
Nancy. (All telegrams must be signed. It is our affirmation of the need to name your 
name and to stand up for what you believe in.) 
To my Sunday School teacher: "I urge you to quit thinking that you are the only 
person to know what God wants." Signed, your student Rodney Phillips. 
To my neighbor on the North Side: "I urge you to see that we have no other place 
to play ball and that you not call the cops so often." Signed, Billy Clark. 
One of the things that students working with values-clarification learn to do is 
to find out what they really want. "I urge telegrams" help do that. Just think of the 
people in your own lives to whom an "I urge telegram" needs to be sent. The second thing 
students working with values-clarification learn to do is to find alternative ways of 
getting what they need and want. Take the case of Billy Clark's neighbor. The class 
spent some time brainstorming ways of approaching that neighbor. They talked about how 
to negotiate with a grouch, and how to try to offer alternatives in your drive to get 
what you want. 
"I urge telegrams" are used several times during the semester. The students keep 
them on file and after they have done five or six, they are spread out on the desk and "I 
learned statements" made from the pattern of the messages carried by the telegrams. 
Students also learn to use the "I urge you to. . " model to get messages 
across between student and student and between student and teacher. 
An assignment I like to use, related to the "I urge telegram," is to have each 
student get a letter-to-the-editor published in a magazine or newspaper. 
Strategy #5-Personal Coat of Arms 
Each student is asked to draw a shield shape in preparation for making a person­
al coat of arms. The teacher could go into the historical significance of shields and 
coats of arms, but the exercise is designed to help us learn more about some of our most 
strongly held values and to learn the importance of publicly affirming what we believe, 
that is, literally wearing our values out front on our shields. 
The coat of arms shield is divided into six sections (see figure). The teacher 
makes it clear that words are to be used only in the sixth block. All the others are to 
contain pictures. He stresses that it is not an art lesson. Only crude stick figures, 
etc., need be used. Then he tells what is to go in each of the six sections: 
1. Draw two pictures. One to represent something you are very good at and one 
to show something you want to become good at. 
2. Make a picture to show one of your values from which you would never budge. 
This is one about which you feel extremely strong, and which you might never 
give up. 
3. Draw a picture to show a value by which your family lives. Make it one that 
everyone in your family would probably agree is one of their most important. 
4. In this block, imagine that you could achieve anything you wanted, and that 
whatever you tried to do would be a success. What would you strive to do? 
5. Use this block to show one of the values you wished all men would believe, 
and certainly one in which you believe very deeply. 
6. In the last block, you can use words. Use four words which you would like 
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A PERSONAL illAT OF ARMS 
The teacher can do several different things at this point. He can have the stu­
dents share among themselves in little trios or quartets. He can also get the picture 
hung up on the walls and get people to take each other on gallery tours to share the 
coats of arms. A game could be played which would involve trying to guess what the pic­
tures represented. The class might try to make a group coat of arms to represent their 
living together in that classroom. In any case, the value expressions elicited in this 
nonverbal way are very exciting and lead to discussions which range far and wide. Inci­
dentally, this strategy is a ·good one to use with parents to illustrate to them the 
power of the values-clarification methodology. It makes a meaningful exercise for an 
evening PTA meeting. 
The Coat of Arms strategy illustrates quite well some things common to all of 
the values-clarification strategies. The teacher sets up an interesting way of eliciting 
some value re:,ponses. He establishes that there is no right answer. Toe strategy is 
open-ended and allows students to take the exploration to whatever level they want to 
take it. Finally, there is a chance to share with each other some of the alternatives 
that emerge from our searching. This whole process allows each student to focus on 
areas where he has some work yet to do in order to keep growing. The Coat of Arms can 
be done several times during the school year and the various shields compared and seen 
as measures o i: a student's search o 
Conclusion 
The five strategies used as illustrations of what values-clarification is must 
raise some serious questions in the minds of readers who have more conventional views of 
what the social studies should be. For one thing, I have used no standard sub_ject­
matter content: there is no history, no geography, etc o Yet, if one thinks through what 
the outcomes of a course will be making use of the five strategies, he will see the stu­
dent emerging with a deeper sense of who he is_, what he wants_, what is p _recious, and 
what is of most worth in his and others' lives. Has the social studies ever done more 
than that? 
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Values-clarification demands that we take a new look at what we have been calling 
the social studies. I feel more and more strongly that the most severe problem facing 
all of us is HOW TO GET PEOPLE 10 LOOK AT THE LIVES THEY ARE LEADING. How can we get 
fathers and 100thers to see that high college-entrance scores are not the end of a high 
school education? How can we get people to see that getting a high-paying job is not the 
final reward of a college degree? How can we get men and women to take on some larger 
share of their personal responsibility for the rampant racism in our nation? Or for al­
lowing a senseless war to continue indefinitely? When will educators make a contribution 
tion towards helping people examine t he headlong pursuit towards accumulating more and 
more material possessions and enjoying them less? Or what can we do about keeping our 
students from making drab and dreary marriages or being trapped into pointless jobs 
which they hate to go to each morning? It boils down to a co ncern for values, and yet we 
must not fall into the trap of believing that if only we could give boys and girls the 
right set of values to believe, they would avoid the mistakes of the rest of us. Non­
sense I 
Indoctrination is not the answer. The only thing that indoctrination did for 
people in the past was to help them postpone the time when they began the hard process 
of hammering out their own set of values. Values simply can't be given to anyone else. 
One can't value for other people. Each individual has to find his own values. One can 
memorize all che platitudes he wants, but when it comes to living and acting on the val­
ues, he needs to carve them out from carefully reflected experience. The skills neces­
sary for doing this can be learned in values-clarffication. 
Perhaps when the reader and au~hor acknowledge how little help they received 
from their own education about making sense out of life, maybe then they will be willing 
to help other people's children learn the process, a lifetime process, of searching for 
a viable set of values to live by and perhaps even to die for. 
The author is convinced that he can leave his own children no greater inheri­
tance than the gift of knowing how to negotiate the lovely banquet of life ahead of them. 
That is indeed something of value. 
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A P P E N D I X 
RESOURCES FOR VALUES EDUCATION 
(Reprinted by permission from the Committee on Education, The Ohio Council of Churches, 
June, 1973.) 
Compiled by: 
Mr. Alexander Campbell 
In Consultation with Task Force Mambers-
Mr. Richard Howard, Chairman Dr. John Kirker 
Mr. Hersh Adlerstein Sr. Beatrice Koerper 
Mr. Howard L. Brown Miss Ruth McDowell 
Mr. G. H. oeutschlander Mr. Bernard Miller 
Dr. Charles Foster Mr, Joseph Newlin 
Dr. ~bert Greer Mrs. Janet Railey Smith 
Mr. Nelson Harper Mrs. F. Estella Worth 
Dr. Edward F. Jirik 
* * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * 
Name of the Program: DECIDING 
Publisher: College Entrance Examination Board 
888 Seventh Avenue 
New York, New York 10019 
Grade Level: 7-9 
Basic Content: The student is supplied with a workbook entitled DECIDING. He engages 
in various exercises, designed to help him examine his values, think 
in terms of alternatives, consider the information necessary for good 
decision making, and become acquainted with strategies he can use in 
the process of decision making. There are exercises which enable him 
to relate values, information and strategy to decisions he must make 
in his personal life, courses at school, further education and voca­
tional choices. 
Cost: $2.50 Teacher's Guide free with every ten copies. 
Name of the Program: DECISION MAKING 
Publisher: Beacon Press, Boston, Massachusetts 
Developed by Clyde and Barbara Dodden, Copyright 1968 
Grade Level: 4-6 
Basic Content: The program consists of a teachers guide and various kinds of material 
for use by the students. The teacher's guide begins with introductory 
material on the complexity of decision making, a look at the preadol­
escent child and consideration of the discovery approach. The major 
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portion of the guide, Chapter IV is given over to the theme. "Helping 
Children Become Imaginative and Responsible Decision Makers." 
Cost: $44.00 
Name of the Program: DUSO 
(UNDERSTANDING OF HUMAN BEHAVIOR) 
Publisher: American Guidance Service, Inc. 
Publishers' Building 
Circle Pines, Minnesota 55014 
Grade Level: K-2 
Basic Content: Related to the themes above are stories presented by DUSO the dolphin 
with the aid of an illustrated text (story illustration cards), cas­
sette tapes and posters. Hand puppets are also used. A teacher's text 
presents the sequential format and includes more stories and sugges­
tions. Detailed, step-by-step directions are given. 
Cost: $89.00 
Name of the P~ogram· DRUGS, VAWES AND PERSONAL PROBLE!',f; 
Publisher: 
Grade Level: 
Basic Content :: 
Cost: $110.00 
Warren Schloat Productions, Inc. 
Pleasantville, New York 10570 Copyright 1972 
4-6, 7-8 
Six filmstrips with cassettes portray situations in the daily lives of 
young people. The filmstrips are: 
1. Lonely Boy 4. Honor Student 
2. Caught in the Middle 5. Track Star 
3. The Neighborhood 6. Growing Up Fast 
As each situation is presented the students are asked to consider two 
aspects: "How else might the character handle his problem?" and "How 
could others have helped him?" Drugs, as such are not dealt with ex­
plicitly in the filmstrips, but are suggested as possible consequences 
of personal problems, not as the problem itself. Suggestions are 
given in a teacher's manual to extend the discussion. 
Name of the Program: DYNAMIC CONSUMER DECISION-MAKING 
Publisher: Educational and Consumer Relations Department 
J.C. Penny Co., Inc. 
1301 Avenue of the Americans 
New York, New York 10019 Copyright 1972 
Grade Level: 9-12, Adult 
Basic Content: The program is bound into a looseleaf notebook that contains four 
sections: 
1. Educator's Core - ideas and learning activities that introduce a 
new way of looking at consumer decision-making. 
2. Extension - suggestions for use of included materials and activi­
ties in adult extension class or groups. 
3, Secondary School - suggestions for use of included materials and 
activities at secondary school level. 
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4. Limited Resources - supplemental materials and activities. 
Cost: $11.50 
Name of the Program: EXPLORING MORAL VAWES 
Publisher: Warren Schloat Productions, Inc. 
Pleasantville, New York 10570 Copyright 1969 
Featuring Dr. Louis Raths 
Basic O:>ntent: 14 filmstrips containing 44 open-ended situations in the areas of pre­
judice, personal values, authority and honesty. Situations covered 
include titles such as "The Crippled Girl," "The Team," "The Elec­
tion," "The Little Brother," "The Stranger", "Trespassers," "The 
Test," "The Bully", etc. 
A guide accompanies the filmstrips, containing a summary of each sit­
uation and suggested questions aoo learning strategies. 
Cost: $93.00 
Name of the Program: FIRST TI-IINGS: VAWES 
Publisher: Guidance Associates 
Pleasantville, New York 10570 
Based on the theoretical research into moral development by Lawrence 
Kohlberg 
Grade Level: K-3 
Basic Content: The program revolves around conflict situations presented through 
sound filmstrips . The situations are open ended, and deal with prob­
lems suggested by the following titles: 
1. The Trouble with Truth 
2. What do you do about rules? 
3. You Promised! 
4. But it isn't yours. 
5. That's No Fair 
There are 10 filmstrips with cassettes that present the above problems, 
plus 3 more that introduce the teacher to the program. Discussion 
Guides accompaning each set of filmstrips. 
Cost: $21.50 for a set of two filmstrips and cassettes plus a discussion guide. 
5 sets in all. 
$17.50 for the Introductory set of three filmstrips with cassettes, plus 
discussion guide. 
Name of the Program: 1HE GAME OF ETI-IICS 
Publisher: Art Fair, Inc. 
80 Fourth Street 
New York, New York Copyright 1971 
Grade Level : 9-12, Adult 
Basic Content: Includes an instruction booklet, 30 human situation cards, 12 modifier 
cards and 2 scoring pads. Players take turns briefly studying and 
making decisions relative to moral conflict situations. After a play­
er has announced his decision, the other players enter a score on his 
decision (from O - absolute disapproval to 10 - absolute approval). 
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When scores are announced the player may accept, defend his position 
or attempt to modify. · Each game is meant to go two rounds, giving 
each player a chance to test his ethics against at least two situa­
tions. 
Cost: $3.00 
Name of the Program: LAW AND ORDER: VAWES IN CRISIS 
Publisher: Warren Schloat Productions, Inc. 
Pleasantville, New York 10570 Copyright 1971 
Grade Level: 9-12 
Basic Content: Six filmstrips with records presenting: 
1. The Varieties of Human Values 
2. The Evolution of American Values 
3. Conflicts in American Values 
4. Strategies for Value Change: Nonviolent Dissent 
5. Intensified Value Conflict: Violent Dissent 
6. Peoples Park: A Case Study in Value Conflict 
A guide with the script of the filmstrips, related questions and 
suggested projects. 
Cost: $96.00 
Name of the Program: LEARNING TO DECIDE 
Publisher: Educational Research Council of America 
Rockefeller Building 
West 6th and Superior 
Cleveland, Ohio 44113 Copyright 1970 
Developed by Alexander Campbell and Ralph H. Ojemann 
Grade Level: 4-6 
Basic Content: The program consists of a teacher's guide containing the philosophy 
of the program, step by step lesson plans and a resource section re­
lated to the lesson material. There are also pupil story booklets, a 
pupil workbook and a sound filmstrip. Through many involvement activi­
ties (40 for each grade) and the use of story situations the teacher 
and students deal with objectives above. 
Cost: Grade 4 Grade 5 Grade 6 
Teacher's Book $ 4.00 $ 4.00 $ 4.50 
Pupil Material 1.10 1.10 1.10 ( consummable) 
Filmstrip & Tape 17.00 17.00 13.00 
Name of the Program: SEARCH FOR VAWES 
Publisher: ?flaum/ Standard 
Dayton, Ohio 45402 Copyright 1972 
Developed by The Center for Learning, Inc. 
Villa Maria, Pa. 
Grade Level: 9-12 
Bas ic Content: The program is divided into seven units: 
Unit I: Time 
Unit II: Competition 
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Unit III: Authority 
Unit IV: Personal Space 
Unit V: Commitment 
Unit VI: Relationships 
Unit VII: Images 
The seven units are composed of 44 lessons. For every lesson there is 
an activity sheet to be used by each individual student. Through the 
use of these activity sheets and other activities the students examine 
goals, alternatives, feelings, various values, set priorities, take 
action. 
Cost: $44.95 
Name of the Program: UNDERSTANDING HUMAN BEHAVIOR 
Publisher: Educational Research C>uncil of America 
Rockefeller Building 
West 6th and Superior 
Cleveland, Ohio 44113 Copyright 1972 
Developed by Alexander Campbell and Jean Lahr 
Grade Leve 1 : 7-8, 9-12 
Basic Content: The program consists of a student book and a teacher guide. The stu­
dent book, using illustrative material, deals with each of the objec­
tives listed above. The teacher guide includes all the material in 
the student book, and in addition, suggested learnirr;i activities for 
each of the units (each unit is related to one of the objectives). 
Cost: $1.25 Student Book 
$2.00 Teacher Guide 
Name of the Program: VAWES AND DECISION MAKING 
Publisher: Educational Research ():)uncil of America 
Rockefeller Building 
West 6th and Superior 
Cleveland, Ohio 44113 Copyright 1971 
Developed by Dan Dyer and Alexander Campbell 
Grade Levels: 7-8 
Basic Content: The program consists of a teacher guide which contains suggestions for 
involving the students in various kinds of activities related to the 
world of art. There is also a supplemental student booklet. The stu­
dent becomes involved in value exploration while engaged in the various 
art activities. 
Cost: $4.00 Teacher Guide 
$ .60 Student Booklet (consummable) 
Name of the Program: VAWES AND GOALS/HOW DO YOU DECIDE 
Publisher: Educational Research Council of America 
Rockefeller Building 
West 6th and Superior 
Cleveland, Ohio 44113 Copyright 1971 
Grade Level: 9-10 
Basic Content: The program consists of a basic student text entitled values and 
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Goals/How Do You Decide and a teacher guide. The guide contains 
various suggested activities to be usec along with the student book. 
These activities center, for the most part, about the four ways people 
use to develop their value systems: 
1. Authority 
2. Feeling 
3. Thinking it Through 
4. Observation and Testing 
Cost: · $4 .00 Teacher Guide 
$1.60 Student Book 
Name of the Game: VALUES (a game) 
Publisher: Friendship Press 
New York city Copyright 1972 
Grade Level: 4-6 (adaptable); 7-8 and 9-12 
Basic Content: The game consists of a game board and spinner. As a person lands on a 
particular place, he picks a card representing a contemporary issue, 
and speaks to that issue or answers questions concerning it. The one 
who most satisfactorily handles the various issues and is fortunate to 
get the "right" spins, is the winner. However, the accent of the game 
is not on winning, but in the dialogue on the issues presented. 
Cost: $5.95 
Name of the Program: THE VAWE GAME 
Publi her: Herder and Herder 
232 Madison Avenue 
New York, New York 10016 Copyright 1970 
Grade Level : 7-8, 9-12, Adult 
Basic Content: The program consists of two booklets, one containing directions for 
playing the value game and the other various topics for discussion, 
such as "Right or Wrong? How certain can we be?", ''When in Doubt, 
Appeal to History", "The Changing Environment", "Peer Groups", etc. 
The main focus of the program is on the value game. In this game, 
persons listen to moral conflict situations, and then determine where 
they stand on the issue. This they do literally by moving to one of 
six positions laid out on a game board on the floor. The positions 
are: absolutely right, right with some reservations, wrong with some 
reservations, absolutely wrong. The participants chart their various 
positions on issues, and discuss them with other members of the group. 
Cost: $ .95 The value game (directions booklet) 
$1.75 
Name of the Program: VAWES IN ACTION 
Publisher: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, Inc. 
383 Madison Avenue 
New York, New York 10017 Copyright 1970 
Developed by Fannie and George Shaftel 
Grade Level: 3-6 
Basic Content: The program revolves around nine different problem situations, each of 
which is open ended. All of the problems are of concern to elementary 
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school children. They are presented via filmstrips with accompanying 
records and a comprehensive Coordinator's Manual . Ten filmstrips in 
all, plus three records and a manual. 
Cost: $99.00 
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